Robert Nola

Constructivism in Science and Science Education: A Philosophical Critique

This paper argues that constructivist science education works with an unsatisfactory account of knowledge which affects both its account of the nature of science and of science education. The paper begins with a brief survey of realism and anti-realism in science and the varieties of constructivism that can be found. In the second section the important conception of knowledge and teaching that Plato develops in the Meno is contrasted with constructivism. The section ends with an account of the contribution that Vico (as understood by constructivists), Kant and Piaget have made to constructivist doctrines. Section three is devoted to a critique of the theory of knowledge and the anti-realism of von Glaserfeld. The final section considers the connection, or lack of it, between the constructivist view of science and knowledge and the teaching of science.

Pendula, Models, Constructivism and Reality

It is argued that Galileo made an important breakthrough in the methodology of science by considering idealized models of phenomena such as free fall, swinging pendula and the like, which can conflict with experience. The idealized models are constructs largely by our reasoning processes applied to the theoretical situation at hand. On this view, scientific knowledge is not a construction out of experience, as many constructivists claim about both the methods of science and about the learning of science. In fact Galileo’s models can, depending on their degree of idealization or concretization, be at variance with experience. This paper considers what is meant by idealization and concretization of both the objects and properties that make up theoretical models, and the ideal laws that govern them. It also provides brief illustrations of ideal laws and how they may be made more concrete, and briefly considers how theories and models might be tested against what we observe. Finally some difficulties are raised for a radical constructivist approach to both science and learning in the light of Galileo’s methodological approach. The upshot is that both the dialogue structure of Galileo’s writings and his method of model building provide a rich resource for science education that rivals that of the standard varieties of constructivism, and at the same time gives a much better picture of the actual procedures of science itself.

A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method

For some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year’s debate, the continuation of which can be summed up as yet more of the proverbial deceased equine castigation. We beg to differ. There are reasons for the negative view, however, some of which will be canvassed in this selective survey of the territory the debate about theories of method has traversed in the second half of the twentieth century. The territory is very wide-ranging. It is hard to find a perspective from which one can get an overall view. If one focuses on one part of the philosophical debate about method then others go out of focus or do not come into view at all. What will be attempted here is a number of snapshots of the philosophical landscape which hopefully convey, if not the whole picture, something of the debate over method that has taken place.

Theories of Scientific Method: An Introduction

Abbreviations Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: The idea of methodolgy 1. What is this thing called scientific method? 2. Theoretical values in science 3. Rules and principles of method 4. Metamethodology Part II: Inductive and hypothetico-deductive methods 5. Induction in science 6. Some justifications of induction 7. The hypothetico-deductive method Part III: Probability and scientific method 8. Probability, bayesianism and methodology 9. Bayesianism: applications and problems Part IV: Popper and his rivals 10. Popper, Lakatos and scientific method 11. Kuhn and Feyerabend Part V: Naturalism, pragmatism, realism and methodology 12. Naturalism, pragmatism and method 13. Scientific realism and methodology Epilogue Notes Bibliography Index

The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: the Case of the Electron

The pessimistic meta-induction attempts to make a case for the lack of ontological continuity with theory change; in contrast, its rival the optimistic meta-induction makes a case for considerable ontological continuity. The optimistic meta-induction is argued for in the case of the origin, and continuity, of our talk of electrons (even though the term “electron” was not initially used). The case is made by setting the history of identifying reference to electrons in the context of a generalised version of Russell’s theory of descriptions, Ramsey’s theory of theoretical terms and a development of these ideas by David Lewis.

Saving Kuhn from the Sociologists of Science

For many in the science education community Kuhn is often closely identified with a sociological approach, as opposed to a philosophical approach, to matters raised in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This paper is an attempt to liberate Kuhn from too close an association with the sociology of scientific knowledge. While Kuhn was interested in some sociological issues concerning science, e.g., how to individuate communities of scientists, many of his other interests were not sociological. In fact in later writings he was quite hostile to the claims of the Strong Programme. This difference in his post-Structure writings is explored, along with his model of weighted values as an account of theory choice. This model has little in common with the model of theory choice advocated by Strong Programmers and much more in common with traditional philosophical concerns about theory choice.

Incredulity towards Lyotard: A critique of a postmodernist account of science and knowledge

Abstract Philosophers of science have paid little attention, positive or negative, to Lyotard’s book The postmodern condition, even though it has been popular in other fields. We set out some of the reasons for this neglect. Lyotard thought that sciences could be justified by non-scientific narratives (a position he later abandoned). We show why this is unacceptable, and why many of Lyotard’s characterisations of science are either implausible or are narrowly positivist. One of Lyotard’s themes is that the nature of knowledge has changed and thereby so has society itself. However much of what Lyotard says muddles epistemological matters about the definition of ‘knowledge’ with sociological claims about how information circulates in modern society. We distinguish two kinds of legitimation of science: epistemic and socio-political. In proclaiming ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ Lyotard has nothing to say about how epistemic and methodological principles are to be justified (legitimated). He also gives a bad argument as to why there can be no epistemic legitimation, which is based on an act/content confusion, and a confusion between making an agreement and the content of what is agreed to. As for socio-political legitimation, Lyotard’s discussion remains at the abstract level of science as a whole rather than at the level of the particular applications of sciences. Moreover his positive points can be accepted without taking on board any of his postmodernist account of science. Finally we argue that Lyotard’s account of paralogy, which is meant to provide a ‘postmodern’ style of justification, is a failure.

Realism through Manipulation, and by Hypothesis

Metaphysical, or ontological, realism with respect to the unobservables of science is the view that unobservable objects, properties of objects, events and processes exist independently of what we believe, perceive or say there is in the world, or what linguistic framework we use to talk about the world. Thus there are electrons, and they do have charge, spin and mass, they are involved in emission events during neutron decay, and enough of them moving in the right way constitute the workings of computers. Under this heading can be found the scientific entity realism advocated by Ellis, Devitt, Hacking, Cartwright and Hellman amongst many others.1 Arguments will be canvassed in this paper in support of this kind of robust scientific realism. Such a realism stands opposed to varieties of anti-realism ranging from constructive empiricism (which remains sceptical, not only about the truth or verisimilitude of our theories even though the theories do have truth values, but also claims about what exists), to the constructivism of many sociologists of science.

Ramsification, Reference Fixing and Incommensurability

Though Kuhn and Feyerabend introduced the idea of referential incommensurability, many have found their account problematic. Subsequent developments in the theory of reference which address some of these problems are reviewed here, from the Kripke and Putnam semantics to the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis account of theoretical terms with recent modifications due to Papineau. However Stich argues that such theories of reference can do no work towards solving issues in the philosophy of science. To overcome this objection, and to remedy some remaining shortcomings in the Ramsey apparatus used, we provide some epistemic conditions for naming. The resulting account yields a less problematic understanding of incommensurability, one that is consistent with realism.

Introduction: Some Issues Concerning Relativism and Realism in Science

Realism is an interpretation of scientific theories nearly as old as science itself. When Aristotle presented Eudoxus’ theory of nested concentric rotating spheres devised to account for the motions of the planets and stars, he assumed that it gave a picture of how the cosmos was actually constructed. His immediate successors were less sanguine about the possibility that any scientific theory, whether of concentric spheres or of combinations of epicycles and deferents, could provide us with such a picture at all. They were early instrumentalists who preferred to regard theories as devices whose task was only, as they put it, “to save the phenomena”. Realism and instrumentalism are rival views of science; a third rival is relativism.