Martin Rudner

Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand

Intelligence Studies as an academic discipline was slow to develop in universities. Perhaps the cause was the secrecy attaching to intelligence matters, or the reluctance of academe to engage with clandestine services, or the fear of being subverted by covert organizations, but universities in most countries seemed disinclined to embark on teaching or research programs relating to the Intelligence domain. A few universities, most notably in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Israel, offered individual courses on intelligence Studies topics during the Cold War era, though mainly in the field of intelligence history. But most academic programs in international relations, political science, history, and even conflict studies eschewed any reference to intelligence topics. As late as the 1990s, a then-forward-looking report commissioned by the leading Association of Professional Scholar of International Affairs gave scant attention to Security Studies, while neglecting Intelligence Studies entirely. In the words of British scholar Christopher Andrew, it was the ‘‘missing dimension’’ of international studies. Yet, since that time, Intelligence and Security Studies have taken on a new life in academe. Even as student

Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States catapulted the intelligence services to the forefront of the ‘‘war’’ against international Islamicist terrorism. In responding to that threat, most governments in other vulnerable regions of the world expanded their intelligence services, provided them with substantially increased resources, equipped them with significantly augmented statutory powers, and vested them with high expectations. Yet, by way of contrast with conventional interstate conflict situations, where adversaries are clearly identified and the function of intelligence is to collect actionable information as to the intentions and capabilities of rival powers, intelligence services faced extraordinary challenges in confronting this international Islamicist menace. Precisely because of the global and furtive character of Islamicist militant networks, intelligence for the war against terrorism has had to address threats of unprecedented geographic scope emanating from a multiplicity of obscure and furtive belligerents. In dealing with the international terrorist menace, intelligence has been transformed into a hunter as well as a gatherer: it must seek out and identify hostile terrorist networks, cells, and individuals; garner information about hostile intentions and capabilities; disrupt their

Apec: The Challenges of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

International trade figures prominently in the economic growth strategies of East and Southeast Asian countries. Despite the economic recession experienced across much of the world since the early 1990s, the pace of economic growth was sustained virtually unabated in the countries of East and Southeast Asia.During the entire decade of the 1980s the East and Southeast Asian economies grew more than twice as rapidly as the rest of the world economy. Along with this growth performance, international trade in the East and Southeast Asian region increased at about twice the rate of Europe and North America. Merchandise exports in East and Southeast Asia increased at an annual average rate of 10% per annum between 1965 and 1989. In 1990 and 1991 aggregate merchandise exports from Asias Newly Industrializing Economies (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong) grew by 9.0% and 11.4%, while the four ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) developing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) recorded average increases of 12.9% and 14.3%, respectively.Expanding merchandise exports were accompanied by surging capital inflows and rising investment rates, culminating in accelerated growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) along with a significant reduction in the incidence of poverty.

Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering

Hizbullah, which has been designated a terrorist entity in several international jurisdictions, depends upon a substantial mobilization of financial resources to support its complex, multi-faceted organizational apparatus, its domestic activities in Lebanon, and its far-reaching transnational operations. This study surveys Hizbullahs resourcing requirements, and examines the role of military assistance from Iran and Syria along with Hizbullahs own reliance on front organizations, clandestine networks, business enterprises, propaganda media, and local exactions to generate funding for operational activities. Particular attention is directed at the diversion of charitable contributions, the exploitation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), involvement in criminal activities and contraband trade, and the money laundering mechanisms utilized to transfer funds to where they are required. It also reviews efforts by international authorities to staunch the flow of financial resources to terror groups, activities and operations, including their effect on Hizbullah terrorism finance.

Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge

Cyber attacks directed at Critical National Infrastructure constitute a significant, diverse, and rapidly escalating risk-element in the global threat environment. Critical infrastructures are susceptible to cyber attacks precisely because of their high inherent value and intrinsic vulnerabilities, coupled with a significant potential to inflict widespread harm on targeted countries. Threats to the cyber-security of critical infrastructures emanate from a wide spectrum of prospective perpetrators: state-sponsored espionage and sabotage, international terrorism, domestic militants, malevolent ‘‘hacktivists,’’ or even disaffected insiders. Thus, British intelligence sources indicate that the United Kingdom is being bombarded by thousands of cyber attacks daily, perpetrated by hackers and state-sponsored organizations targeting government and business so as to steal secrets or disable networked computerized systems. While criminal elements can also pose a threat to cyber-security, they tend to be motivated by material or financial benefit, whereas the focus here is

Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile

Founded in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, Hizbullah (Arabic for ‘‘Party of God’’) is a radical Shi’a political and terrorist organization. Inspired and supported by Iran, it is committed to the removal through violence of all non-Islamic influences in the Middle East and to the destruction of the State of Israel. Hizbullah shares its political and religious ideology with Iran and the doctrines of the late ayatollahs Baqir as Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, who held that a religious jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) should hold supreme authority over the Shi’a community. Hizbullah looks to Iran’s Supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and to Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the leading Lebanese Shi’a religious authority, for political and policy guidance in advancing the Islamic revolution in Lebanon. As well, in recent years Hizbullah has transformed its relationship with Syria into that of an intimate strategic partnership. Reflecting the world outlook of this revolutionary Shi’a leadership, Hizbullah has promulgated a political– cultural identity around religion as the mainspring for an unremitting revolutionary struggle against perceived enemies of Islam.

“Electronic Jihad”: The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror

ABSTRACT The Internet has emerged as a key technology for Al Qaeda and other jihadist movements waging their so-called electronic jihad across the Middle East and globally, with digital multiplier effects. This study will examine the evolving doctrine of “electronic jihad” and its impact on the radicalization of Muslims in Western diaspora communities The study describes Internet-based websites that served as online libraries and repositories for jihadist literature, as platforms for extremist preachers and as forums for radical discourse. Furthermore, the study will then detail how Internet connectivity has come to play a more direct operational role for jihadi terrorist-related purposes, most notably for inciting prospective cadres to action; for recruiting jihadist operatives and fighters; for providing virtual training in tactical methods and manufacture of explosives; for terrorism financing; and for actual planning and preparations for specific terror attacks. Whereas contemporary jihadist militants may be shifting from the World Wide Web to social media, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter for messaging and communications, nevertheless the Internet-based electronic jihad remains a significant catalyst for promoting jihadist activism and for facilitating terrorist operations.

Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism

Islamic terrorism, prompted by a militant spirit of Jihad, or religious struggle, differs from other, previous manifestations of terrorism by dint of its global purview, networking, and operational reach. In its own terms, and in terms of its violent strategy and lethal tactics, Jihadist terrorism represents an asymmetric mode of warfare. Like all forms of warfare, the asymmetric warfare waged by militant Jihadist organizations requires substantial financial wherewithal. This mobilization of resources relates to the issue of financing terrorism. Four core elements of terrorism finance are evident in the contemporary international domain: (a) the evolving Islamicist terror threat; (b) the pattern of terrorist activities and operations and their financing requirements; (c) terrorist economic management and the supply of funding to meet operational demands; and (d) counterterrorist institutional responses and interventions by governments and international organizations to staunch the flow of financial resources to terror groups, activities, and operations. Although no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, all the various official definitions internationally current seem to address similar defining characteristics. These tend to specify premeditated acts of violence perpetrated for

Canada's Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization

and costliest intelligence organization and the main provider of foreign intelligence to the Canadian government. It is, arguably, also the most secretive component of the Government of Canada. For decades the very existence of CSE was unconfirmed, it has no statutory mandate, and virtually all details of its resources, objectives and operations are still shrouded in official secrecy. What is known is that CSE collects, analyses and reports on signals intelligence (referred to as Sigint) derived from interceptions of foreign electronic communications, radio, radar, telemetry, and other electromagnetic emissions. In fulfilment of these foreign intelligence functions, CSE participates in international collaboration and exchanges as part of a special Sigint sharing arrangement with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. CSE is also responsible for providing technical advice and guidance for protecting Canadian government communications and electronic data security. CSE is a civilian agency of Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND). Ministerial responsibility for CSE is vested in the Minister of National Defence, however in a unique bifurcation of executive authority, administrative and operational controls are divided between DND and the Privy Council Office (PCO), the federal government’s central agency, headed by the Prime Minister. Administrative and financial matters are under the control of DND, through the Deputy Minister of National Defence, its most senior official, whereas policy and operational controls over CSE are exercised by the Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence in PCO. At the policy level, the direction and co-ordination of Canada’s intelligence effort involves a complex web of PCO secretariats and inter-departmental committees. 4

Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and counter-terrorism

Canadas Communications Security Establishment has undergone a far-reaching transformation in conjunction with the expanded role of Signals Intelligence in the global ‘war on terror’. For the first time, Canada adopted a formal statute for CSE, including an expanded remit for countering terrorism. With a shift in targeting priorities towards terrorism and threats to Canadian interests abroad, Canadas participation in SIGINT-related international partnerships takes on new significance. The collection of communication intelligence touches upon public sensibilities regarding privacy rights of Canadians. The evolution of Canadian SIGINT capabilities was therefore accompanied by the establishment, as early as 1996, of a system for intelligence accountability and review, the Office of the CSE Commissioner. Recent advances in communications technology and pressing requirements for Signals Intelligence have impelled changes in the law, while also accentuating the role played by the CSE Commissioner in scrutinizing CSE activities to ensure compliance with ministerial authorizations and the laws of Canada.