Renske Doorenspleet

Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization

Since the publication of Samuel Huntingtons 1991 study of democratization, scholars have come to take for granted the notion that the spread of democracy has come in waves. Although Huntingtons work has clearly proved to be an influential study, this article suggests that his analysis is far from compelling. There are two problems embodied in the work. The first is largely conceptual. Huntingtons analysis fails to provide a clear and meaningful distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes because it focuses primarily on what Dahl had defined in 1971 as the dimension of competition and pays insufficient attention to the equally important dimension of inclusion. The second problem is more empirical. Huntington has estimated the incidence of transitions to democracy in terms of the percentages of world states involved. Since the denominator in this equation, that is, the number of states in the world, is far from constant, this measure can be misleading. This article proposes solutions to both of these problems, and this new approach leads to conclusions that are quite different from Huntingtons.

Critical Citizens, Democratic Support and Satisfaction in African Democracies

Worldwide, there is substantial popular support for the ideal of democracy but, on the other hand, there is considerable dissatisfaction with democracy within democracies. Democracies are inhabited by many so-called ‘dissatisfied democrats’: citizens who are strong supporters of the democratic ideal, but are unhappy with the way democracy is working in their country. It is not clear how to explain this phenomenon, but based on a review of the existing literature, two different approaches can be distinguished: an optimistic and a pessimistic one. Subsequently, this article investigates why some people are dissatisfied democrats while others are not in eight African democracies – Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa. The empirical evidence seems to support the complex mix of both the optimistic and pessimistic approaches: to be sure, dissatisfied democrats are critical citizens compared with dissatisfied non-democrats, but they are not more politically active than the rest of the population. Future studies need to find out whether dissatisfied democrats can be seen either as a democratic danger or as a democratic defence, but the first findings in this article suggest that a growing group of dissatisfied democrats are a sign of democracy in decline.

Against the odds : deviant cases of democratization

Economic development and diffusion effects appear to exert substantial influence on the success of democratization. However, large-N quantitative studies also show that there are some ‘outliers’, or ‘deviant’ cases, which do not fit the general pattern and cannot be explained by existing theories and models. It appears that deviant cases of democratization include Costa Rica and India (since the 1940s), Botswana (since the 1960s) and Benin and Mongolia (since the 1990s). This introduction focuses on important conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems involved when studying them. We first look at the highly contested concept of democracy and place ‘deviant democracies’ in the framework of a minimal definition of democracy and transition waves. We also provide a working definition for two other highly contested concepts – democratic transition and democratic consolidation. We then go on to briefly review existing general theories of democratization. By doing so, we lay the ground for specifying more precisely the level of ‘deviancy’ of our cases, and offer potential explanations for their unusually successful process of democratization. Finally, we outline the nested mixed method, the logic of which we follow in this special issue.

Electoral systems and good governance in divided countries

Abstract The effects of electoral systems have been broadly investigated in the literature. Lijphart (1999) recommended PR systems for all countries, and argued that majority rule has to be avoided, primarily in divided societies. It has, however, not yet been investigated whether his findings can be extended to both new democracies and divided societies. This article shows that PR systems should indeed be promoted, especially in divided countries. Proportional systems in divided societies have a higher level of good governance than divided countries with more majoritarian characteristics.

Upping the Odds: Deviant Democracies and Theories of Democratization

This concluding article tries to integrate the different insights of the individual case studies of this special issue into some comparative observations. The findings are related to debates and findings of the broader literature on democratization, with the aim of generating new insights that might help develop new studies on the topic. Importantly, our suggestions are to be considered as hypotheses complementary to the two dominant theories of democratization, rather than opposite to them, accepting both their key assumptions and stipulations. More specifically, two aspects of key concern to the study of democratization are discussed in more detail: the phasing of the process of democratization and the ambiguity of the process(es) of diffusion. We argue and show that, while accepting that the different phases of the process of democratization might overlap in practice, the analytical distinction of democratic transition and consolidation provide clearer insights into the factors affecting processes of democratization. We also emphasize the importance of processes of diffusion in explaining (the different phases of) democratization, but at the same time analyse the current conceptual, methodological and theoretical problems involved in diffusion theory.

Party systems and democracy in Africa

1. Do Party Systems Matter for Democracy in Africa? Renske Doorenspleet and Lia Nijzink 2. Multi-Party Elections in Africa: For Better or Worse Matthijs Bogaards PART I: ONE-PARTY DOMINANT SYSTEMS 3. South Africa: Electoral Dominance, Identity Politics and Democracy Steven Friedman 4 Botswana: Presidential Ambitions, Party Factions and the Durability of a Dominant Party Christian John Makgala and Shane Mac Giollabhui 5. Namibia: From Liberation to Domination Henning Melber PART II: OTHER PARTY SYSTEMS 6. Ghana: The African Exemplar of an Institutionalized Two-Party System? Cyril Daddieh and George Bob-Milliar 7. Benin: A Pulverized Party System in Transition Rachel Gisselquist 8. Zambia: Dominance Won and Lost Dan Paget PART III: CONCLUSION 9. Do Party Systems Help or Hinder Democracy in Africa? Renske Doorenspleet and Lia Nijzink

From protest to parties: party-building and democratisation in Africa

in Malaysia (Only oil and the country’s Employee Provident Fund are mentioned in passing). Yet patronage was equally crucial in Malaysia for maintaining a coalition of rent-seeking businessmen and entitled mass publics. Further, if Malay entrepreneurs were really so pivotal to this coalition, how did the regime survive nearly all of them dissolving in bankruptcy after their bailouts had been rescinded, necessitating the absorption of their remaining assets into a sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah Holdings? These entrepreneurs had mostly been ‘bred’ by Malaysia’s long-serving prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, in order to forge an indigenous capitalist class, though more out of nationalist preference than any structural requirements. Hence, they were more of a drain on the government’s resources than any vital contributor to its coffers – and hence a source of popular resentment even among Malay mass publics when they were favoured with bailouts during the crisis. Although these linkages between coalitional dynamics and regime outcomes are not fully illuminated, Pepinsky makes a strong start in shifting scrutiny away from institutions, viewed typically as constraining eliteand mass-level behaviours. He outlines succinctly, for example, how under what is usually understood as Malaysia’s well-institutionalised authoritarian rule, Mahathir was able during his tenure to de-register, re-register, rename, restructure, and otherwise manipulate in highly personalist ways his dominant party, the United Malays National Organization, in order consistently to wrong-foot his rivals. In Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes, Pepinsky correctly reverses causality, then, demonstrating the weightiness of political coalitions and the malleability of institutions.

Do Party Systems Matter for Democracy in Africa

After a wave of democratization reached Africa in the early 1990s, regular multiparty elections have become the norm, and there are only a handful of countries where these are not a feature of the political landscape. Moreover, free and fair elections are now widely regarded as essential elements of democracy on the continent. Thus, when we think about democracy and democracy promotion in Africa, elections tend to be our first area of focus. Providing electoral assistance has become the cornerstone of democracy promotion, and election observation missions have become a fixed feature of elections across the continent, with international organizations, including African intergovernmental organizations like the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community, regularly sending delegations to observe electoral proceedings.

Democracy and Civil War

Does democracy have a ‘dark side’, or is civil war less likely in democracies? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war are mixed up in civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is difficult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses. Moreover, there is no clear link, and civil war is just as likely in democracies as it is in dictatorships. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is high compared to other political systems. More specifically, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power. Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make far more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. It would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely.

Democracy and Interstate War

The study of democracy and interstate war is a flourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one. Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear. In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive. Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country. Hence, with regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value.