Rodney Falvey

Trade Liberalisation and Human Capital Adjustment

This paper highlights the way in which workers of different age and ability are affected by anticipated and unanticipated trade liberalisations. A two-factor (skilled and unskilled labour), two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin trade model is supplemented with a education sector which uses skilled labour and time to convert unskilled workers into skilled workers. A skilled worker’s income depends on her ability, but all unskilled workers have the same income. Trade liberalisation in a relatively skilled labour abundant country increases the relative skilled wage and induces skill upgrading by the existing workforce, with younger and more able unskilled workers most likely to upgrade. But not all upgraders are better off as a result of the liberalisation. The older and less able upgraders are likely to lose. For an anticipated liberalisation we show that the preferred upgrading strategies depend on a worker’s ability and that much of the upgrading will take place before the liberalisation. Hence some workers who would have upgraded had they anticipated the liberalisation will not if it is unanticipated, and that adjustment assistance that applies only to post-liberalisation upgraders will fail to compensate some losers and distort the upgrading decisions of others.

Does Trade Weaken Product Quality Standards

In this paper we investigate the interrelationships between trade and national minimum quality standards. We employ a simple partial equilibrium model in which national regulators set a minimum quality standard for a product whose quality is unobservable to consumers prior to purchase. Both producers and consumers can benefit from a minimum standard, but the former prefer a lower standard to the latter. Because producers are organized and consumers are not, the standards set by national regulators may tend to unduly favor producer interests. We focus on two specific issues: first, how the weight given to producer interests affects the outcomes in autarky and the open economy; and, second, how outcomes differ when the effects of standards on trade are explicitly taken into account or ignored in standard setting in the open economy.

Competitive and harmonized R&D policies for international R&D alliances involving asymmetric firms

We examine R&D policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in R&D capabilities, select among three forms of R&D alliance and adopt a profit�?sharing rule if they coordinate their R&D decisions. When firms coordinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen, but if governments harmonize their policies, they decide not to intervene. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance chosen. Agreements to share R&D information can outperform those with both coordination and sharing as a result of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.

The Impact of Financial Market Frictions on Trade Flows, Capital Flows and Economic Development

We introduce financial frictions in a two sector model of international trade with heterogeneous agents. The level of specialization in the economy (economic development) depends on the quality of financial institutions. Underdeveloped financial markets prohibit an economy to specialize in sectors where finance is important. Capital flows and international trade are complements when countries differ in the degree of development of their financial sectors. Capital flows to countries with more robust financial institutions which in turn allow their economies to develop sectors that are financially dependent.

The theory of trade policy and reform

Historically, trade taxes have been an important source of government revenue in subsistence-oriented economies with large informal sectors. As countries developed and economic activity became more market-oriented, governments sourced revenue from broader, more efficient tax bases. But trade taxes remained, with protection of domestic import-competing activity, rather than revenue, becoming their primary motivation. This shift of motivation also facilitated the substitution of alternative policies, quantitative restrictions for example, which would limit import competition without necessarily generating revenue.

Explaining International Differences in the Prices of Tradables and Non-Tradables (with a New Zealand Perspective)

The World Banks International Comparison Program (ICP) data on national price levels for tradables and non-tradables (and goods compared to services) reveals that New Zealand has relatively high prices of both tradables and non-tradables when compared to a sample of over 40 OECD-Eurostat countries (Gemmell, 2013). The present paper seeks to explain both those observed international variations in non-tradables and tradables prices in general, and New Zealands especially high prices in particular.

Competitive and harmonised R&D policies for international R&D alliances involving asymmetric firms

We examine research and development (R&D) policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in their R&D capabilities, and adopt a profit-sharing rule when R&D decisions are coordinated. National R&D tax/subsidy policies are set independently or harmonized. When firms coordinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen. But there is no intervention if policies are harmonized. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance choosen. Agreements to share R&D information may be preferred to those combining coordination of R&D decisions and information sharing because of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.