Rüdiger F. Pohl

Ignorance- versus evidence-based decision making: A decision time analysis of the recognition heuristic.

According to part of the adaptive toolbox notion of decision making known as the recognition heuristic (RH), the decision process in comparative judgments-and its duration-is determined by whether recognition discriminates between objects. By contrast, some recently proposed alternative models predict that choices largely depend on the amount of evidence speaking for each of the objects and that decision times thus depend on the evidential difference between objects, or the degree of conflict between options. This article presents 3 experiments that tested predictions derived from the RH against those from alternative models. All experiments used naturally recognized objects without teaching participants any information and thus provided optimal conditions for application of the RH. However, results supported the alternative, evidence-based models and often conflicted with the RH. Recognition was not the key determinant of decision times, whereas differences between objects with respect to (both positive and negative) evidence predicted effects well. In sum, alternative models that allow for the integration of different pieces of information may well provide a better account of comparative judgments.

Recognizing Users of the Recognition Heuristic

The recognition heuristic is hypothesized to be a frugal inference strategy assuming that inferences are based on the recognition cue alone. This assumption, however, has been questioned by existing research. At the same time most studies rely on the proportion of choices consistent with the heuristic as a measure of its use which may not be fully appropriate. In this study, we propose an index to identify true users of the heuristic contrasting them to decision makers who incorporate further knowledge beyond recognition. The properties and the applicability of the proposed index are investigated in the reanalyses of four published experiments and corroborated by a new study drawn up to rectify the shortcomings of the reanalyzed experiments. Applying the proposed index to explore the influence of knowledge we found that participants who were more knowledgeable made use of the information available to them and achieved the highest proportion of correct inferences.

One-reason decision-making unveiled: A measurement model of the recognition heuristic

The fast-and-frugal recognition heuristic (RH) theory provides a precise process description of comparative judgments. It claims that, in suitable domains, judgments between pairs of objects are based on recognition alone, whereas further knowledge is ignored. However, due to the confound between recognition and further knowledge, previous research lacked an unbiased measure of RH use. Also, model comparisons have not been based on goodness-of-fit and model complexity as criteria. To overcome both limitations we introduce and test a multinomial processing tree model showing that it fits empirical data and provides an unbiased measure of RH use. Analyses of 8 data sets reveal that the RH alone cannot account for the data, not even when it is implemented in a probabilistic way. That is, information integration beyond recognition plays a vital role and cannot merely account for empirical data better due to model flexibility. Also, we present several validations of the central model parameter and provide demonstrations of how the model can be applied to study the less-is-more effect as well as determinants of (and individual differences in) RH use. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Research on hindsight bias: A rich past, a productive present, and a challenging future

In this introduction to the present issue, we give a brief description of the phenomenon. Subsequently, we discuss the major theoretical accounts, focusing on how these are related to the papers included in the issue.

The Effects of Feedback Source and Plausibility of Hindsight Bias

Whenever people try to recollect an earlier given estimate after they have received feedback about the true solution, they tend to overestimate what they had known in foresight. This phenomenon is known as “hindsight bias”. This paper reports three attempts to eliminate hindsight bias by labelling the feedback value as another persons estimate (instead of as the solution) and by providing extremely incorrect (instead of the true) values as feedback. Both variations, however alone and in combination failed to reduce hindsight bias. Only when the data were separated according to whether participants considered the feedback value plausible or not did cases of unbiased recollections emerge: Feedback values that were labelled as estimates of another person and found to be implausible did not lead to hindsight bias. This finding argues against the view that hindsight bias is an automatic and unavoidable effect of feedback presentation.

Fluent, Fast, and Frugal? A Formal Model Evaluation of the Interplay between Memory, Fluency, and Comparative Judgments.

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency-that is, the speed with which objects are recognized-will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes.

Effort reduction after self-control depletion: The role of cognitive resources in use of simple heuristics

Heuristics have been described as decision strategies that save time and effort. Given this advantageous property, heuristics should be more often used when cognitive resources are scarce. We tested this general view with respect to the fast and frugal recognition heuristic which assumes one-reason decision making based on recognition alone whenever one object in a paired comparison is recognised and the other is not. In an experiment, we manipulated cognitive resources through an executive control procedure previously used in ego-depletion research. From the choice frequencies, the probability of using the recognition heuristic was estimated by means of a multinomial processing tree model. Results confirmed that use of the recognition heuristic was indeed more likely under depleted resources and thus limited cognitive capacity. These findings corroborate the general notion that a need for effort reduction fosters use of simple decision heuristics.

Das autobiographische Gedächtnis

Das Gedachtnis ist der Aufbewahrungsort aller Erinnerungen. Seine wesentliche Funktion besteht darin, Erinnerungen so aufzuarbeiten und zu speichern, dass sie fur zukunftige Situationen nutzbar sind. Alle Erfahrungen, die jemand macht, konnen zu einem Bestandteil des eigenen Gedachtnisses werden. Die einzelnen Erinnerungen konnen verschiedene Informationen beinhalten. Kognitive Psychologen unterscheiden einen prozeduralen Anteil des Gedachtnisses, der nicht-verbalisierbare Informationen enthalt, wie z. B. automatisierte motorische Ablaufe, und einen deklarativen (verbalisierbaren) Anteil. Das deklarative Gedachtnis wird weiter in einen semantischen und einen episodischen Teil unterteilt (s. Kap. I.1). Das semantische (bedeutungs-haltige) Gedachtnis enthalt Faktenwissen, wie beispielsweise, dass Paris die Hauptstadt von Frankreich ist, wahrend das episodische (erfah-rungshaltige) aus zeitlich datierbaren Erlebnissen besteht, wie beispielsweise, dass ich 1994 mit meiner Frau einen romantischen Urlaub in Paris verbracht habe.

Hindsight bias as a function of anchor distance and anchor plausibility

This study explored the influence of anchor distance on hindsight bias and how the subjective plausibility of different anchors moderates this relation. In addition to the standard memory design used in hindsight bias research, participants were asked to indicate the range of values for possible answers to difficult almanac questions. Varying anchor distance on the basis of each participants individual range of possible answers showed (1) that anchor plausibility decreased with increasing anchor distance following a non-linear monotone function, (2) that size of hindsight bias initially increased with increasing anchor distance but, from a certain distance, started to decrease, and (3) that hindsight bias was found to be always higher for plausible than for implausible anchors.

A matter of time: Antecedents of one-reason decision making based on recognition ☆

The notion of adaptive decision making implies that strategy selection in both inferences and preferences is driven by a trade-off between accuracy and effort. A strategy for probabilistic inferences which is particularly attractive from this point of view is the recognition heuristic (RH). It proposes that judgments rely on recognition in isolation-ignoring any further information that might be available-and thereby allows for substantial effort-reduction. Consequently, it is herein hypothesized that and tested whether increased necessity of effort-reduction-as implemented via time pressure-fosters reliance on the RH. Two experiments corroborated that this was the case, even with relatively mild time pressure. In addition, this result held even when non-compliance with the response deadline did not yield negative monetary consequences. The current investigations are among the first to tackle the largely open question of whether effort-related factors influence the reliance on heuristics in memory-based decisions.