Paul M. Anglin

The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting

When a house is placed on the market, the seller must choose the initial offer price. Setting the price too high or too low affects the marketability of the property. While there is near universal agreement that the seller faces a trade-off between selling at a higher price and selling in less time, there is less agreement about how to measure this trade-off. This paper offers a framework for analysis and shows that an increase in the list price increases expected time-on-the-market (TOM). Because house buyers must solve a type of signal extraction problem, the effect of a higher list price is magnified for houses in a market segment having a low predicted variance of the list price. This paper also shows that the list price of houses which are withdrawn before sale has a higher mean and variance, and that the possibility of withdrawal censors information about the time-on-the-market.

SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF A HEDONIC PRICE FUNCTION

Previous work on the preferred specification of hedonic price models usually recommended a Box-Cox model. In this paper we note that any parametric model involves implicit restrictions and they can be reduced by using a semiparametric model. We estimate a benchmark parametric model which passes several common specification tests, before showing that a semiparametric model outperforms it significantly. In addition to estimating the model, we compare the predictions of the models by deriving the distribution of the predicted log(price) and then calculating the associated prediction intervals. Our data show that the semiparametric model provides more accurate mean predictions than the benchmark parametric model. Copyright 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Residential real estate brokerage as a principal-agent problem

We analyze the terms of the brokerage contract between a house seller and his agent, using the established literature on the principal-agent problem. Considering the influence of moral hazard and adverse selection, we predict a number of features of the contract. Many of these features are not present in observed contracts. To account for this discrepancy, we discuss certain aspects of the real estate market which are not included in the standard principal-agent model but may explain the difference. Standard principal-agent theory neglects important contract design considerations, namely robustness and costs of complexity. In general, the commission contract performs poorly by failing to allocate risk efficiently or to provide agent incentives. It favors established agents and precludes contractual diversity. Finally, we contrast the brokerage contract for real estate with the dealership contract for used cars, but find no compelling answer as to why there are few used house dealers.

Determinants of Buyer Search in a Housing Market

Using data collected from specially-designed questionnaires, the duration of search by a house buyer is estimated. Duration is measured in two ways: in terms of time and in terms of the number of houses seen. To explain this data, several features must be added to a simple model when search models are applied to a housing market. Many of the statistically significant variables, such as prior information and the quality of information provided by a newspaper or a real estate agent, deal with the provision of information. The type of agency that employs the agent and the characteristics of the buyer have little effect.

Evidence on Grades and Grade Inflation at Ontario's Universities

Using information on first-year university grades from across Ontario, we examine whether or not there has been grade inflation by discipline. In a survey of seven universities for the periods 1973-74 and 1993-94, we find significant grade inflation in various Arts and Science programs. The rate of inflation is not uniform. Some subjects, such as Mathematics experienced little or no change in average grades at most universities, while English and Biology experienced significant grade inflation.

Integrating Illiquid Assets into the Portfolio Decision Process

We consider the issues associated with modeling the decision to invest in an illiquid asset, such as real estate, over an extended period of time. Markets for illiquid assets tend to display certain characteristics: for example, significant time‐till‐sale and correlation in the rates of return over time. More importantly, as the liquidity of a market cannot be an issue if an investor never needs to liquidate an asset, we focus on how the liquidity of a market interacts with an individuals uncertain need to liquidate. We show that the optimal strategy is state contingent, if possible. We also show that the penalty associated with an illiquid investment depends on the characteristics of other assets being held in the portfolio, on the characteristics of liquidity shocks and on the interaction between time and behavior. We show that borrowing to pay for a liquidity shock cannot overcome all of the costs of owning an illiquid asset. In contrast, borrowing at t = 0 benefits from the complementarity in the assets. In a simpler model, we show that the portfolio perspective makes illiquid assets more valuable to an investor with a longer time horizon.

Information, Multiprice Search, and Cost-of-Living Index Theory

This paper derives the cost-of-living index of an individual who faces imperfect and costly information about prices. Traditional cost-of-living in dexes assume that the consumer passively accepts prices as given. The authors derive a multiprice search model in which the consumer choos es the search strategy that minimizes the expected cost of buying a g iven level of utility. In contrast to existing search models, the mod el allows the consumer to change the allocation of expenditures among goods as information about prices changes and enables them to constr uct a cost-of-living index for an agent who searches across distribut ions of offer prices. Unlike traditional cost-of-living measures that ignore search behavior, the searchers cost-of-living index depends on search costs. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies?

This study is the first to examine dual agency sales over the listing contract between seller and listing agent. We test hypotheses about the timing of dual agency and its effects on sales price and time on market. Probit results indicate that dual agency sales are more likely to occur near the beginning or the end of a listing contract. Three stage least squares results demonstrate that dual agency affects sales price in both periods and that dual agency sales have shorter marketing times. Results support the conclusion that dual agency sales result from both incentives and informational efficiencies.

Contracts for the sale of residential real estate

I propose a model where the terms of a real estate brokers contract influence both the brokers and thesellers choices. Given equal contract, higher quality, and thus higher priced on average, houses will sell in less time. Thus, simple conditions suffice to show that a “competitively set” commission rate should fall as the average price rises and, since a sellers cost of waiting are higher for higher quality houses, a “cartels” commission rate should rise with the average price. Because this model studies the effects of alternate contracts on observable variables such as the price of a house and its time-till-sale, its implications are testable.

A rational economic analysis of public-school closings in Saskatoon

The Saskatoon public board closed eleven elementary schools and one high school during the period 1978–88. The finding from two economic models is that the school board did not act as a discriminating rational economic decisionmaker in closing two elementary schools located in a case-study neighbourhood. The postponement of the closures resulted in an annual subsidy to the remaining students and their families for an amount eventually equivalent to 40% of the actual savings. The school board thus incorporated noneconomic factors into its decisions in anticipation of the community reactions to a closure.