Monika Bütler

Neoclassical life-cycle consumption : A textbook example

Summary. We present a simple neoclassical life-cycle model in continuous time, in which the effects of endogenous labor supply, uncertain lifetime, and family composition on consumption and income profiles are jointly analyzed. Due to a parsimonious specification, analytical solutions for consumption growth are available for constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution preferences. Without relying on borrowing constraints, the model can generate a hump in the consumption profile, and a comovement of consumption and income during working life.

The political feasibility of pension reform options. The case of Switzerland

This paper investigates the political feasibility of different hypothetical reform options of an unsustainable pay-as-you-go public pension system. In calibrating the model to the Swiss economy, we find that low internal rates of return and high distortions can reduce political support for an increase in earmarked taxes, up to a point where a reduction in the size of the social security program receives a majority of votes. Our simulations show that the consideration of non-social security taxes is crucial in welfare analysis. This is especially true for countries in which the public pension system is explicitly or implicitly subsidized.

How Much Do Means-Tested Benefits Reduce the Demand for Annuities?

We analyze the effect of means-tested benefits on annuitization decisions. Most industrialized countries provide a subsistence level consumption floor in old age, usually in the form of means-tested benefits. The availability of such means-tested payments creates an incentive to cash out (occupational) pension wealth for low and middle income earners, instead of taking the annuity. Agents trade-off the advantages from annuitization, receiving the wealth-enhancing mortality credit, to the disadvantages, giving up “free” wealth in the form of means-tested supplemental benefits. We find that the availability of means-tested benefits can reduce the desired annuitization levels substantially. Using individual level data, we show that the model’s predicted annuitization rates as a function of the level of pension wealth are roughly consistent with the cash-out patterns of occupational pension wealth observed in Switzerland.

Payouts in Switzerland: Explaining Developments in Annuitization

Switzerland is one of the few countries with long-term experience on the payout decisions made by retirees in fully-funded pension plans. Switzerland is also atypical in its unusually high annuitization rates: A majority of retirees covered by mandatory occupational pension plans choose an annuity. This paper will shed light on this extraordinary aspect. It revisits the historical role of occupational pension plans in the provision of old age income, and examines the role of regulation in the payout phase of the scheme. Recent developments in both market conditions and regulations are used to assess the impact of certain determinants of the annuitization decision, such as money’s worth ratios (MWR), means-tested benefits and behavioral factors.

The Political Feasibility of Increasing the Retirement Age: Lessons from a Ballot on the Female Retirement Age

In 1998, the Swiss voters approved of an increase in the female retirement age within the public pension system from 62 to 64. The referendum, being on a single issue only, offers a unique opportunity to explore the political feasibility of pension reforms and to apply theoretical models of life-cycle decision making. Estimates carried out with municipality data suggest that the outcome of the vote conforms well with predictions drawn from a theoretical model. Young agents, elderly and—to a lesser extent—middle-aged men favor an increase in female retirement age, while middle-aged women strongly oppose it. Richer communities and those with a high proportion of self-employed or a low fraction of blue-collar workers are more likely to opt for a higher retirement age. Ideological preferences and regional differences also play a considerable role.

Anticipation effects of looming public-pension reforms

Abstract In many countries, current unfunded public pension systems are unsustainable. Though agents recognize that fiscal imbalances will be eliminated sooner or later, the timing of reforms and future policy mixes are typically unknown. The paper proposes a tractable framework to study forthcoming but ill-specified events, such as a crisis in the pension system, within a macroeconomic model based on individual life-cycle optimization. The uncertainty about the timing of a future stabilization is modeled by a subjective hazard function where the state-dependent hazard rate depends on a measure of the public-pension systems expected net liabilities. Using Switzerland as a motivating example, the model is calibrated and simulated under a number of alternative policy options and different perception patterns. Expectations prior to a reform are shown to have large impacts on aggregate variables and on cross-generations profiles of consumption and labor supply. In comparison to well-specified pre-announced stabilization policies, timing uncertainty and misperceptions can lead to welfare losses, in particular for the middle-aged and the elderly.

Annuities in Switzerland

Switzerlands pension system has attracted considerable attention, mainly due to its reliance on a three-pillar structure. A relatively small pay-as-you-go system (first pillar) is complemented by a mandatory, employer-based, fully funded occupational pension scheme (second pillar). The main goal of this paper is to provide a detailed description and analysis of the Swiss pension system. Particular emphasis is placed on the second pillar and its role in the provision of old age benefits within the Swiss social security system. The paper shows, for example, that a typical individual with an uninterrupted career can expect a net (after-tax) replacement rate of at least 70 percent. Occupational pension plans are highly regulated. Minimum interest rate requirements and minimum conversion rates (at which the accumulated retirement balances are transformed into annuity streams) introduce many elements of defined benefit plans into notionally defined contribution schemes. The resulting moneys worth ratios are very high (with the exception of single males). Switzerland also has a high annuitization rate by international standards (approximately 80 percent). However, due to high fragmentation of the scheme and non-uniform accounting practices, some aspects of the system are not very transparent. The paper sheds light on the financial health of the pension system and the evolution of the regulatory framework in the past two decades.

How Much Does Annuity Demand React to a Large Price Change

In this paper, we present new evidence for the effect of changes in annuity prices on the decision to annuitize. We exploit an unprecedented change in policy in several Swiss occupational pension plans. There is an implied 8 percent reduction in the rate at which retirement capital is translated into an annuity, and this represents a net present value loss of CHF 18,500 (around US

Die Auswirkungen bedarfsabhängiger Leistungen : Ergänzungsleistungen in der Schweiz

20,000). To estimate the impact of this change, we use data from companies that changed their prices and from one large company that did not. We find that the price change reduces the propensity to annuitize among affected individuals by 16.8 percentage points.

Economists: moral realists or real moralists? Comment on Fourcade and Brunetti

Abstract As in many other countries, means tested benefits constitute an important part of the Swiss old age security system and disability insurance. In contrast to universal benefits, such targeted transfers are intended to only support the ones in need and thereby lead to low level of public expenses. However, individuals face strong incentives at various stages in life to adapt their behavior in order to become eligible. Using the Swiss Erg¨anzungsleistungen as an example, we argue that means tested benefits increase the incentive to apply for disability benefits, raise the attractiveness of early retirement, and induce individuals to favor a lump sum payment over an annuity. Moreover, they decrease the incentive to purchase private long-term care insurance.