Maria Rosaria Di Nucci

Nuclear Waste Governance

* € (D) sind gebundene Ladenpreise in Deutschland und enthalten 7% MwSt; € (A) sind gebundene Ladenpreise in Österreich und enthalten 10% MwSt. CHF und die mit ** gekennzeichneten Preise für elektronische Produkte sind unverbindliche Preisempfehlungen und enthalten die landesübliche MwSt. Programmund Preisänderungen (auch bei Irrtümern) vorbehalten. Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Lieferund Zahlungsbedingungen. Springer-Verlag GmbH, Handelsregistersitz: Berlin-Charlottenburg, HR B 91022. Geschäftsführung: Haank, Mos, Hendriks A. Brunnengräber, M. R. Di Nucci, A. M. Isidoro Losada, L. Mez, M. Schreurs (Hrsg.) Nuclear Waste Governance

Nuclear Waste Governance – ein wicked problem der Energiewende

Die Energiewende und die Transformation zu einer dekarbonisierten Wirtschaft wird unvollendet bleiben, wenn nicht zugleich ein verantwortlicher Umgang mit den Hinterlassenschaften des bisherigen Energiesystems – mit grosem Nachdruck – vorangetrieben wird. Das wiederum scheint nur moglich zu sein, wenn sich mit der Diffusion der erneuerbaren Energien gleichzeitig die Strukturen und Institutionen im Energiesektor grundsatzlich verandern. Denn die Schwierigkeiten im Umgang mit radioaktiven Stoffen, mit klimaschadlichen Emissionen, der Luftverschmutzung oder der Versauerung der Ozeane sind Symptom der Paradoxien des herrschenden Energiesystems.

The Nuclear Power Option in the Italian Energy Policy

Italy took a pioneering role in the early development of nuclear power. This source of energy should have provided the answer to the lack of domestic fossil resources. Due to the cheap oil prices, the influence of the state hydrocarbons company ENI and an influential petroleum lobby, following the nationalisation of the electricity sector in the early sixties, the nuclear option was no longer consequently pursued. Italy became heavily dependent on imported oil. Although in the period 1974–1975 an intensive nuclear power development programme was launched, the share of nuclear power remained marginal. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster and following the referendum phasing out nuclear power in 1987, the national energy policy was newly defined. Our analysis will follow the customary practice to subdivide the Italian nuclear power development into three phases: the pioneering years till the mid-1960s; the period between 1966 and 1987 and the post-Chernobyl phase. We discuss the early phase at a certain length, since it is symptomatic of the way in Italy technological and industrial matters are dealt with and well illustrates the alliance games and behaviour of still existing market players. Although disputes about the alleged advantages of nuclear power are revived with certain regularity and are justified with arguments such as climate change and dependence on imported fuel, we argue that a return to nuclear power in Italy is not foreseeable. Nonetheless, the country cannot be considered a nuclear-free area. Nuclear wastes still play a disquieting role and imported electricity is generated also by nuclear power. Moreover, another tendency has set through. Due to a large liquidity provided by the mandated divestments in the framework of the liberalisation of the electricity market, the previous monopolist ENEL is heavily investing in generating capacities, including stakes in nuclear plants abroad, especially in new EU countries.

The Technical, Political and Socio-Economic Challenges of Governing Nuclear Waste

This is the second volume examining high level radioactive waste (HLW) disposal processes around the world. Volume I examined European and North American cases (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Volume II looks at: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, Japan, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, and the Ukraine.

An Open Door for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Export

Worldwide, the majority of countries with nuclear activities have – or plan to have – national legislative, regulatory, and organisational frameworks. There is an implicit ethical principle or even a common understanding that each country should be responsible for the safe disposal of its own spent fuel elements and radioactive waste. Due to safety and proliferation concerns, however the disposal of radioactive waste should not be considered a national matter. National frameworks and policies are designed in accordance with standards and guidelines set at, and agreed to at the international level. These are laid down in international agreements and conventions.

Breaking the Stalemate

The governance of radioactive waste in Italy is burdened by the legacy of over 50 years of discontinuous nuclear research as well as by incoherent technology and industrial policies. Nuclear waste management cannot be separated from the broader political debate on nuclear power, which was and remains a highly political issue. Italy has only a very modest park of four permanently shut-down power plants. Spent fuel (SF) and radioactive waste (RW) are being temporarily stored in at least 21 sites (Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) 2013), some of which are dedicated to fuel reprocessing and manufacturing.

Comparative Perspectives on Nuclear Waste Governance

The contrasting arguments are well known: opponents of nuclear power argue that the nuclear industry should not continue to produce nuclear energy without having a deep geological disposal (DGD) repository for its radioactive high-level waste (HLW). The nuclear industry and parts of the scientific community claim that the necessary knowledge and technologies for radioactive waste management exist; they argue the main problem hindering a waste solution lies with missing societal acceptance and that the fault for this lies with politics.

Evaluation as a Cornerstone of Policies and Measures for the Energiewende

The German energy transition strategy aims at moving towards a sustainable energy supply and demand over the long term. It consists of many different activities and measures to address existing greenhouse gas mitigation potentials and to mobilize the necessary resources to reach stringent mitigation targets. It builds upon the federal government’s Energy and Climate Programme (BMU 2007) as well as its Energy Concept (BMU & BMWI 2010) and is described in detail in various official documents (BMU & BMWI 2011). The National Climate Initiative (NCI) of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMUB) represents an important element of the programmes and measures relating to the Energiewende. It aims to provide substantial support for the reduction of Germany’s GHG emissions by 40% by 2020 and by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. The NCI is geared to bring about more climate-friendly behavior among businesses, consumers and local authorities in areas with significant efficiency potentials that cannot be tapped by instruments such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (the revenues of which fund the NCI). Numerous projects have been developed by the NCI so far, with many others to follow. These projects range from energy-aware and climate-friendly behavior, the use of efficient technologies and renewable energy, to measures

The Roll-out of Smart Metering between Discording Interests and Institutional Inertia

Smart metering is alleged to be opening up a new frontier for energy supply and consumer empowerment. These are both very important elements of the German energy transition strategy. Since the second half of the 1990s, the diffusion of smart metering has become an issue that has increasingly drawn attention at both theoretical and empirical levels. A high number of countries in the European Union introduced smart meters in homes – some on a large scale – and there have been massive investments. The diffusion of smart metering is not only significant in Europe, where the EU legislation (especially the Energy Services Directive and the 3rd Energy Package) has been an important driver, but also in the USA and in countries with high electricity demand profiles in East Asia. The most recurrently cited reasons for a large-scale roll-out are that they allow frequent or even realtime reading and billing; peak load management/shifting and improve energy efficiency (ERGEG 2009; KEMA 2012; Smart Regions 2013). In Germany – where along with the UK, France and Italy there have been high investments in smart grid technology – there has been no official commitment to the deployment of smart meters. Smart grid is an element of the energy transition strategy, but a roll-out of smart metering on a large scale is not part of this strategy. In the absence of a wide-ranging national policy, smart metering has been left to market forces and has been “relegated” to pilot projects and some commercial initiatives. In July 2013, after years of inertia, the publication of the long awaited cost-benefit analysis on behalf of the Ministry for Economy (Ernst & Young 2013) put smart metering again in focus, albeit in the middle of the

Wettlauf der Systeme

Die olympische Disziplin des Hurdenlaufs kann aus ganz verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet werden. Beim Zuschauen sind Schnelligkeit, Leichtfusigkeit und Eleganz zu bewundern. Beim Sprint wird Kraft gefordert. Es werden hohe technische und koordinative Anforderungen gestellt. An der Ziellinie wird die Zeit genommen, die fur die zuruckgelegte Strecke benotigt wurde. Nicht grundlos wird der Hurdenlauf als die anspruchsvollste Disziplin in der Leichtathletik angesehen.