Shelley E. Taylor

Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health

Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para

Risky Families: Family Social Environments and the Mental and Physical Health of Offspring

Risky families are characterized by conflict and aggression and by relationships that are cold, unsupportive, and neglectful. These family characteristics create vulnerabilities and/or interact with genetically based vulnerabilities in offspring that produce disruptions in psychosocial functioning (specifically emotion processing and social competence), disruptions in stress-responsive biological regulatory systems, including sympathetic-adrenomedullary and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical functioning, and poor health behaviors, especially substance abuse. This integrated biobehavioral profile leads to consequent accumulating risk for mental health disorders, major chronic diseases, and early mortality. We conclude that childhood family environments represent vital links for understanding mental and physical health across the life span.

Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: the mobilization-minimization hypothesis.

Negative (adverse or threatening) events evoke strong and rapid physiological, cognitive, emotional, and social responses. This mobilization of the organism is followed by physiological, cognitive, and behavioral responses that damp down, minimize, and even erase the impact of that event. This pattern of mobilization-minimization appears to be greater for negative events than for neutral or positive events. Theoretical accounts of this response pattern are reviewed. It is concluded that no single theoretical mechanism can explain the mobilization-minimization pattern, but that a family of integrated process models, encompassing different classes of responses, may account for this pattern of parallel but disparately caused effects.

A stitch in time: self-regulation and proactive coping.

In a conceptual and temporal framework, derived from research on social cognition, social interaction, and stress and coping, the authors analyze the processes through which people anticipate or detect potential stressors and act in advance to prevent them or to mute their impact (proactive coping). The framework specifies five stages in proactive coping: (1) resource accumulation, (2) recognition of potential stressors, (3) initial appraisal, (4) preliminary coping efforts, and (5) elicitation and use of feedback concerning initial efforts. The authors detail the role of individual differences skills, and resources at each stage. They highlight the unique predictions afforded by a focus on proactive coping and the importance of understanding how people avoid and offset potential stressors.

Psychological resources, positive illusions, and health.

Psychological beliefs such as optimism, personal control, and a sense of meaning are known to be protective of mental health. Are they protective of physical health as well? The authors present a program of research that has tested the implications of cognitive adaptation theory and research on positive illusions for the relation of positive beliefs to disease progression among men infected with HIV. The investigations have revealed that even unrealistically optimistic beliefs about the future may be health protective. The ability to find meaning in the experience is also associated with a less rapid course of illness. Taken together, the research suggests that psychological beliefs such as meaning, control, and optimism act as resources, which may not only preserve mental health in the context of traumatic or life-threatening events but be protective of physical health as well.

Modeling Cognitive Adaptation: A Longitudinal Investigation of the Impact of Individual Differences and Coping on College Adjustment and Performance

Drawing on cognitive adaptation theory, optimism, psychological control, and self-esteem were explored as longitudinal predictors of adjustment to college in a sample of 672 freshmen. Although a direct effect of optimism on adjustment was found, most of the predicted effects were mediated by coping methods. Controlling for initial positive and negative mood, the beneficial effects of optimism, control, and self-esteem on adjustment were mediated by the nonuse of avoidance coping, greater use of active coping, and greater seeking of social support. Alternative models of the causal relations among these variables did not fit the data as well as the a priori mediational model. The results of a 2-year follow-up indicated that self-esteem and control predicted greater motivation and higher grades, controlling for college entrance exam scores. Implications for cognitive adaptation theory and for interventions with populations under stress are discussed.

Social Comparison Activity Under Threat: Downward Evaluation and Upward Contacts

Social comparison processes include the desire to affiliate with others, the desire for information about others, and explicit self-evaluation against others. Previously these types of comparison activity and their corresponding measures have been treated as interchangeable. We present evidence that in certain groups under threat, these comparison activities diverge, with explicit self-evaluation made against a less fortunate target (downward evaluation), but information and affiliation sought out from more fortunate others (upward contacts). These effects occur because downward evaluation and upward contacts appear to serve different needs, the former ameliorating self-esteem and the latter enabling a person to improve his or her situation and simultaneously increase motivation and hope. Implications for the concept, measurement, and theory of social comparison are discussed.

Positive illusions and well-being revisited : separating fact from fiction

In 1988, we published an article that challenged the notion that accurate perceptions of self and the world are essential for mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). We argued instead that peoples perceptions in these domains are positively biased and that these positive illusions promote psychological well-being. In the current article, we review our theoretical model, correct certain misconceptions in its empirical application, and address the criticisms made by Colvin and Block.

Attributions, Beliefs About Control, and Adjustment to Breast Cancer

Attributions for cancer and beliefs about control over cancer were examined for their association with adjustment to breast cancer. Although 95% of the respondents made attributions for their cancer, no particular attribution (e.g., stress, diet) was associated with better adjustment. Analyses of attributions of responsibility for the cancer to the self, environment, another person, or chance yielded only a negative relation between adjustment and blaming another person. In contrast, both the belief that one could now control ones cancer and the belief that others (e.g. the physician) could now control the cancer were significantly associated with good adjustment. Of the different types of control, cognitive control was most strongly associated with adjustment, behavior control was less strongly associated with adjustment, and information control and retrospective control were unassociated with adjustment. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

The affective consequences of social comparison: either direction has its ups and downs.

Research on social comparison processes has assumed that a comparison in a given direction (upward or downward) will lead to a particular affective reaction. In contrast, the present two studies proposed and found that a comparison can produce either positive or negative feelings about oneself, independent of its direction. Several factors moderated the tendency to derive positive or negative affect from upward and downward comparisons. In Study 1, cancer patients low in self-esteem and with low perceived control over their symptoms and illness were more likely to see downward comparisons as having negative implications for themselves. Those low in self-esteem were also more likely to perceive upward comparisons as negative. In Study 2, individuals with high marital dissatisfaction and those who felt uncertain about their marital relationship were more likely to experience negative affect from upward and downward comparisons. The implications of these findings for social comparison theory and for the coping and adaptation literature are discussed.