Riccardo Alcaro

Learning From a Troubled Experience – Transatlantic Lessons from the Nuclear Standoff with Iran

With the US eventually embracing the European-devised ‘dual track’ approach comprising both sanctions and incentives, the transatlantic partners have currently reached a remarkable level of convergence on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear conundrum. Although EU--US unity might not be enough to solve the dispute, the experience of transatlantic cooperation on Iran offers some important lessons. It shows that strategic convergence between the transatlantic partners, or lack thereof, has a considerable impact on the way a crisis unfolds in an area in which both parties have a stake. It highlights the added value represented by European/EU political and economic assets in a situation in which US military options are both unlikely to have the desired effect and at grave risk of backlash. Finally, it sets an important precedent for a specific option for intra-EU and EU--US cooperation – the contact or lead group – that seems to suit the emerging multipolar world better than other, more institutionalised methods.

Contestation and Transformation. Final Thoughts on the Liberal International Order

Abstract The liberal international order, the inseparable mix of US geopolitical power and ideational project of organising international relations along normative frameworks such as internationalism, institutionalism and democracy, is reeling under the pressure of profound systemic changes such as greater interconnectedness and multipolarity. Predictions abound that increasing great power competition, most visibly at play in geographical areas of contested orders, will eventually tear it down. However, even if major actors – the US included – display a selective, irregular and often instrumental commitment to the liberal order, they are still repositioning themselves in that order and not outside of it. In addition, conflict is not the default outcome of order contestation, as hybrid forms of governance are possible even in troubled regions. No doubt, the world of tomorrow will be less American-shaped and less liberal, but transformation is a more plausible future than collapse for the liberal order.

Multipolarity, Multilateralism and Leadership: The Retreat of the West?

Peterson, Alcaro and Tocci focus on the emergence of multipolarity, the future of multilateralism and scope for transatlantic leadership within global governance. Their central argument is that multiple polarities exist in different issue-areas of world politics. It thus becomes implausible to theorise based on a generalized balance of power. Second, the fragile domestic positions of the leaders of major powers place strict limits on multilateral cooperation. Third, these contextual factors pose profound challenges to the transatlantic alliance. Fourth, if international relations theories are all systemic theories, they are likely to fail to generate explanations for the emerging international order. International relations increasingly have become the sum of its parts: individual policies in specific issue-areas. What is needed, in these circumstances, is the scientific study of foreign policy.

The Paradoxes of the Liberal Order: Transatlantic Relations and Security Governance

Alcaro argues that the incipient multipolarity is not incompatible with the Western-supported liberal order, as even the most restive among the non-Western powers, such as China and Russia, have a stake in its endurance. He maintains that the transatlantic ability to shape security governance will diminish if relations among great powers become conflictual, largely because of Europe’s modest hard power and lack of strategic cohesion. On the contrary, if centripetal dynamics prevail, the Europeans can make use not only of their individual assets to address functional threats, such as terrorism and regional crises, but also exploit the soft power potential of the European Union, whereby United States power gains greater outreach and impact.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Big Potential, Limited Impact?

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is an innovative, multi-pronged action aimed at enhancing the domestic capacities of a state, as well as its ability to interconnect internationally and to deal with the risk of a terrorist attack involving nuclear or radioactive materials. The GICNT, a joint US-Russian initiative, has now evolved into an informal network of over 70 countries. It pursues an objective of boosting the protection, detection, prosecution and response capabilities of a state by fostering cooperation on three levels: between a government and its agencies; between government and the private sector; and between like-minded states. Given its comprehensive approach to the nuclear terrorism threat, the initiative has great potential. Nevertheless, structural flaws such as the absence of any evaluation mechanism and the exclusion of military-related nuclear materials and sites are likely to make its impact far less global than expected.

The Premise: The Underneath Continuity in the E3/EU’s Iran Policy

The intra-EU policy convergence on Iran effected by the E3/EU group (France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the High Representative) was a consequence of the pre-eminence of the nuclear issue. Nuclear proliferation had been a prominent item in EU-Iran exchanges already in the 1990s. Hence, it came as no surprise that the issue climbed the list of priorities in the EU’s agenda when Iran’s nuclear programme turned out to be far more advanced than previously anticipated. Thus, when the E3 engaged the Iranians, they were pursuing an established EU non-proliferation objective. The E3 adopted an approach based on engagement, dialogue, the promise of improved EU-Iran relations and the promotion of rules-based regimes, all elements already contained in the pre-existing EU Iran policy. Even though the E3/EU narrowed down the remit of EU-Iran relations to the nuclear issue, they presided over an adaptation of and not a break with the pre-existing EU policy.

The Theory: Lead Groups and EU Foreign Policy-Making

Lead groups such as the E3/EU team on Iran are crisis management solutions to problems the EU is incapable of addressing through its own institutions and mechanisms. A practice that finds no basis in EU treaties, lead groups invariably create an imbalance between the member states in the lead, the insiders, and those that follow, the outsiders. The compromise underlying lead groups results from an intergovernmental bargaining process that reflects an asymmetry of interest between insiders and outsiders. Yet, lead groups can only form if the terms of the ‘bargain’ between insiders and outsiders are in line with the EU identity layer of all member states. As foreign policy-making machines, lead groups not only give direction and substance to EU foreign policy, but also articulate the type and role identity of the EU and its member states as international agents.

Conclusion: The E3/EU and EU Foreign Policy

Lead groups are interest-based bargaining processes unfolding in the intersubjective normative context constituted by EU membership. As such, they are not only a theoretically consistent pattern of EU foreign policy-making but an empirically effective foreign policy practice. The experience of the E3/EU group (France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the High Representative) lends credibility to this claim. The E3/EU set up a negotiating framework that worked as a de-escalating tool, a catalyst for Security Council unity and a permanent forum for crisis management. The E3/EU inflicted pain on Iran by adopting a comprehensive sanctions regime in coordination with the United States, but did so only having pre-emptively secured US commitment to seeking a diplomatic solution. Once the deal was reached, they defended it with deeds and not only with words. If President Trump were indeed to reverse course, the EU can still defend the deal by refusing to cooperate. The E3/EU might have been supporting actors, yet their achievements were real.

The Action/2: The E3/EU and the United States

Intra-EU unity and transatlantic convergence on Iran’s nuclear issue were intrinsically tied. On the one hand, EU unity resulted from transatlantic convergence. France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) used the ‘US factor’ throughout the nuclear dispute to defend themselves from intra-EU criticisms, build support for their policy line or persuade the other member states to take difficult decisions. On the other hand, EU unity facilitated transatlantic convergence. During the Bush presidency, the E3 managed to moderate US requests for tougher action by insisting that the European Union would only support coercive measures if they were incremental, reversible and had a legal basis in Security Council resolutions. When Obama took office and steered US policy closer to EU preferences, the E3/EU could argue that EU-sanctioned coercive measures were a way to strengthen Obama’s hand in forcing Iran back to the negotiating table and fend off criticisms from America’s Middle Eastern allies and their supporters in the US Congress.

The Action/1: E3 Leadership and EU Ownership

Intra-EU leadership on Iran always remained the product of a bargain. France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) had to strike a balance between two potentially conflicting needs: first, ensure that they remained in control of the EU Iran policy; second, promote a sense of EU-wide ownership of their action. Being in the Iran group gave the E3 obvious advantages: exclusive access to Iran (at least on nuclear matters), selective intra-EU information sharing, intra-EU alliances and the endorsement of the Security Council. The E3’s policy-making capacity, however, ultimately rested on the ability to promote an EU-wide sense of ownership of their initiative, which the E3 achieved by giving the group’s outsiders a degree of participation and representation through the involvement of the High Representative in the negotiation.