Pierangelo Isernia

Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparative Perspective

The aggregate changes in public opinion attitudes toward foreign policy issues in three West European countries during the cold war decades (1954-1990) are analyzed. The stability hypothesis is addressed from different angles to ascertain the amount of change in public opinion attitudes toward foreign policy issues in France, Germany, and Italy. Results reveal a low level of volatility in public opinion that corresponds with the findings for the American public. On the other hand, French, German, and Italian public opinion shows a somewhat higher level of fluctuation than in the United States. Attitudes toward NATO, the United States, and the Soviet Union closely reflect the evolution of world politics and therefore represent a reasonable reaction to international events and crises.

The EuroPolis deliberative poll

This special issue focuses on EuroPolis, a unique experiment in ‘deliberative democracy’ at the European level convened in Brussels soon before the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. A European wide random sample of the 27 member countries at the time was gathered to deliberate about two key issues--climate change and immigration as well as its voting intentions. The articles in the special issue focus on this Deliberative Poll, both quantitatively and qualitatively to assess what it tells us about ambitious versions of a ‘European wide public sphere.’ Can the citizens of Europe deliberate together across all the barriers of language and nationality? Can there be a credible process of European wide ‘public will formation’ about substantive policy issues and about voting?

The role of deliberation in attitude change: An empirical assessment of three theoretical mechanisms

Though the impact of deliberative polling on attitude change has received ample attention in the literature, micro models of attitude change before, during, and after deliberation are understudied. The relative strength of three competing views of the way attitudes change—the heuristics, systematic, and deliberative models—is assessed, using the quasi-experimental data of the EuroPolis deliberative project and comparing a group of people who participated in the deliberative poll with a control group. The results are: (1) in line with the systematic model, predispositions play a larger role than in the heuristics or deliberative models; (2) predispositions play a different role for participants and nonparticipants; (3) predispositions shape attitude formation in different ways depending on the issue at hand. On some issues the beliefs of participants change as a consequence of deliberation and become more complex and nuanced than before. This is, however, not the case for immigration issues where deliberation seems to strengthen predispositions.

The Transatlantic Gap in Public Opinion

The American Presidential election in November 2004 has heightened interest in the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. One of the more specific questions is what the consequences of the re-election of President Bush will or could be in this connection. Nowhere is this truer than on both sides of the Atlantic given the differences that have roiled the US-European relationship in recent years.

European Public Opinion on Security Issues

Abstract Interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War. We distinguish at least three different waves of research on this topic and examine two main components of the present policy debate: the need for an Atlantic community and agreement on the means to reach common goals. As to the first issue, we explore the extent to which Atlanticism—defined as the willingness to cooperate among European partners and the US on problems perceived as common—is still high in the 2000s. We find considerable variation between European countries and the US. The left–right cleavage is still relevant in explaining attitudes toward collaboration across the Atlantic both in the US and in several European countries. As to the means, we look at the issue of support for the use of military force in Europe and the United States. On the basis of the available data, support for the use of force is much higher, across the board, in the US than in Europe. On the other hand, the contextual conditions under which force will be used seem to make a significant difference, albeit in different ways, in Europe and the US.

Revealing preferences: does deliberation increase ideological awareness among the less well educated?

Research suggests that the rightist discourse on immigration appeals to left-leaning citizens with lower levels of education. The opposite is, however, not true for right-wing voters with lower educational levels, and this asymmetry leaves left-wing parties at a disadvantage compared with the right on immigration and integration issues. Deliberative theory promises that discussion, information and reflection can promote a more balanced political discussion and a more enlightened citizen. This article assesses the extent to which deliberative polling increases the ideological awareness of citizens with lower educational levels. More specifically, it gauges the extent to which especially less well educated left-wing voters � those whose attitudes research finds to be particularly out of tune with their ideological predispositions regarding immigration and integration � adjust their attitudes as a consequence of deliberate exposure to informational input and the presentation of two-sided arguments. Use is made of unique data generated during the first European-wide deliberative polling project, �EuroPolis�, held in 2009. The results indicate that less well educated left-wing voters indeed have slightly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than leftist voters with secondary or post-secondary educational levels. Turning to the micro-mechanisms of attitude change in a deliberative setting, the analyses show that both levels of education and ideological predispositions play a role in the extent to which participants of the deliberative poll adjust their attitudes. In three out of four models, evidence is found that less well educated left-leaning citizens are indeed most likely to adjust their attitudes on immigration and integration after being presented with a more balanced discussion of the topic.

The US Rebalancing to Asia and Transatlantic Public Opinion

The US policy of ‘rebalancing to Asia’ is likely to have major implications for transatlantic relations as well as for the role of rising powers, such as China. US public opinion and leaders are largely aware of this eastward shift in attention and this awareness can be considered, albeit in a somewhat indirect way, an indicator of support for the policy. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, Europeans seem to be less aware of the fact that the Far East is becoming the main chessboard of international relations in a multipolar global order. Nevertheless, when objectively informed about China, people on both sides of the Atlantic are less in favour of a shift in interests toward Asia and their negative perceptions of China are significantly correlated to a hesitancy in supporting a rebalancing policy. Moreover, if people perceive Beijing as a threat, especially an economic threat, they are even less likely to support a shift of interests to the Far East, the only exception being American elites, who tend to increase their support for the rebalancing strategy in the presence of a Chinese economic threat.

How political are national identities? A comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the 2010s

Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.

Conclusions: An Agenda for Future Crises

To understand the present state of public opinion in an Atlantic context, it is necessary to take a more long-term historical perspective. The interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of World War II. In Chapter 1 we began our analysis by offering an overview of the interaction between the research program on this topic and the political events that prompted this growing interest over the years.

Support for the Use of Force: Situational and Contextual Factors

Measuring support for, or opposition to, the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under, and purposes for, which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading with respect to what can be expected in concrete and specific historical cases. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so (Mueller 1973; Brody, 1991; 2000).