Robert L. Pfaltzgraff

SALT : implications for arms control in the 1970s

The symposium brought together one of the most distinguished groups of experts on arms control and international security yet assembled from the United States and abroad, from research institutes and universities, and from governments. The wide-ranging discussion that took place during each session of the symposium is succinctly related by the editors to the major themes discussed in the papers.

International security dimensions of space

A collection of essays from a Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy conference which generally views space as an important arena for competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, one in which the U.S. should substantially increase its efforts. Robert Pfaltzgraffs conclusions support President Reagans Strategic Defense Initiative and argue in favor of accelerating work on space-based ballistic missile defense.

The Emerging Global Security Environment

The global security environment of the 1990s is far more complex than in any previous era. Before the end of the decade, several additional states will have acquired formidable military arsenals containing weapons of increasing range, accuracy, and destructiveness for the conduct of high-intensity conflict, with other actors able to project military power within and even beyond their immediate region. At the same time, numerous conflict issues within and between existing states, some based on the revival of historical animosities and others of more recent origin, will fuel the potential for instability, including the possibility of civil war fought even with nuclear weapons. Therefore, the United States will face a continuing need to develop doctrines, technologies, and force structures for an unfolding security environment characterized by dramatic change and instability as well as multipolarity as we move toward and into the twenty-first century.

TABLES AND BOXES

1.1 China – key economic indicators, 2000–05 3 1.2 Measures of activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises, selected years, 1980–2001 9 1.3 The ownership status of Chinese industrial enterprises, 2002 10 2.1 Economic characteristics of the twenty largest countries, 1997 19 2.2 Growth and productivity changes in the pre-reform and reform periods 21 2.3 Shares of Chinese industrial output value by ownership, 1978–93 32 2.4 Structure of domestic savings, 1978–94 38 3.1 A profile of China’s state-owned enterprises, 2001 52 3.2 Employment by nature of enterprise, selected years, 1980–2001 53 3.3 State-owned industrial units, 1993–2002 55 3.4 Forms of foreign direct investment in China, 1979–2002 58 3.5 Transformation of small and medium enterprises in China, by 2000 69 3.6 Measures of the financial performance of Chinese state enterprises relative to all enterprises, 1994–2000 73 3.7 China’s 20 largest listed corporations, 2004 79 3.8 Outline of the enterprise reform process 82 4.1 Distribution of productive assets in the Chinese agricultural sector, 1978 and 1985 106 4.2 Employment in certain non-state enterprises, for selected years 1981–2001 107 6.1 Household saving and bank deposits, 1978–2000 190 6.2 Chinese banking institutions (end 2003) 205 6.3 New finance raised in Chinese financial markets, 1995–2004 206 6.4 Short-term lending by China’s national state banks to various sectors, 1985–2003 208 6.5 Equity structure of stocks listed on China’s stock markets, 1992–2004 210 6.6 Sources of financing for private enterprises in China, based on various samples 214 7.1 Estimates of non-performing loans of Chinese banks, 1994–2004 228

The Global Politics of Arms Sales.

Marshaling a great deal of new information in a highly readable manner, the author explains the reasons for the dramatic expansion of arms sales during the past decade and clearly traces such trends as the rise in sophistication of weapons being sold so as to include the most advanced technologies, and the shift in sales to unstable parts of the Third World.Originally published in 1982.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The Superpower Relationship and U.S. National Security Policy in the 1980s

In retrospect, the United States has experienced repeated failure in the efforts of successive administrations over the last decade to bring about an improved relationship with the Soviet Union because of fundamentally different Soviet and American security interests and objectives and conceptions of the role of force in international politics. The debate in the United States about the SALT II Treaty provided the basis for a broader discussion of the adequacy of American defense capabilities in light of the growth of Soviet capabilities and the manifest propensity to extend Soviet influence by direct means, as in Afghanistan, or by the use of surrogates, as in Africa. In the years ahead, the United States faces the need both to rebuild its military forces and to fashion a global political strategy that deters the Soviet Union from exploiting whatever advantages may be perceived to accrue from vast military capabilities during this period of vulnerability in which interests vital to the United States and its allies will be at stake.

Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden. Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites. Pp. xii, 447. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969.

tage clearly lay in attaching herself firmly to that coalition, which itself could survive only on the basis of close AngloFrench cooperation. For reasons carefully sketched out by the author, it proved impossible for Henry to convince the unimaginative James of the benefits of committing himself to the French position. Central to that position was the policy of promoting war between Spain and her Dutch enemies. James systematically undermined this chief pillar of Henry’s design by a peace policy which, in helping to end the quarreling of Dutch and Spaniards, freed them to compete with England in maritime rivalry, and so betrayed England’s own best interest. Lee shows further that Henry, by masterful subterfuge, almost succeeded in hoodwinking James, in spite of himself, into an anti-Hapsburg alliance over the JuIich-Cleves succession question. Henry’s assassination in 1610 not only collapsed this plan, however, but also led France, under the regency of Henry’s incompetent wife Marie de Medici, into a long period of diplomatic drift and even accommodation with the Hapsburgs. With neither the resources, the resolution, nor the understanding to fill the position of leadership vacated by Henry IV, James too, drifted toward a policy of accommodation with Spain-a policy which in no way accorded with England’s interests and which, for that reason, resulted in a kind of diplomatic isolation with disastrous later results.

12.50

For much of the twentieth century, the United States has sought to prevent hostile powers from gaining ascend ancy in Europe and the Pacific Basin because the security of these regions was deemed vital to her security. Several con straints now limit U.S. influence in Europe and Asia: (1) the changed strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in which, under conditions of nuclear parity, the stakes for which the United States would risk its own destruc tion for defense of overseas commitments increase; (2) the willingness of U.S. elites and public opinion to continue to support large-scale conventional forces abroad is reduced; and (3) the international system has evolved toward a limited multipolarity with the emergence of potential new power centers in Europe and Asia. The formidable task facing the United States over the next decade is to maintain sufficient forces abroad to safeguard its interests and to preserve the residual linkage between U.S. strategic deterrence and local security in Europe and Asia, while encouraging the development of power centers less de pendent upon her for their security. The immediate and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, especially from Europe, would render difficult, if not impossible, the achievement of such goals.