Michael L. Peterson

God and evil: Problems of consistency and gratuity

Through the centuries few themes have bewitched mans intellectual endeavor more than the problem of evil. Theologians and philosophers still ponder its effects on the credibility of the Christian faith. Evaluating the problem is difficult, since it involves a complex interplay of moral values, ontological commitments, logical principles, and religious loyalties. To understand better the problem of evil many philosophers have analyzed in detail its internal structure. These analyses frequently differ and are not always helpful. In this article, I survey the recent literature on the topic and note ways in which the problem has been conceived. Then I analyze and evaluate two important conceptionsthe problems of consistency and gra tu i tywhich are keys to understanding the traditional and current scholarship on God and evil. Last, I offer several observations on the subject. Some philosophers have thought that the problem of evil is not just one particular argument, but a cluster of arguments, each relating to a certain area of concern and having an identifiable structure. Of course, the precise rendition of the argument which one countenances determines the direction of his analysis. A brief survey of the different ways in which philosophers have distinguished formulations of the problem would be helpful. H. D. Aiken divides the problem of evil into the logical and the existential problems. The former pertains to the relations of key ideas contained in two essential theistic claims: