Patricia A. Hurley

The Decline of Party in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968

In this paper the decline of party voting in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1887 to 1968 is analyzed. The levels of party voting (by Congress) are fitted to a regression line, with the results showing a high period of party voting (1890-1910), an intermediate period (1911-1940), and a low period (1941-1968). A model is developed to measure the effects on party voting of external variables-party homogeneity, party conflict, presidential partisanship, and turnover; and internal variables-centralized leadership and caucus strength. Both types of variables are shown to have some effect, but external-and particularly electoral-variables are more important. Since these variables are culled from contemporary research, the results demonstrate that contemporary hypotheses and findings regarding legislative parties are generalizable over time.

Dyadic representation reappraised.

Recent research on representational linkages between legislators and their constituents challenges the long-standing assumption that constituency preferences are exogenous to the linkage process but does not clearly suggest the conditions under which a specific pattern of linkage should exist. Drawing on a diverse collection of prior research the authors argue that issues that function as main lines of cleavage between competing political parties should be characterized by reciprocal linkages between mass and elite preferences while highly complex issues on which party distinctions are unclear should be characterized by no linkages between mass and elite. For salient issues on which the public fails to distinguish party positions the authors expect the traditional one-way linkage from mass to elite. The authors test their theoretical expectations with a unique version of the data from the 1958 American Representation Study--and with explicit predictions for which policy issues addressed in that study should demonstrate which particular pattern of mass-elite linkage. The empirical results derived from LISREL analyses for three policy areas are entirely in accord with the authors predictions. (authors)

Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages

We offer a theory of the direction and nature of representational linkages between constituents and their elected representatives based on two attributes of issues: their complexity and their relationship to the lines of partisan cleavage. We show that the theory is compatible with the existing evidence on representation and then offer results of tests of new predictions from the theory for both simple and complex party-defining issues. For additional evidence of the dyadic basis of these findings, we also show that the strength of the observed linkages varies in accordance with theoretical expectations about the seniority of members of Congress and, for senators, recency of election. We also explain how the theory can account for a number of seemingly contradictory empirical findings in the large literature on policy representation and how it allows scholars to make precise predictions about the characteristics of representational linkages.

The Representation of Criminal Events in Houston's Two Daily Newspapers.

. . .all that news--pen can do is to establish some standard operating procedures for sampling what is happening. Whatever procedures they adopt will bias the selection of information. Leon Sigal. Reporters and wficials, p. 187. If the victim is well known or if he is injured, the story is worth more than if he is not; the more the property is worth, the more important the crime is as news; and an unusual twist makes for a better story. Charles Brown. Informing the People, p. 237-238.

Symbolic Speeches in the U.S. Senate and Their Representational Implications

We document multiple forms of symbolic behavior by members of the U.S. Senate and then offer systematic tests intended to account for variations in such behavior. Our measures of symbolic behavior are developed from floor speeches in the Senate, and we demonstrate, first, that the major types of speeches match particular home style activities and other commonly recognized behaviors of legislators. Our empirical tests provide evidence that the frequency with which senators give particular kinds of speeches is predictable by theoretically grounded expectations about their representational, positional, and strategic interests. Our results provide support for the prospect of systematic analysis of symbolic behavior and representation and for developing integrated theory that takes account of symbolic and policy representation simultaneously.

Collective Representation Reappraised

This paper presents a critique and an extension of Weissbergs theory of collective representation. The present paper redefines collective representation as the extent to which policy outputs reflect nation-wide public preferences. Data on public preferences collected by the SRC/CPS election surveys in 1978 are supplemented with roll-call data from the 95th Congress to demonstrate that assessments of the extent of collective representation vary considerably depending on the conceptual defiition of representation. If one uses Weissbergs definition of representation as having ones point of view articulated in the legislature, collective representation looks much better than dyadic. When defined as collective satisfaction with the outcome, however, collective representation enjoys the advantage over dyadic on only two House votes out of seven.

Partisan Voting Patterns in the U. S. Senate, 1877-1986

In this paper we describe patterns of party voting, party cohesion and party strength in the U.S. Senate from 1877 through 1986, and replicate, for the Senate, earlier explanatory models developed for the House of Representatives. We then refine and extend these models to correct for autocorrelation and measurement problems in the replicated analysis. The new analysis demonstrates that cohesion and strength for the two parties in the Senate are driven by different forces. For Democrats, cohesion and strength have been a function of the size of the Southern Democratic contingent. For Republicans, cohesion and strength are a product of membership turnover and presidential partisanship. Finally, we note the close correspondence between the overall patterns of party voting in the Senate and the House and discuss potential causes and implications of this relationship.

Partisan Representation and the Failure of Realignment in the 1980s

This paper advances the concept of partisan representation and suggests that such representation plays a role in the process of realignment. Partisan representation focuses attention on how well the parties in Congress, as groups, represent their rank-and-file identifiers, as groups. Improved partisan representation within the advantaged party, as well as increased congruence between independents and the advantaged party should be important factors in transforming short-term electoral change into durable new patterns of partisan preference and voting behavior. Failure to represent well both existing identifiers and independents should inhibit the process of realignment. Since the public opinion data necessary to test this hypothesis are unavailable for any period of realignment, the hypothesis is tested by examining the failed realignment of the 1980s with the expectation that the relationship of Republican House voting patterns to the issue preferences of Republicans and independents in the mass public should not improve between 1980 and 1984. A comparison of public opinion with House roll call voting in the 97th and 98th Congresses supports the null hypothesis, as expected.

Measuring Legislative Potential for Policy Change

Major changes in the policy posture of the Congress are rare political events. In this century, only Wilsons first Congress (63rd), Roosevelts first three Congresses (73rd, 74th, and 75th) and Johnsons 89th Congress clearly stand out as innovative (Ripley, 1969; Burns, 1956; Sundquist, 1968). Given the rarity of such events, it is not surprising that political scientists have not systematically examined the conditions which facilitate or are associated with innovative Congresses.1 In this paper we seek to partially fill this vacuum by devising a measure which taps the conditions necessary for major shifts in the policy posture of the U. S. House of Representatives. We then turn to the question of which variables are related to or can be said to account for the conditions necessary for major policy innovations, One of the major functions of the House of Representatives in the policy process is legitimation or adoption of policies (Anderson, 1975). Ultimately, legitimating policies requires that a supportive majority be formed for the specific policy. Building majorities in the U. S. House of Representatives is a more complex process than it is in most parliamentary bodies because the American congressional parties are not as unified as others; thus majority building is contingent upon the size of the majority party as well as its cohesiveness. In addition, given the shifting nature of majority coalitions in the House, the minority partys size and cohesiveness can also affect the ability of the majority party to legislate. Any measure

Partisan Representation, Realignment, and the Senate in the 1980s

The 1980 election was heralded by a number of observers as the beginning of one of those rare periods of partisan realignment in American politics. The capture of control of the Senate by the Republican party gave some credence to this prediction, yet the Congressional elections of 1982, 1984, and 1986 failed to sustain the realignment process. This paper advances the thesis that the failure of realignment in the 1980s is connected to the failure of the Congressional Republican party to represent adequately the policy concerns of independents and dissident Democrats as well as some existing Republican identifiers. The thesis is tested by examining trends in partisan representation (defined as the extent of congruence between Republicans, Democrats, and independents in the electorate, as groups, and the Congressional Republican and Democratic parties, as groups) between 1980 and 1986. The analysis focuses principally on representation in the Senate. As expected, the level of congruence between the Republicans and especially the independents in the electorate and the Congressional Republican party declines over time. Moreover, the representation provided to Democrats and independents in the electorate by the Congressional Democratic party improves, thereby limiting the prospect for Republican gains in identification from these groups.