Sergio Moreno-Ríos

A driving-emulation task to study the integration of goals with obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs

This research aims to analyse how drivers integrate the information provided by traffic signs with their general goals (i.e. where they want to go). Some previous studies have evaluated the comparative advantages of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs using a judgement task. In this work, a new experimental task with greater similarity to driving situations is proposed. Participants imagine they are driving a vehicle and must make right or left turn manoeuvres according to a previously indicated objective and the information from obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs. Eighty-two participants took part in two different experiments. According to the results, an obligatory traffic sign is associated with faster and more accurate responses only when the participants initial objective is allowed. When the initial objective was not allowed, an advantage in accuracy was observed with prohibitory traffic signs and there was no significant difference in reaction time between the two types of sign. These results suggest that having an obligatory traffic sign may facilitate a correct response when the drivers goal is effectively allowed, whereas a prohibitory traffic sign could be more effective in preventing error when the driver has a not-allowed goal in mind. However, processing a prohibitory sign requires an extra inference (i.e. deciding which is the allowed manoeuvre), and thus the potential advantage in reaction time of the prohibitory sign may disappear. A second experiment showed that the results could not be explained by a potential congruency effect between the location (left or right) of the road signs and the position of the key or the hand used to respond (such as the Simon effect or the spatial Stroop effect). Also, an increase in the difficulty of the task (using an incongruent hand to respond) affected performance more strongly in experimental conditions that required making inferences. This made the advantage of the obligatory sign over the prohibitory sign in this condition more noteworthy. The evidence gathered in the current study could be of particular interest in some applied research areas, such as the assessment of road traffic signalling strategies or the ergonomic design of GPS navigation systems.

Priming in deduction: A spatial arrangement task

The mental model theory assumes that people reason by manipulating mental representations of states of the world, called “mental models.” In the present study we used a new deduction task based on diagrammatic premises. We show that a premise can prime other premises that induce similar mental models in a way analogous to the case of words with related meanings, which can prime one another. We present three experiments. In Experiment 1 we used an evaluation task. In Experiment 2, a construction task was used. The priming effect was obtained in both cases. In a third experiment we show that the priming effect was still present when participants were instructed to ignore a prime displayed before the premises. In all three experiments we compared determinate and indeterminate problems and found faster responses in the former.

El desarrollo del razonamiento sobre lo que podría haber ocurrido: condicionales indicativos y subjuntivos

Resumen Se evaluaron 117 alumnos de 7 a 14 años y a un grupo de 26 universitarios en una tarea de razonamiento con condicionales fícticos (sobre lo que ocurrió) y semifícticos (sobre lo que podría haber ocurrido). Los resultados mostraron que, como los adultos, los niños aceptaban menos inferencias lógicas con condicionales semifícticos que con fícticos. En general, los resultados no descartan la creencia de que los niños puedan construir una representación doble con enunciados semifícticos. Los patrones evolutivos con ambos tipos de condicionales diferían: con los condicionalesfícticos se daban dos conjuntos de resultados: el primero correspondía a las respuestas inferenciales de los grupo de edad intermedios (de 10 y 14 años) y el segundo, a los grupos de edades extremas (7 y 19 años). Estos resultados apoyan la existencia de diferencias en la representación de los condicionales fícticos. Por otra parte, el patrón de desarrollo con condicionales semifícticos era mís homogéneo, aproximíndose progresivamente a la ejecución de los adultos. El resultado habitual, bloqueo de la falacia afirmación del consecuente, sólo se lograba después de la preadolescencia.

Unless conditionals: New evidence from priming

Using a priming paradigm, the possibilities that people keep in mind in order to understand “unless A, B” were compared to those from “if A, not-B” conditionals. The length of time it took people to read conjunctions as “A and B”, “A and not-B”, “not-A and B”, and “not-A and not-B” after they had been primed by the different conditionals was measured. The results show that, whereas people rely on one possibility to understand “if”, they rely on two possibilities to understand “unless” conditionals. Results are discussed within the mental models framework.

Improvement of Working Memory in Preschoolers and Its Impact on Early Literacy Skills: A Study in Deprived Communities of Rural and Urban Areas.

Research Findings: The present study evaluated the impact of a working memory (WM) stimulation program on the development of WM and early literacy skills (ELS) in preschoolers from socioeconomically deprived rural and urban schools in Chile. The sample consisted of 268 children, 144 in the intervention group and 124 in the comparison group. The computer-based intervention comprised 16 sessions of 30 min each. Children in the intervention group demonstrated significantly more progress in WM than those in the comparison group when we evaluated them 3 months after exposure to the program and controlled for initial differences with an analysis of covariance. ELS were significantly stronger in children who were exposed to the stimulation program, which supports a link between WM and ELS. Practice or Policy: Results suggest that children’s WM can be improved from an early age regardless of socioeconomic context or geographic location (rural or urban). This has direct implications for early education and may compensate for some of the difficulties that children experience when starting school.

Concessive and semifactual interpretations during reasoning with multiple conditionals

The present research evaluates how people integrate factual ‘if then’ and semifactual ‘even if’ conditional premises in an inference task. The theory of mental models establishes that semifactual statements are represented by two mental models with different epistemic status: ‘A & B’ is conjectured and ‘not-A & B’ is presupposed. However, following the principle of cognitive economy in tasks with a high working memory load such as reasoning with multiple conditionals, people could simplify the deduction process in two ways, by discarding: (a) the presupposed case and/or (b) the epistemic status information. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we evaluated each of these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants make inferences from two conditionals: two factual conditionals or one factual and one semifactual, with different representations. In Experiment 2, participants make inferences with a factual conditional followed by two different semifactual conditionals that share the same representations but differ in their epistemic status. Accuracy and latency data suggest that people think of both the conjectured and the presupposed situations, but do not codify the epistemic status of either when the task does not require it. The results are discussed through theoretical predictions about how people make inferences from different connected conditionals.

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

ABSTRACT In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.

Perceptual inferences about indeterminate arrangements of figures.

Previous studies in spatial propositional reasoning showed that adults use a particular strategy for making representations and inferences from indeterminate descriptions (those consistent with different alternatives). They do not initially represent all the alternatives, but construct a unified mental representation that includes a kind of mental footnote. Only when the task requires access to alternatives is the unified representation re-inspected. The degree of generalisation of this proposal to other perceptual situations was evaluated in three experiments with children, adolescents and adults, using a perceptual inference task with diagrammatic premises that gave information about the location of one of three possible objects. Results obtained with this very quick perceptual task support the kind of representation proposed from propositional spatial reasoning studies. However, children and adults differed in accuracy, with the results gradually changing with age: indeterminacy leads adults to require extra time for understanding and inferring alternatives, whereas children commit errors. These results could help inform us of how people can make inferences from diagrammatic information and make wrong interpretations.

Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony

ABSTRACT Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an experts testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the experts testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no advantage for prior disclosure over immediate disclosure. Experiment 3 showed that the pattern of inferences when there was no disclosure mirrored the pattern when it was disclosed that the experts testimony was true rather than false. Participants made more correct inferences from true conjunctions than disjunctions, and from false disjunctions than conjunctions. We discuss the implications for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie human reasoning.

Thinking about social and nonsocial alternative possibilities in premature preschoolers

ABSTRACT Introduction: Prematurely born preschoolers show developmental cognitive delay compared to full-term children. There are important neurological networks developing at preschool age related to perspective taking about the attribution of belief and to deduction with contrary-to-fact situations. Other deductive abilities may be completed during that period. Method: A group of very prematurely born children (N = 35) aged between 4 and 5 years was compared with a control group of children born at full term (N = 35). They completed different cognitive tasks that required making inferences about possible true facts and false facts, and about others’ beliefs. Results: Results showed that preterm children had more difficulties with false beliefs and counterfactual tasks than the controls but they did not differ in equivalent deductive tasks. Conclusions: We discuss the possible difficulties of preterm children when they first reach primary school age, not only with social perspective taking, but also with considering nonsocial contrary-to-fact alternatives. Prematurity is not a syndrome, but could be a risk condition. Therefore, these results are relevant in the field of differential diagnosis—in particular, for children with difficulties in perspective taking, a condition with which children born prematurely could share some characteristics.