Richard B. Brandt

A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses

IF WE AIM to formulate and defend a utilitarian theory of excuses, we should begin with a rough indication of what the theory is to be about-what, in broad terms, an excuse is-and with a statement making clear what kind of theory is to be offered -whether a definition or explication, or a normative statement, or what. The following introductory remarks are intended to do these things. We speak of something as excused or inexcused only when something has gone wrong. If a boy goes to school on time, is there all day, and works hard, the question whether something is excused does not arise. It arises only if he is absent, comes late, dawdles, and so on. Suppose he is tardy, and presents an excuse. What does he do? If the excuse is a good or valid one, he presents some explanation of his lateness, which shows that the tardiness was not a result of lack of diligence in conforming to the schools rules (and so forth). As a consequence he does not have to stay after school, do extra homework, or be otherwise disciplined. The excuse, while not a denial that something untoward occurred, prevents both the imputation of some kind of fault to the agent and the application of punishment or sanction. We may generalize this, and say that excuses are offered only when some form of behavior-behavior taken very broadly, we shall see-is in some way out of line; and a good excuse is some story or explanation which prevents an imputation of some fault to the agent, and just application of a penalty. Excuses in this sense comprise that part of criminal justice usually discussed in legal textbooks under the heading of responsibility. Suppose, for example, a woman has shot her husband. In the normal course of events she would be charged with homicide and be punished if found guilty. She can, however, admit that she shot her husband, but offer an explanation of the event which prevents the imputation of a guilty mind (mens rea) and the application of the penalty; she can say that the shooting was accidental, or that she mistook her husband for a burglar, that she was tempo-

Law, Liberty, and Morality.

In this book Professor Hart examines the use of criminal law to enforce morality, in particular sexual morality. He considers the views of experts from J. S. Mill to Lord Devlin, and argues that their challenges fail to recognise distinctions of vital importance for legal and political theory.