Pierre-Guillaume Méon

INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND TRADE: WHICH INSTITUTIONS? WHICH TRADE?

Using a panel of countries over 1920-2000, this paper examines the extent to which different dimensions of the institutional framework affect exports of total, manufactured, and non-manufactured goods. It is observed that exports of manufactured goods are positively affected by the control of corruption, the rule of law, government effectiveness, and the lack of political violence. This result does not hold for non-manufactured and total exports. Instrumental variable regressions finally confirm that the control of corruption, but not the other dimensions of governance, robustly cause manufactured exports.

Is Corruption an Efficient Grease

This paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries, both developed and developing. Using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance, we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective. It may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective. We thus find evidence for the “grease the wheels” hypothesis in its weak and strong forms.

Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s Decision Rule

This paper aims at discovering the decision rule the Governing Council of the ECB uses to set interest rates. We construct a Taylor rule for each member of the council and for the euro area as a whole, and aggregate the interest rates they produce using several classes of decision-making mechanisms: chairman dominance, bargaining, consensus, voting, and voting with a chairman. We test alternative scenarios in which individual members of the council pursue either a national or a federal objective. We then compare the interest-rate path predicted by each scenario with the observed euro area’s interest rate. We find that scenarios in which all members of the Governing Council are assumed to pursue Euro-area-wide objectives are dominated by scenarios in which decisions are made collectively by a council consisting of members pursuing national objectives. The best-performing scenario is the one in which individual members of the Governing Council follow national objectives, bargain over the interest rate, and their weights are based on their country’s share of the zone’s GDP.

The Viability of Fixed Exchange Rate Commitments: Does Politics Matter? A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

This article studies the connection between political instability and the sustainability of an exchange rate regime. A model based on the credibility of monetary policy shows that political unrest should be correlated with the adoption of flexible exchange rates. That intuition is tested using various measures of political instability on a panel of 125 countries between 1980 and 1994.

Does taking the shadow economy into account matter when measuring aggregate efficiency

We analyse how adding the shadow economy to official output figures affects the estimated technical efficiency at the country level. We find that this not only slightly affects the ranking of efficiency scores, but also increases average efficiency in a sample of 87–97 countries, both developed and developing. Our results are robust to the functional form of the production technology and the adjustment of labour to account for years of schooling.

Institutional Changes Now and Benefits Tomorrow: How Soon is Tomorrow?

This paper investigates the timing of the impact of changes in checks and balances on macroeconomic efficiency in a panel of countries. Using Battese and Coellis one-stage approach, we find that increasing checks and balances results in greater efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of institutional changes on efficiency is delayed, with a full effect showing after five to six years. This finding remains robust after distinguishing developed and developing countries, including country-fixed effects and using alternative functional forms of the production frontier and alternative measures of checks and balances. The relation is also robust to controlling for endogeneity.

Does Investment Spur Growth Everywhere? Not Where Institutions are Weak

We investigate the impact of investment on growth in a sample of developed and developing countries, conditioning the marginal effect of investment on institutional quality. The panel structure of our dataset allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and dealing with the risk of endogeneity bias. In line with our expectations, we find that investment increases growth more in countries with high institutional quality than in countries with defective institutions. The results are essentially driven by government instability, corruption, and the rule of law.

A Model of Exchange Rate Crises with Partisan Governments

This paper investigates the consequences of elections on the capacity of governments to defend a fixed parity in the presence of output shocks. It demonstrates that the political uncertainty associated with elections may significantly modify the reactions of governments in a way that may be interpreted as opposite to their ideology. It also shows that the probability that a devaluation occurs increases significantly after an election.

Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty

This article analyses the voting and abstention patterns in French departments in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht treaty, in light of the potential impact of monetary union. We observe that departmental characteristics implying either greater benefits or lower costs from monetary union are significantly correlated with the approval rate. This supports the view that the voting behaviour of individual agents depended on their self-interest. The impact of economic characteristics on the abstention rate is less clear. Indeed, the variable that is most significantly correlated with abstention in the referendum is average abstention in other elections.

The Belief that Market Transactions Are Mutually Beneficial: A Comparison of the Views of Students in Economics and Other Disciplines

Using a survey of a large group of first- and final-year students of different disciplines to study their beliefs in the existence of mutual benefits of market transactions, the authors observe significant differences between economics and business students versus students of other disciplines. These differences increase over time, due partly to economics students increasingly supporting the belief and partly to other students, in particular psychology students, increasingly disagreeing with it. The beliefs of economics students are more homogeneous at the end of their studies. The authors, therefore, report evidence of both a selection effect and an effect of studying different disciplines that goes beyond initial self-selection.