Romain Brenguier

Concurrent games with ordered objectives

We consider concurrent games played on graphs, in which each player has several qualitative (e.g. reachability or Buchi) objectives, and a preorder on these objectives (for instance the counting order, where the aim is to maximise the number of objectives that are fulfilled). We study two fundamental problems in that setting: (1) the value problem, which aims at deciding the existence of a strategy that ensures a given payoff; (2) the Nash equilibrium problem, where we want to decide the existence of a Nash equilibrium (possibly with a condition on the payoffs). We characterise the exact complexities of these problems for several relevant preorders, and several kinds of objectives.

Nash equilibria for reachability objectives in multi-player timed games

We propose a procedure for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player timed games with reachability objectives. Our procedure is based on the construction of a finite concurrent game, and on a generic characterization of Nash equilibria in (possibly infinite) concurrent games. Along the way, we use our characterization to compute Nash equilibria in finite concurrent games.

Pure nash equilibria in concurrent deterministic games

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives that she achieves.)

The complexity of admissibility in Omega-regular games

Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games played on graphs with ω-regular objectives. In this paper, we study the algorithmic properties of this concept for such games. We settle the exact complexity of natural decision problems on the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. As a byproduct of our construction, we obtain automata which recognize all the possible outcomes of such strategies.

Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Büchi Objectives

We study the problem of computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with Buchi-definable objectives. First, when the objectives are Buchi conditions on the game, we prove that the existence problem can be solved in polynomial time. In a second part, we extend our technique to objectives defined by deterministic Buchi automata, and prove that the problem then becomes EXPTIME-complete. We prove PSPACE-completeness for the case where the Buchi automata are 1-weak.

The first reactive synthesis competition (SYNTCOMP 2014)

We introduce the reactive synthesis competition (SYNTCOMP), a long-term effort intended to stimulate and guide advances in the design and application of synthesis procedures for reactive systems. The first iteration of SYNTCOMP is based on the controller synthesis problem for finite-state systems and safety specifications. We provide an overview of this problem and existing approaches to solve it, and report on the design and results of the first SYNTCOMP. This includes the definition of the benchmark format, the collection of benchmarks, the rules of the competition, and the five synthesis tools that participated. We present and analyze the results of the competition and draw conclusions on the state of the art. Finally, we give an outlook on future directions of SYNTCOMP.

The Second Reactive Synthesis Competition (SYNTCOMP 2015)

We report on the design and results of the second reactive synthesis competition (SYNTCOMP 2015). We describe our extended benchmark library, with 6 completely new sets of benchmarks, and additional challenging instances for 4 of the benchmark sets that were already used in SYNTCOMP 2014. To enhance the analysis of experimental results, we introduce an extension of our benchmark format with meta-information, including a difficulty rating and a reference size for solutions. Tools are evaluated on a set of 250 benchmarks, selected to provide a good coverage of benchmarks from all classes and difficulties. We report on changes of the evaluation scheme and the experimental setup. Finally, we describe the entrants into SYNTCOMP 2015, as well as the results of our experimental evaluation. In our analysis, we emphasize progress over the tools that participated last year.

Assume-admissible synthesis

In this paper, we introduce a novel rule for synthesis of reactive systems, applicable to systems made of n components which have each their own objectives. This rule is based on the notion of admissible strategies. We compare this rule with previous rules defined in the literature, and show that contrary to the previous proposals, it defines sets of solutions which are rectangular. This property leads to solutions which are robust and resilient, and allows one to synthesize strategies separately for each agent. We provide algorithms with optimal complexity and also an abstraction framework compatible with the new rule.

Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis

In this invited contribution, we summarize new solution concepts useful for the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.

Pareto Curves of Multidimensional Mean−Payoff Games

In this paper, we study the set of thresholds that the protagonist can force in a zero-sum two-player multidimensional mean-payoff game. The set of maximal elements of such a set is called the Pareto curve, a classical tool to analyze trade-offs. As thresholds are vectors of real numbers in multiple dimensions, there exist usually an infinite number of such maximal elements. Our main results are as follow. First, we study the geometry of this set and show that it is definable as a finite union of convex sets given by linear inequations. Second, we provide a \(\varSigma _2\) P algorithm to decide if this set intersects a convex set defined by linear inequations, and we prove the optimality of our algorithm by providing a matching complexity lower bound for the problem. Furthermore, we show that, under natural assumptions, i.e. fixed number of dimensions and polynomially bounded weights in the game, the problem can be solved in deterministic polynomial time. Finally, we show that the Pareto curve can be effectively constructed, and under the former natural assumptions, this construction can be done in deterministic polynomial time.