Paul-Henri Gurian

The Calculus of Concession Media Coverage and the Dynamics of Winnowing in Presidential Nominations

In this research we outline and evaluate a theory of the “calculus of concession”: when and why presidential primary candidates exit the race. Our explanation builds on prior studies of candidate attrition that traditionally emphasize money. However, we focus additional attention on the role of the press and its potential to influence a candidate’s exit decision. Data from the 2000 Republican presidential nomination campaign are used to test a Weibull model of candidate exit. Our results suggest that money is a critical component. But our research also demonstrates that the influence of money on candidates’ decisions depends on the candidate’s competitive position in the race. The availability of financial resources is far more critical to a close runner-up than to a less established long shot. Conversely, news coverage is far more critical to the decisions of longshot candidates early in the campaign than it is to big-shot candidates later on.

Campaign Strategy in Presidential Primaries, 1976-88

Candidates in multicandidate presidential nomination campaigns allocate their financial resources to maximize delegates and momentum. Gurian (1986) demonstrated that, in the campaigns of 1976 and 1980, well-known established candidates emphasized delegates while relatively unknown long-shot candidates emphasized momentum. The resource allocation strategy of established candidates is based on the simple fact that the candidate with a majority of the delegates wins the nomination. The resource allocation strategy of long-shot candidates is based on financial constraints: they lack the resources to compete effectively in delegate-rich primaries; thus, they attempt to maximize momentum, which leads to greater public (including financial) support. This study extends the previous research to the 1984 and 1988 campaigns with a more fully specified model and a more consistent measure of momentum. By doing so, we hope to contribute to the growing body of literature concerning nomination politics (Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988; Campbell 1983; Castle 1991; Hammond 1980; Kessel 1988; Marshall 1981; Nice 1980; Norrander 1989; Parent, Jillson, and Weber 1987; Wattier 1983). In presidential nomination campaigns, candidates make strategic decisions to maximize their chances of nomination. Depending on competitive circumstances, candidates employ differing means to achieve that end. There exist at least two strategic goals that candidates pursue: maximizing delegates and maximizing momentum. By momentum, we refer to the consequences of winning or exceeding expectations in the early contests (Aldrich 1980). Success in the early contests tends to lead to extensive positive media coverage as well as increases in public recognition and financial support. According to their position in the competitive environment, candidates attempt to maximize a weighted combination of these goals. Therefore, resources are allocated to state contests in proportion to each states potential contribution to strategic goals. At the beginning of the campaign, many candidates are relatively unknown and thus are at a disadvantage in terms of attracting votes and contributions. Long-shot candidates prefer small, early, heavily covered primaries (like New Hampshire) because such contests are less expensive

The Role of Candidate Spending in Presidential Nomination Campaigns

One of the central questions about American presidential nominations concerns the effects of candidate spending on the outcomes of primaries and caucuses. This issue lies at the heart of normative concerns relating to political equality and access, representation, and democratic constraint on the presidency. Despite its importance, however, a good deal remains unclear about the extent to which, and under what conditions, money influences presidential nomination contest results. In this paper we explore these questions by testing a multivariate model of nomination outcomes in which we isolate the effects of spending on votes, controlling for the impact of other variables known to be important to the process. We find that candidate spending is an important component of success in the struggle for the presidential nomination. The relationship between spending and vote outcomes, however, is mitigated by other forces inherent in the battle.

Getting the Message Out: Candidate Communication Strategy During thr Invisible Primary

This article applies the theory of competitive (war) and substantive (marketing) communication strategies to the presidential nomination campaign, focusing primarily on the time period during which we expect the candidates to be most concerned with framing their campaigns-the invisible primary. We utilize candidate press releases to assess the accuracy of this theory and refine it. We then test the hypothesis that a candidates strategic goals, which are generally defined by the candidates competitive status relative to the field, determine the dominant type of message communicated during this penod. We find that there are definite patterns of messaging choice relative to candidate status. We also find that competitive messages dominate the “discourse” of candidates relative to the news media to a far greater extent than anticipated.

The Distribution of News Coverage in Presidential Primaries

News coverage is a critical component of modern presidential nomination campaigns. In this study, the geographic distribution of news coverage during several such campaigns is analyzed. Controlling for the size of the state delegation and other factors, contests that are part of a regional primary receive less coverage than contests that are not. As an illustration, it is shown that the southern states involved in Super Tuesday, 1988 received less coverage than would normally be expected considering the early date and large number of delegates at stake.

Do campaigns matter outside the United States? Equilibrium and enlightenment in Korean presidential elections

Do presidential campaigns matter outside the United States? We examine how public opinion responds to campaign events during Korean presidential campaigns. The fundamental variables of the election year influence vote intention before the campaign begins and substantially influence eventual vote choice. Campaign events assist voters to learn more about the fundamental variables – regionalism, party identification, and retrospective evaluations of the incumbent administration – and this leads to more informed intentions during the campaign. The results suggest that there is substantial congruence in the explanatory power of Holbrook’s ‘equilibrium’ theory and Gelman and King’s ‘enlightenment’ theory in presidential campaigns held in the US and in Korea.