Simon Serfaty

The Media and foreign policy

Part 1 Who sets the agenda?: the strategic defense initiative - the Presidents story, Philip L.Geyelin Libya - a government story, R.Gregory Nokes diplomacy in a television age - the dangers of a teledemocracy, David Gergen the congress and the media - forces in the struggle over foreign policy, Robert J. Kurz. Part 2 Who says what?: leakers, terrorists, policy makers and the press, John P.Wallach terrorism, media coverage and government response, Robert B.Oakley the care and handling of leaks, Robert J McCloskey secrets, Michael A. Ledeen. Part 3 Do the media matter?: the news media and national security, Richard R.Burt woefully inadequate - the presss handling of arms control, Kenneth L. Adelman US intelligence - current problems in historical perspective, William E.Odom a view from the executive branch, Robert E.McFarlane. Part 4 Beyond the beltway: foreign policy and the provincial press, Charles W. Bailey notes on freedom of the press in Britain and America, Harold Evans the Italian press and the Moro affair, John L.Harper new communications technolocy and the international political process, David Webster neither hero nor villian, Simon Serfaty.

Moving into a Post-Western World

The ‘‘unipolar moment’’ that followed the Cold War was expected to start an era. Not only was the preponderance of U.S. power beyond question, the facts of that preponderance appeared to exceed the reach of any competitor. America’s superior capabilities (military, but also economic and institutional) that no other country could match or approximate in toto, its global interests which no other power could share in full, and its universal saliency confirmed that the United States was the only country with all the assets needed to act decisively wherever it chose to be involved. What was missing, however, was a purpose a national will to enforce a strategy of preponderance that would satisfy U.S. interests and values without offending those of its allies and friends. That purpose was unleashed after the horrific events of September 11, 2001. Now, however, the moment is over, long before any era had the time to get started. Such a turn of events is not surprising. Unipolar systems have been historically rare and geographically confined, at most geostrategic interludes during which weaker nations combined to entangle Gulliver with a thousand strings. What is surprising, though, is not only how quickly this most recent moment ended, but also how quickly a consensus has emerged about an inevitable and irreversible shift of power away from the United States and the West. Moving out of this consensual bandwagon, the challenge is to think about the surprises and discontinuities ahead. In the 20th century, the postEurope world was not about the rise of U.S. power, but about the collapse of everyone else. In the 21st century, the post-Western world, should it be

The New Normalcy

In its summer 2001 issue, The Washington Quarterly published twelve global authors’ responses to the question, “In the ideal world, what role would you want the United States to perform with your country and region?” In this issue, three U.S. authors reply to them, particularly in light of the terrorist attacks on September 11… The summer 2001 “Through the Looking Glass” authors could not have anticipated the events of September 11. Yet they did anticipate tests of U.S. will and leadership that will now shape the final form of the worlds new normalcy.

The West in a World Recast

A receding West appears increasingly challenged by a mixed group of emerging powers, new influentials, and nuisance or failed states, but its Euro-Atlantic core remains on top and indispensable.

Terms of estrangement: French–American relations in perspective

The United States and France have many good reasons to be exasperated with their difficult partnership. Over the years, each often found the other to be a predictable obstacle to the others leadership or aspirations. During the Cold War, however, their bilateral crises never had serious or lasting consequences, and both countries repeatedly proved to be reliable and proactive partners whenever crises reached a danger point. But with the Cold War over, haunted by the daunting legacies of m September 2001, and in the midst of the uncertainties surrounding European institutions, the reciprocal visions that shape the US–French ambivalence ought to be adjusted. However French policies are (mis)represented in the United States, and whatever is thought of US policies in France, understanding them for what they are, and why – and what they do, and how – would be more constructive than the over-simplified, and occasionally offensive, caricatures that became commonplace during the harsh and flawed debate over Iraq.

Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States

The fiction imagined as “Europe” has become real. By 2007, the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the process turning the nation‐states of Europe into EU member states will be nearly complete. Heres what the upcoming years could look like.

Repenser l’Atlantique dans un monde à repenser

Le monde qui a vu naitre le partenariat euro-americain n’existe plus. Se dessine aujourd’hui un monde beaucoup plus complexe, ou la puissance est a la fois concentree et diffuse et ou les societes occidentales, pour fortes qu’elles demeurent, paraissent en mauvais etat. Il faut donc redefinir l’ensemble atlantique, en le reliant aux espaces critiques que sont la Mediterranee, l’Afrique, ou l’Amerique latine – lesquels peuvent seuls lui rendre un sens strategique. politique etrangere

The Management of Discord in Alliance Relations

The usual starting point for a discussion of US-European relations is the recurrence of crisis. From Truman to Reagan, each American President has faced an Atlantic crisis he could legitimately call his own: over Germany’s rearmament, Suez, the Multilateral Force (MLF), the US dollar, OPEC, Afghanistan, and the Siberian pipeline, to cite but a few of the many issues that have confronted the allies since the end of the Second World War. On each occasion the warning was dire, and, struggling to give a new language to the deja vu of past tensions, observers spoke of an alliance that was cracked, troubled, complex, a fantasy, unhinged, fading, and much more.1