Øyvind Østerud

Introduction: The peculiarities of Norway

Abstract The Norwegian tradition in comparative political research, from Stein Rokkan onwards, has impressed a profiled picture of national peculiarities on the international scholarly community – the corporatist mode of government, the strength of the rural districts and the periphery, the egalitarianism and the deep structure of social democratic norms across the political spectrum. The established picture is now increasingly an outdated stereotype, and we explain here why and how Norwegian governance is being rapidly transformed. Still, traditional features have an impact on the direction and pace of transformation. Neo-liberal reforms are of a peculiar type in Norway, and globalisation and Europeanisation do not wipe out all prior characteristics. Even if the Nordic model of politics fades in the rear-view mirror, there are lessons to be learnt also elsewhere, on the conditions of statehood and representative government. On the basis of the recent Norwegian Power and Democracy Study (1998 – 2003), new analyses are presented in order to generalise the Norwegian case within a comparative and international framework.

The eroding of representative democracy in Norway

Abstract The Norwegian Power and Democracy Study concluded that representative government is eroding. Popular participation has moved from long-term organizations and political parties to short-term action groups and associations with immediate concerns. Public sector reforms seem to weaken municipal autonomy and strengthen central control in emphasizing greater efficiency and better quality of municipal service provision. The judicialization of politics has strengthened the legal system and weakened the autonomy of local democracy, while the expansion of market forces further affects the span of parliamentary rule. Mass media have become politically more independent, while they adapt more closely to economic forces and the quest for return of investments. There has, accordingly, been centralization of economic power through mergers and acquisitions following the globalization of the Norwegian economy, while corporatism is partly weakened and partly restructured. The so-called Scandinavian (or Nordic) model is increasingly strained, putting pressure on the Norwegian social contract that has been characterized by high levels of institutional centralization balanced by a high level of citizen control.

Regional Great Powers

The category of states called ‘regional great powers’ is one which we feel, intuitively, must be affected by strategic postures and power relationships at the global level. It has often been argued that the really Great Powers may fortify regional alliance partners by relative retrenchment, or that superpower accomodation generally might increase the scope for regional assertiveness. On the other hand is the equally conventional view that powers at the local level reflect regional configurations relatively isolated from external control; the ‘region’ is a microcosm of the states system. For a variety of reasons, these are some of the murkier waters of international commentary. One may even ask whether ‘regional great power’ is a fruitful category at all, and if there is some sort of general role for states of this elusive standing.

The narrow gate: entry to the club of sovereign states

Territorial secession and dissolution of empire means a challenge to the established system of states. How are the criteria for recognition of new states worked out? How is the gatekeeping to statehood performed? We shall sort out the answers by putting the new post-Cold War challenge into historical perspective. It is not only a question of changing criteria of entry to the system of states, but also one of a change in the state system whereby the quest for ‘criteria of admission’ became meaningful. The question of ‘gatekeeping’ is therefore intrinsically linked up with the modern evolution of the state system as such. The article is structured in a way that will specify this linkage historically.

Between Realism and ‘Crusader Diplomacy’: The Norwegian Channel to Jericho

Norway figured on the international scene with two high-profile images during 1993–94. One was connected with the protest against commercial whaling, with the ‘No way, Norway’ banners outside many embassies around the world. In this representation, Norway was widely depicted as the autonomous brute who ignored world opinion in general and the voice of environmental activists in Sea Shepherd and Greenpeace in particular. The other image concerned the revelation of a secret Norwegian channel to an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), with Norwegian diplomacy on a remarkable peace crusade. In this representation, Norway appeared to be, truly, the country of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Towards a more peaceful world? A critical view

Contemporary scholars do not agree on whether there is a declining prospect of war and armed conflict. A substantial number of authors of quantitative studies have concluded that the current worldwide trend is towards peace. I argue that this conclusion builds on insufficient evidence and possibly on misleading categorisations. The complacent view on the contemporary international system is based on inadequate awareness of the changing patterns of violence. The so-called new wars are not played out on the traditional battlefield. Valid conclusions about present trends would require a reconsideration of definitions, empirical evidence, and coding rules. Moreover, the current wave of democratisation and the increasing number of international interventions probably do not make the world more peaceful. Therefore, the conclusions in some of the most extensive recent analyses of war and peace, that the world is becoming more peaceful, are flawed.

Global conflict trends: A rejoinder

The core of my article “Towards a more peaceful world? A critical view” (CSD 8 (2), June 2008), was that the picture of a declining trend in violent conflict is based on insufficient and partly misleading evidence. I argued for a critical examination of the indicators employed in many quantitative studies, and for a mixing of methods to capture the historical dynamics of deadly violence. I also claimed that the predictive value from shortterm trends—if they could be substantiated—is limited because the explanations evoked to predict a more peaceful world order are inadequate. Sollenberg and Wallensteen, in their reply, seem too eager to defend their data programme. They partly distort my arguments and partly repeat the flaws that were the subject of my criticism. Contrary to my own assertion, they claim that I am alone in my critical remarks: “There is undisputed evidence that the number of ongoing armed conflicts as well as deaths from armed conflict globally are on the decrease”. In fact, I indicate rather squarely that the dominant picture emerging from quantitative analyses is that the world is becoming more peaceful. When I say that this is not universally endorsed, I refer to an article based on the Correlates of War data (which has met sensible objections), and

War Termination in the Western Sahara

2. The Intricacies of Decolonization During the late 1800s and early part of this century, Spain gradually expanded its occupation of the Western Sahara, with a formally defined borderline towards French possessions in the region from 1912. In the late 1950s the colony was declared an incorporated province of metropolitan Spain, partly as an answer to Moroccan anticolonial resistance, while Spain gave up its protectorate north of the area, in southern Morocco.

Strategic Ability in Europe: The Case of France

In 2003 France was outside the command structure of NATO and a leading opponent of allied intervention in Iraq. A few years later, France had fully returned to NATO and become a strong supporter of Western interventions abroad. How did this re-orientation come about?

Vor einer neuen maktutredning

In 1997 the Norwegian storting decided to put up a so called Power-Commission (maktutredning = MU), and in the spring of 1998 appointed a group of five senior researchers, headed by Øyvind Østerud, for this task. In this introductory discussion Østerud is trying to pin down the central issues for the new commission. His point of departure is the previous MU (1972–1982), which was a milestone in Scandinavia and had a tremendous impact not only on Scandinavian policy making and public debate, but also on Scandinavian social research. Unlike its predecessor, the new MU will not be organized as a couple of closekill research programs, but rather act as the prime mover in a loosely coupled network of scholars from different disciplines. Furthermore the new one must be characterized by theoretical and methodological pluralism. The rationale behind this strategy is not least the fact that present-day Norway is a totally different society from what it was in the 1970s. The homogenous, self-assured, Scandinavian social democratic nation-state simply does not exist anymore. Instead, Norway has become a “normal” Northern European country trying to find its place and way in a new world of globalization, European integration, and denationalization.