Michael Baurmann

Solidarity as a Social Norm and as a Constitutional Norm

I will use the term “solidarity” in a broad sense. By acting in solidarity I mean the voluntary transfer of goods or services to another individual or to a group of individuals whenever this transfer is not the object of an explicit contract. A transfer of this kind is unconditional in the sense that it is not contingent on the enforceable duty of the beneficiary to provide a specified equivalent for the gains he or she obtains. Acting in solidarity with a single individual means to contribute voluntarily and unconditionally to an individual good. Acting in solidarity with a group of individuals means to contribute voluntarily and unconditionally to a public good.1 If we analyze the empirical conditions which promote or impede solidarity in the sense of voluntarily and unconditionally contributing to individual or public goods we can identify three main empirical constellations. Let us begin with the constellations in regard to solidarity in favor of public goods.

Legal Authority as a Social Fact

From a sociological point of view, theconceptual and logical relations between the norms oflegal order represent empirical and causal relationsbetween social actors. The claim that legal authorityis based on the validity of empowering norms means,sociologically, that the capability to enact andenforce legal norms is based on an empirical transferof power from one social actor to another. With thisprocess, sociology has to explain how a proclamationof legal rights by the creation of empowering normscan lead to the establishment of the factual power ofcoercion. This explanation reveals that legalauthority as a social fact is irrevocably dependent onnon-legal power, which is not created by legalempowering norms but is the empirical foundation forall legal authority and state power.

Liberal Society and Planned Morality

Is there a case for applied ethics in regard to morality itself? That is not only in regard to the question of what claims morality has in respect to certain problems but also in regard to the question of how the effectiveness of morality can be guaranteed and whether, from a moral point of view, there is a need to take special steps to protect and reinforce moral conduct. Nowadays there is an increasing trend to answer this question positively and, moreover, to diagnose an urgent need for sweeping measures. But, as the history of social philosophy shows, this question was not always at the top of the agenda.

Rechte und Normen als soziale Tatsachen

Abstract The concept of right plays a central role in Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory. It is defined as an empirical concept which refers to rights as social facts. One consequence of this view is according to Coleman that the normative-ethical question of how rights ought to be distributed can have no answer. The following article wants to show that this thesis is not convincing. The main focus of the article is a critical analysis of Colemans theory of the relationship between rights and norms. It is argued that Coleman’s ‘right-based’ approach to define the concept of norm-existence with the concept of right is not tenable. On the contrary only a ‘norm-based’ approach is adequate which bases the concept of right on the concept of norm. Some explanatory consequences of this alternative view are discussed and it is shown that on this ground Colemans attack on normative ethics can be rejected.

Zum Programm einer kritischen Sozialwissenschaft - Empirie und Theorie

Abstract The article argues for a synthesis between analytical philosophy and social sciences as relevant and necessary. The motivation and framework of such a synthesis is outlined on the basis of a critical social science. The authors illuminate such a perspective negatively in a critique of empirical and theoretical sociology, then positively in a clarification of the critical standpoint. Four theses, two under each-aspect, are defended: 1. Concerning empirical social sciences Neither the quantitative nor the qualitative paradigm of empirical social science is able to put forward adequate methods for social research. Instead, the development of reconstructive methods is proposed to combine the advantages and eliminate the disadvantages of the quantitative and qualitative paradigms. 2. Concerning theoretical sociology Macrosociological theories tend to resist empirical corrobation. Pure theoretical and philosophical justification abounds instead. In this situation the tools of analytic theory of science are proposed in order to clarify the necessary steps towards a further development of theories, which can be empirically tested. 3. Concerning the critique of society A critical social science must incorporate a theory of a just society in order to analyse social institutions in a normative way. In this context an ethical realist approach is offered which tries to fulfill two conditions for sociologically relevant normative reasonings: satisfaction of individual interests and the rational consensus of all persons concerned. 4. Concerning critique of ideology The tools of analytic philosophy can be given new application by combining them with an analysis of interests under the title of critique of ideology.

Meinungsdynamiken in fundamentalistischen Gruppen. Erklärungshypothesen auf der Basis von Simulationsmodellen

Abstract If we want to understand how fundamentalist group ideologies are established, we have to comprehend the social processes which form the basis of the emergence and distribution of such beliefs. In our paper we present an innovative approach to examining these processes and explaining how they function: with the method of computer-based simulation of opinion formation we develop heuristic explanatory models which help to generate new and interesting hypotheses. The focus is thereby not on individuals and their idiosyncrasies but on the dynamic mutual adaptation of beliefs in a group. These dynamics can produce an incremental establishment of ‘charismatic’ opinion leaders and an increasing radicalization and alienation. A prototype of such a simulation model has produced promising first results which are presented and discussed.

The Golden Age of the Campfire: Should We Take Our Ancestors Seriously?

Abstract In his book The Ethical Project Philip Kitcher presents an ‘analytical history’ of the development of human ethical practice. According to this history the first ethical norms were launched in the ancient world of the hunters and gatherers and their initial function was to remedy altruism failures. Kitcher wants to show that the emergence of ethical norms can in this case and in general be explained without referring to supernatural causes or philosophical revelation. Furthermore, he claims that the first manifestation of the ethical project still serves as an ideal. In my comment I will contest the plausibility of Kitcher’s analytical history and question whether the presumed characteristics of ethics in prehistoric times could still be binding for us today.

Zum Programm einer kritischen Sozialwissenschaft – Theorie der gerechten Gesellschaft und Ideologiekritik

Abstract Critical social science has to acknowledge that every fundamental critique of society implies the justification of alternative norms and institutions. Several current objections against such an explicitly normative understanding of critical social science are discussed. The following outline of a theory of a just society tries to meet two demands: the rational consensus of all individuals concerned and the satisfaction of individual interests. In societies characterized by class struggles, however, these two aims turn out to be incompatible. Therefore an ethical realist approach is offered which takes into account the clarification and normative reinterpretation of interests. The tools of analytic philosophy can be given new application in combination with an analysis of interests under the title of a critique of ideology.

“Führer befiehl, wir folgen dir!” Charismatic Leaders in Extremist Groups

If we want to understand how extremist group ideologies are established, we have to comprehend the social processes which form the basis of the emergence and distribution of such beliefs. In our chapter, we present an innovative approach to examining these processes and explaining how they function: with the method of computer-based simulation of opinion formation, we develop heuristic explanatory models which help to generate new and interesting hypotheses. The focus is thereby not on individuals and their idiosyncrasies but on the dynamic mutual adaptation of beliefs in a group. These dynamics can produce an incremental establishment of “charismatic” opinion leaders and an increasing radicalization and alienation. A prototype of such a simulation model has produced promising first results which are presented and discussed.

A Sociological Speculation about Law and Ethics

Abstract It is argued that ethics is undergoing a similar development in modern societies as law did in former times. If this development continues, it could be that in the future collective decisions in many areas will be justified by the application of ethical principles just as today judicial decisions are justified by the application of the rules of law. The paper describes some of the remarkable similarities between law and ethics in modern societies and considers possible causes of this development.