Sean Fox

Political order, development and social violence

Why are some countries more prone to social violence than others? Despite the fact that annual deaths due to homicides worldwide outnumber those due to organized armed conflict by a factor of roughly 3 to 1, this question has received very little attention from conflict and development specialists in recent years. As a modest first step in addressing this gap in the literature we draw together insights from the conflict and criminology literatures to develop a model of social violence that accounts for both political-institutional and socio-economic factors. While there is an extensive literature on the socio-economic determinants of social violence, there are only a handful of studies that consider the significance of political-institutional arrangements. Using cross-country estimates of homicides produced by the World Health Organization as an indicator of social violence, we test our model using OLS regression analysis for a sample of more than 120 countries. We find that countries with ‘hybrid’ political orders experience higher rates of social violence than those with strong autocratic or strong democratic regimes, and that weakly institutionalized democracies are particularly violent. We also find robust associations between indicators of poverty, inequality and ethnic diversity and social violence. These results indicate that social and political violence share some common underlying causes. We conclude by suggesting that the apparent global decline in organized armed conflict and the concomitant rise in social violence in recent decades may be linked to world urbanization and the ‘third wave’ of democratization in the global South, although further research is required to confirm this hypothesis.

Understanding the dynamics of Nigeria’s urban transition: A refutation of the ‘stalled urbanisation’ hypothesis:

Nigeria contains some of Africa’s oldest and newest cities, hosts five of the 30 largest urban settlements on the continent, and is estimated to have the biggest urban population on the continent. Yet many of the basic ‘facts’ about spatial-demographic trends in Nigeria have been contested. Most recently, an article published in World Development in 2012 claimed that urbanisation had stalled in Nigeria. In an effort to establish and explain the stylised facts of Nigeria’s urban transition we analyse demographic and spatial trends drawing on diverse sources, including censuses, household surveys, remotely sensed data and migration studies conducted over the past three decades. The evidence does not support the claim of stalled urbanisation: Nigeria’s urban population is growing rapidly in absolute terms and will continue to increase as a share of the national population because of both rural–urban migration and rural transformation. These drivers of urbanisation are a product of persistently high fertility in a context of declining mortality in both rural and urban areas. Robust economic growth over the past decade likely accelerated urbanisation, but even as the economy slows demographic fundamentals will continue to drive rapid urban growth and urbanisation.

Mitigating Conflict and Violence in African Cities

The process of urbanisation has historically been associated with both socioeconomic development and social strain. Although there is little evidence that urbanisation per se increases the likelihood of conflict or violence in a country, in recent decades Africa has experienced exceptional rates of urban population growth in a context of economic stagnation and poor governance, producing conditions conducive to social unrest and violence. In order to improve urban security in the years ahead, the underlying risk factors must be addressed, including urban poverty, inequality, and fragile political institutions. This, in turn, requires improving urban governance in the region by strengthening the capacity of local government institutions, addressing the complex political dynamics that impede effective urban planning and management, and cultivating integrated development strategies that involve cooperation between various tiers and spheres of government and civil society.

If Immigrants Could Vote in the UK: A Thought Experiment with Data from the 2015 General Election

The distribution of voting rights in the UK is an artefact of history rather than a product of clear legal or philosophical principles. Consequently, some resident aliens (i.e. immigrants) have the right to vote in all UK elections; others can vote in local elections but are excluded from national elections; still others are excluded from all elections. In England and Wales alone, roughly 2.3 million immigrants are excluded from voting in national elections. This exclusion is inconsistent with the founding principle of democracy and distorts political discourse. What if all immigrants could vote in national elections? We estimate that up to ninety-five parliamentary seats could have been won by a different party in the 2015 general election. More substantially, enfranchising all immigrants would require re-drawing UK constituency boundaries. The new electoral map would increase the relative power of urban constituencies and would incentivise some political entrepreneurs and parties to temper anti-immigration rhetoric.