Robert Balas

Can the Formation of Conditioned Attitudes Be Intentionally Controlled

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). Counter to views that EC is the product of automatic learning processes, recent research has revealed various characteristics of nonautomatic processing in EC. The current research investigated whether the formation of conditioned attitudes can be intentionally controlled. Whereas EC effects on self-reported evaluations were reduced (enhanced) when participants were instructed to prevent (promote) the influence of CS-US pairings, EC effects on an evaluative priming measure remained unaffected by control instructions. Moreover, although EC effects on self-reported evaluations varied as a function of evaluative priming effects and recollective memory for CS-US pairings, motivation to control the influence of CS-US pairings qualified only the predictive relation of recollective memory. The results highlight functionally distinct contributions of uncontrollable encoding-related processes and controllable expression-related processes to EC effects.

Propositional Versus Dual-Process Accounts of Evaluative Conditioning: I. The Effects of Co-Occurrence and Relational Information on Implicit and Explicit Evaluations

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). According to propositional accounts, EC effects should be qualified by the relation between the CS and the US. Dual-process accounts suggest that relational information should qualify EC effects on explicit evaluations, whereas implicit evaluations should reflect the frequency of CS–US co-occurrences. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, when relational information was provided before the encoding of CS–US pairings, it moderated EC effects on explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. In Experiment 3, relational information moderated EC effects on both explicit and implicit evaluations when it was provided simultaneously with CS–US pairings. Frequency of CS–US pairings had no effect on implicit evaluations. Although the results can be reconciled with both propositional and dual-process accounts, they are more parsimoniously explained by propositional accounts.

On the influence of affective states on intuitive coherence judgements.

Recent research has shown that coherence judgements of semantically related word triads are facilitated by a subtle positive response triggered by their increased fluency of processing. Such positive affective response serves as a cue indicating semantic coherence. However, we argue that the fluency of processing is not the only source of affective response that can influence intuitive judgements. The present study investigated differential influences of mood and affective valence of solution words on intuitive coherence judgements. We show that affective cues resulting from processing fluency can be strengthened or weakened by inducing positive or negative affective response through the activation of solutions to semantically coherent triads. Also, mood is shown to impact the breadth of activated associations therefore affecting not only judgements of semantic coherence but also solvability of word triads. We discuss the implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgements of semantic coherence.

Is evaluative conditioning really uncontrollable? A comparative test of three emotion-focused strategies to prevent the acquisition of conditioned preferences.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) because of its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). Counter to views that EC is the product of automatic learning processes, recent research has revealed various characteristics of nonautomatic processing in EC. The current research investigated the controllability of EC by testing the effectiveness of 3 emotion-focused strategies in preventing the acquisition of conditioned preferences: (a) suppression of emotional reactions to the US, (b) reappraisal of the valence of the US, and (c) facial blocking of emotional responses. Although all 3 strategies reduced EC effects on self-reported evaluations by impairing recollective memory for CS-US pairings, they were ineffective in reducing EC effects on an evaluative priming measure. Regardless of the measure, effective control did not depend on the level of arousal elicited by the US. The results suggest that the 3 strategies can influence deliberate CS evaluations through memory-related processes, but they are ineffective in reducing EC effects on spontaneous evaluative responses. Implications for mental process theories of EC are discussed.

Evaluative conditioning may occur with and without contingency awareness

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is considered to play an important role in the attitude formation. One of the ongoing debates in this field concerns the impact of contingency awareness (i.e., awareness of the contingent relationship between conditioned and unconditioned stimulus, CS–US) on the EC occurrence. Despite the claims that EC does not require awareness of CS–US contingencies, the recent studies have claimed just the opposite. However, a number of methodological issues can be raised to undermine those claims. In two experiments, we tried to eliminate potential faults and sought to learn whether EC occurs with or without contingency awareness of either US identity or US valence. We report significant EC effects both with and without contingency awareness. These results provide support for the claim that the EC effects might be produced by independent mechanisms linked to awareness. We also argue that those mechanisms are differently captured by available measures of EC.

Propositional Versus Dual-Process Accounts of Evaluative Conditioning: II. The Effectiveness of Counter-Conditioning and Counter-Instructions in Changing Implicit and Explicit Evaluations

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). Expanding on the debate between dual-process and propositional accounts, two studies investigated the relative effectiveness of counter-conditioning and counter-instructions in reversing EC effects on implicit and explicit evaluations. After conditioned evaluations were acquired via CS-US pairings, participants were either (1) presented with repeated CS-US pairings of the opposite valence or (2) given instructions that the CSs will be paired with USs of the opposite valence. Although both procedures reversed previously conditioned explicit evaluations, only directly experienced CS-US pairings reversed previously conditioned implicit evaluations. The findings question the functional equivalence of counter-conditioning and counter-instructions hypothesized by single-process propositional accounts. Yet, they support dual-process accounts, suggesting that associative and propositional processes jointly contribute to EC effects.

Intuitive (in)coherence judgments are guided by processing fluency, mood and affect.

Recently proposed accounts of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence assume that processing fluency results in a positive affective response leading to successful assessment of semantic coherence. The present paper investigates whether processing fluency may indicate semantic incoherence as well. In two studies, we employ a new paradigm in which participants have to detect an incoherent item among semantically coherent words. In Study 1, we show participants accurately indicating an incoherent item despite not being able to provide an accurate solution to coherent words. Further, this effect is modified by affective valence of solution words that are not retrieved from memory. Study 2 replicates those results and extend them by showing that mood moderates incoherence judgments independently of affective valence of solutions. The results support processing fluency account of intuitive semantic coherence judgments and show that it is not fluency per se but fluency variations that drive judgments.