Peter M. Lewis

From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria

Upon taking power in August 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida promised a decisive course of economic and political change for Nigeria. Alongside a phased transition to democratic rule, the new President outlined far-reaching reforms intended to alleviate major distortions in the economy, to resolve a lingering impasse with external creditors, and to reduce a mounting burden of debt. Within a year, a comprehensive structural adjustment programme (SAP) was launched, incorporating key policies advocated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and yielding significant early results in stabilising the economy and arresting decline.

Shifting fortunes: The political economy of financial liberalization in Nigeria

Abstract On the recommendation of the World Bank, Nigeria began to liberalize its financial sector in 1986. Contrary to the prediction of financial repression theory, savings and investment decline in the wake of banking deregulation. By 1995, the Nigerian financial system was in a state of collapse. The paper locates the main failure of Nigerias financial deregulation in the political and institutional setting of reform. The institutional mechanisms needed to supervise and regulate banking under the new system were absent while private sector banking capacities were weak. Moreover, financial liberalization was quickly captured by a clientalist state as a means of reallocating rents to strategic constituents. An additional precipitating factor was macroeconomic instability. The paper points to the importance of incorporating political and institutional variables into any model of financial reform or transformation.

Economic statism, private capital, and the dilemmas of accumulation in Nigeria

Abstract Nigerias persistent economic stagnation is attributable to a mutually reinforcing political dynamic, comprising a weak developmental state and pervasive rent-seeking within the private sector. This syndrome was a source of Nigerias initial economic crisis in the early 1980s, and it continues to impede structural adjustment initiatives. Economic policy reform has been compromised by state strategies designed to preserve the gains of elite rentier groups, while private entrepreneurs have responded to policy change by seeking new rental havens in finance and other nontradable sectors. In consequence, structural adjustment has failed to elicit a supply response or to generate significant political support for a more propitious enabling environment. Nigerias experience reinforces the perception that changes in nominal incentives must be accompanied by broader institutional transformation if economic reform is to be effective.

Tracking Development in South‐East Asia and Sub‐Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy

The Tracking Development project aims to explain the divergences in development outcomes in sub‐Saharan Africa and South‐East Asia over the past fifty years through the pair‐wise comparison of four countries in each region. The development trajectories in South‐East Asia revealed that the transition to sustained growth has consistently been associated with policies aimed at (i) macroeconomic stabilisation; (ii) improving life in the rural sector, increasing agricultural productivity and ensuring an ample supply of food; and (iii) liberalising the economy and creating conditions of economic freedom, particularly for peasant farmers and other small actors. In Africa, initiatives in these directions have been taken in some instances, but the simultaneous pursuit of all three policy objectives has not occurred. Most noticeably, policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation were pursued in both regions, but whereas in South‐East Asia these were associated with policies leading to poverty reduction, this was not the case in Africa.

Constituencies for reform in Ghana

The attitudes of ordinary people in Africa towards the liberalisation of politics and economies are not well known. Are there popular constituencies for reform? Which specific reform measures do different social groups accept or reject? And does popular support for structural adjustment, if any, go together with support for democracy? In an effort to find answers, this article reports results of a national sample survey in Ghana conducted in July 1999 as part of the Afrobarometer. The survey finds that the constituency for democracy is broader than the constituency for market reform, which is concentrated among educated male elites. In addition, while most Ghanaians are patient with democracy and want to retain this political regime, most Ghanaians are fatigued with adjustment and want the government to ‘change its policies now’. Given this distribution of popular preferences, one can surmise that democracy will be easier to consolidate than a market-based economy.

The Durability of Political Goods? Evidence from Nigeria's New Democracy

Abstract A conventional argument suggests that, for new democracies to survive, citizens must receive benefits of socioeconomic development. Yet an emerging literature shows that, following democratic transitions, the delivery of political goods such as order, civil rights and good governance, can sustain a new regime, at least in the short run. But how long does any such honeymoon last? This article uses survey data over time to assess the durability of various types of public goods in shaping popular attitudes to democracy in Nigeria, a critical test case where democracy is under threat. We find that, even under unfavourable conditions, political goods are more durable than previously thought and that mass preferences for democracy do not require an economic miracle. To be sure, economic assessments of policy performance shape evolving views about the supply of democracy. Over time, however, political assessments of the trustworthiness of national leaders are equally important.