Philip P. Everts

Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy

Author(s): Joe D. Hagan, Philip P. Everts, Haruhiro Fukui, John D. Stempel Reviewed work(s): Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking (Summer, 2001), pp. 169-216 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186568 . Accessed: 28/02/2012 05:16

European Public Opinion on Security Issues

Abstract Interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War. We distinguish at least three different waves of research on this topic and examine two main components of the present policy debate: the need for an Atlantic community and agreement on the means to reach common goals. As to the first issue, we explore the extent to which Atlanticism—defined as the willingness to cooperate among European partners and the US on problems perceived as common—is still high in the 2000s. We find considerable variation between European countries and the US. The left–right cleavage is still relevant in explaining attitudes toward collaboration across the Atlantic both in the US and in several European countries. As to the means, we look at the issue of support for the use of military force in Europe and the United States. On the basis of the available data, support for the use of force is much higher, across the board, in the US than in Europe. On the other hand, the contextual conditions under which force will be used seem to make a significant difference, albeit in different ways, in Europe and the US.

Developments and Trends in Peace and Conflict Research, 1965-1971: A Survey of Institutions

Early in 1971 UNESCO asked us to prepare a new International Repertory of Institutions for Peace and Conflict Research, and to undertake an analysis of the data collected for that purposed 1 In order to carry out a task like this it is necessary to formulate, at least for oneself, as clearly as possible, what is to be understood by this kind of activity, called peace and conflict research.2 What then do we understand by peace and conflict research? What are its

Domestic factors in the making of defense policy: The case of the Netherlands

SUMMARY The importance of domestic factors in explaining the foreign‐policy process can, today, not be overlooked. It has been suggested that four sets of variables play an important role in determining the chances for domestic groups to exercise influence on this process: external autonomy, internal (domestic) consensus, the availability of time and the presence or absence of conditions of influence such as legitimacy, resources and access. From a series of case studies on foreign policymaking in the Netherlands two were selected for this article: the introduction of the neutron warheads and the deployment of cruise missiles. Both were very controversial in the Netherlands. They show that under favourable conditions, i.e. divisions within the ruling Christian Democratic Party, committed and well‐organized domestic groups which are capable of keeping public opinion mobilized over time can have an important and even decisive influence on the outcome of the making of defence and foreign policy. Domestic con...

Conclusions: An Agenda for Future Crises

To understand the present state of public opinion in an Atlantic context, it is necessary to take a more long-term historical perspective. The interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of World War II. In Chapter 1 we began our analysis by offering an overview of the interaction between the research program on this topic and the political events that prompted this growing interest over the years.

Support for the Use of Force: Situational and Contextual Factors

Measuring support for, or opposition to, the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under, and purposes for, which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading with respect to what can be expected in concrete and specific historical cases. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so (Mueller 1973; Brody, 1991; 2000).

Time and War: Public Opinion on Kosovo, Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq in a Transatlantic Perspective

Measuring support for or opposition to the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (e.g., Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under and purposes for which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading us with respect to what can be expected in a concrete and specific historical case. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so. This is a well-known phenomenon that deserves to be mentioned in this connection (Mueller, 1973).

The Nature and Structure of the Transatlantic Divide

It is perhaps inevitable that proponents of each of the various views on the causes and nature of the alleged transatlantic divide will look for — and sometimes find — arguments and data from public opinion research results that tend to confirm their own differing hypotheses. At the same time, the core issue of where and why American and European publics differ on questions of war and peace and the use of military force in particular — as has been shown in Chapter Three — has not yet been adequately addressed. Continuing the analysis, we now want to supplement more conventional presentations of results of surveys on this issue by digging a bit deeper into the nature and structure of the transatlantic divide by looking primarily at general attitudes, or the level of political ideology, and then systematically comparing the relative explanatory power of these different dimensions of the Atlantic community in accounting for support for the use of force in hypothetical and real situations.

Theoretical Issues and Empirical Problems

Ever since public opinion became a powerful force in politics (and, probably, even before that), a vexing question for scholars as well as policymakers has been to determine and interpret to what degree and under what conditions the public is prepared to support the use of military force.

Theory Formation and Empirical Knowledge

We speak a lot in common parlance about ‘public opinion’, but what do we mean by that and is that the most proper and useful definition? In spite of the vast research on the concept of public opinion as one of the most enduring concepts in the social sciences, its definition remains controversial. ‘Public opinions’, like beauty, is essentially in the eyes of the beholder. Indeed, the difficulty of defining public opinion as an object of empirical study has perhaps been best expressed a long time ago by V. O. Key and is appropriately quoted again here: ‘To speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.’1