Richard G. Vanden Bergh

Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy

We draw on the Positive Political Theory literature to develop insights into how firms decide whether to lobby legislatures or agencies in order to gain favorable policy outcomes. We present a simple structural model of the interaction among a firm, a legislature, an executive, a court and an agency to illustrate how, even if the agency has responsibility for implementing public policy, the firm will, under the right conditions, lobby the legislature instead to bring about a change in policy. Accordingly, we contribute to the existing non-market strategy literature by incorporating institutional players other than the legislature into the analysis, and by addressing the question of how firms allocate lobbying resources across the different branches of government.

The Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts

One of the most important developments in theories of American bureaucracy has been the claim that organizational procedures that are enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance. This development has been accompanied, however, by limited empirical investigation. We address this gap by examining the conditions under which administrative procedure acts (APAs) are adopted by the states. In particular, we test five hypotheses derived from the literature as to when a state‐level APA (SLAPA) will be adopted. In general, two conditions increase the likelihood that a SLAPA will be adopted: (1) when Democratic legislative supermajorities face a Republican governor and (2) when Democratic control is perceived to be temporary. These results indicate that existing theories emphasizing agency and dynamic effects are empirically valid, albeit with an important qualification: there is a distinctive partisan bias in the usefulness of administrative procedures for these purposes.One of the most important developments in theories of American bureaucracy has been the claim that organizational procedures that are enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance. This development has been accompanied, however, by limited empirical investigation. We address this gap by examining the conditions under which administrative procedure acts (APAs) are adopted by the states. In particular, we test five hypotheses derived from the literature as to when a state-level APA (SLAPA) will be adopted. In general, two conditions increase the likelihood that a SLAPA will be adopted: (1) when Democratic legislative supermajorities face a Republican governor and (2) when Democratic control is perceived to be temporary. These results indicate that existing theories emphasizing agency and dynamic effects are empirically valid, albeit with an important qualification: there is a distinctive partisan bias in the usefulness of administrative procedures for these purposes.

Toward A Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making

State Supreme Courts have grown in importance during the last thirty years in the formation of public policy. Their judgements determine many aspects of constitutional law, tort reform, judicial selection, and campaign finance reform, among others. A vast body of literature has been developed that analyzes State Supreme Court decision making, which emphasizes the conditioning effects of the legal and institutional environment. This article expands on this previous work by incorporating the interaction of the judiciary with other government institutions, and applies the Positive Political Theory approach to law and legal institutions to the State Supreme Court. In addition, the neo-institutionalist literature of the selection process is incorporated to defend a systematic approach towards decision making. Towards that end, this article explores how judicial decisions are conditioned by institutional rules, resulting in a formal modeling of how the State Supreme Courts interact with political actors to form constitutional interpretation. This model includes the judicial selection processretention or competitive reelectionand is extended to constitutional amendment rules, explaining how these two interact rather than acting independently. Finally, the hypothesis is tested that when State Supreme Court judges face retention elections and political preferences are homogeneous, the probability increases of observing constitutional amendment prosposals.

Institutions and Firm Strategy: Exploring the Interface between Firms and Institutions

Firms competing in international markets face a host of challenges. Understanding market conditions and risks is important, but equally salient are institutional issues. This symposium will feature...