Stéphanie Caillies

Children's understanding of idioms and theory of mind development

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis according to which theory of mind competence was a prerequisite to ambiguous idioms understanding. We hypothesized that the child needs to understand that the literal interpretation could be a false world representation, a false belief, and that the speakers intention is to mean something else, to correctly process idiomatic expressions. Two kinds of ambiguous idioms were of interest: decomposable and nondecomposable expressions (Titone & Connine, 1999). An experiment was designed to assess the figurative developmental changes that occur with theory of mind competence. Five-, 6- and 7-year-old children performed five theory of mind tasks (an appearance-reality task, three false-belief tasks and a second-order false-belief task) and listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions inserted in context, before performing a multiple choice task. Results indicated that only nondecomposable idiomatic expression was predicted from the theory of mind scores, and particularly from the second-order competences. Results are discussed with respect to theory of mind and verbal competences.

Idiom comprehension in French children: A cock-and-bull story

The aim of this study was to investigate the comprehension of idiomatic expressions by children from second-kindergarten grade to second-grade (from 4.2 to 9.2 years old). Two kinds of idioms were of interest: decomposable and nondecomposable expressions (Titone & Connine, 1999). We expected a developmental effect: decomposable expressions would be earlier and easier to understand than nondecomposable expressions. An experiment was designed to determine whether and when childrens comprehension of decomposable and nondecomposable expressions takes place, and to assess the figurative developmental changes that occur with verbal competence, and academic competence such as reading. Childrens ability to understand idiomatic expressions was tested using multiple-choice questions. The results showed that children as early as third-kindergarten grade are able to grasp the figurative meaning of decomposable idioms presented in context, while they need to be in second grade to understand nondecomposable expressions. Results are discussed with respect to verbal and academic competence.

Verbal irony processing: How do contrast and humour correlate?

Verbal irony relies on contrast, that is, incongruity between the situational context and the ironic assertion. But is the degree of contrast related to the perceived humorousness of ironic comments? We answered this question by conducting two experiments. In the first experiment, participants were asked to read a list of sentence pairs (ironic or control) and judge the extent to which the meaning of the first sentence contrasted with that of the second. In the second experiment, participants were invited to rate the humorousness of ironic comments compared with their literal counterparts. Results showed that ironic remarks were rated as more contrasting and more humorous than their literal counterparts, but that humour only emerged from a moderate contrast.

Children's understanding of ambiguous idioms and conversational perspective-taking

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that conversational perspective-taking is a determinant of unfamiliar ambiguous idiom comprehension. We investigated two types of ambiguous idiom, decomposable and nondecomposable expressions, which differ in the degree to which the literal meanings of the individual words contribute to the overall idiomatic meaning. We designed an experiment to assess the relationship between the acquisition of figurative comprehension and conversational perspective-taking. Our sample of children aged 5-7 years performed three conversational perspective-taking tasks (language acts, shared/unshared information, and conversational maxims). They then listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions presented in context before performing a multiple-choice task (figurative, literal, and contextual responses). Results indicated that decomposable idiom comprehension was predicted by conversational perspective-taking scores and language skills, whereas nondecomposable idiom comprehension was predicted solely by language skills. We discuss our findings with respect to verbal and pragmatic skills.

Differential bilateral involvement of the parietal gyrus during predicative metaphor processing: an auditory fMRI study.

Despite the growing literature on figurative language processing, there is still debate as to which cognitive processes and neural bases are involved. Furthermore, most studies have focused on nominal metaphor processing without any context, and very few have used auditory presentation. We therefore investigated the neural bases of the comprehension of predicative metaphors presented in a brief context, in an auditory, ecological way. The comprehension of their literal counterparts served as a control condition. We also investigated the link between working memory and verbal skills and regional activation. Comparisons of metaphorical and literal conditions revealed bilateral activation of parietal areas including the left angular (lAG) and right inferior parietal gyri (rIPG) and right precuneus. Only verbal skills were associated with lAG (but not rIPG) activation. These results indicated that predicative metaphor comprehension share common activations with other metaphors. Furthermore, individual verbal skills could have an impact on figurative language processing.

Nondecomposable idiom understanding in children: recursive theory of mind and working memory.

Which skills are required to start understanding ambiguous, unfamiliar nondecomposable idioms in context? In this study, we examined the contributions of both second-order false-belief understanding and working memory to the understanding of unfamiliar nondecomposable idioms in children aged 6, 7 and 8 years old. We assumed that, in order to process these idioms, children would have to be able to (a) take a double perspective (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), (b) maintain both literal and figurative meanings as being different from the expression itself, and (c) take the context into account. Six-, 7- and 8-year-old children performed three, second-order false-belief tasks and three working-memory tasks, and listened to 15 nondecomposable idioms inserted into a context, before performing a multiple-choice task. Results indicated that nondecomposable idiom understanding was explained by theory-of-mind skills.

Speaking Volumes: A Longitudinal Study of Lexical and Grammatical Growth between 17 and 42 Months.

Dynamic analyses of language growth tell us how vocabulary and grammar develop and how the two might be intertwined. Analyses of growth curves between 17 and 42 months, based on longitudinal data for 34 children, revealed interesting patterns of vocabulary and grammatical developments. They showed that these patterns were nonlinear, but with coinciding peaks of growth, suggesting a bilateral relationship between acquisition of vocabulary and grammar. A more detailed analysis of specific components of vocabulary (nouns, verbs, grammatical words) and grammar showed that each followed its own developmental course, but that its growth rates were likely to be negatively or positively correlated with those of other components. For example, a faster rate for acquiring nouns coincided with a slower rate for verbs. Last, an assessment of intra-individual variability in three children showed that mean scores obscure individual profiles.

Children's justifications of plants as living things between 5 and 7 years of age

Children do not recognize plants as living things before the age of 6. In order to consider plants as part of the biological domain, children have to inhibit motion as a mandatory characteristic of life and consider other properties as well. We designed a special animated task to help us study how childrens explanations about plants change during preschool. This task contained pairs of items, with unexpectedly moving plants being contrasted with motionless animals and artefacts. Children were requested to compare these pairs and to answer “why” questions. Participants were 60 typically developing children aged 5, 6 and 7. Mention of the unexpected motion of plants increased with age, while biological justifications tended to be more frequent in older children for animals only. Functional justifications were hardly ever provided and only for plant–artefact pairs. These findings contribute to a better understanding of young childrens conceptions of plants.

Neural Correlates of Contrast and Humor: Processing Common Features of Verbal Irony

Irony is a kind of figurative language used by a speaker to say something that contrasts with the context and, to some extent, lends humor to a situation. However, little is known about the brain regions that specifically support the processing of these two common features of irony. The present study had two main aims: (i) investigate the neural basis of irony processing, by delivering short ironic spoken sentences (and their literal counterparts) to participants undergoing fMRI; and (ii) assess the neural effect of two irony parameters, obtained from normative studies: degree of contrast and humor appreciation. Results revealed activation of the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), posterior part of the left superior temporal gyrus, medial frontal cortex, and left caudate during irony processing, suggesting the involvement of both semantic and theory-of-mind networks. Parametric models showed that contrast was specifically associated with the activation of bilateral frontal and subcortical areas, and that these regions were also sensitive to humor, as shown by a conjunction analysis. Activation of the bilateral IFG is consistent with the literature on humor processing, and reflects incongruity detection/resolution processes. Moreover, the activation of subcortical structures can be related to the reward processing of social events.

S143. NEURAL CORRELATES OF INTENTION AND BELIEF INFERENCE RELATIVE TO EMOTION ATTRIBUTION TO OTHERS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AND PSYCHOSIS PRONENESS: ACTIVATION LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION META-ANALYSIS

Abstract Background Social cognition can be briefly defined as the ability to interact with and understand others. It involves several cognitive processes that are considered as critical for an adapted social functioning. In patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) and subjects prone to psychosis (PP), a number of studies have revealed impairments in the abilities to infer beliefs, intentions or emotions of others. Cognitive tasks specifically addressing these abilities have also revealed abnormal neural processing in these subjects. However, these studies have not yet been compared in order to identify shared or distinct functional brain networks underlying these processes in the two subject groups. Therefore, we aimed to determine whether the neurofunctional correlates of intention/belief attribution are distinct from those of emotional inference in SCZ and PP compared to healthy controls (HC). We further attempted to identify neuroimaging markers of psychosis endophenotype in mentalizing tasks. Finally, we examined shared and distinct brain regions involved in intention/belief attribution relative to emotional inference in SCZ. Methods Using a neural coordinate-based Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) meta-analysis, we investigated differences in activation patterns between intention/belief and emotion attributions to others in SCZ and PP relative to HC. Results We selected 33 studies after a systematic review of the literature. Inferring intentions/beliefs in SCZ patients correlated with decreased functional activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and left posterior temporoparietal junction (TPJ). In PP subjects, precuneus, posterior cingulate gyrus, middle and superior temporal gyri displayed additional under-activation pattern, while posterior cingulate, right TPJ, left lateral PFC and insula were over-activated. In patients with SCZ thalamus and striatum, right dorsolateral PFC, right insula, and right transverse temporal gyrus were under-activated during emotion attribution to others, while left ventrolateral PFC, left insula, right lingual gyrus and areas in the cerebellum were over-activated. Finally, in PP subjects, right TPJ was under-activated while left parahippocampal, middle and superior temporal gyri, were over-activated during affective mentalizing. Conjunction analyses demonstrated under-activation in left rostral mPFC and left fusiform gyri in both SCZ and PP relative to HC during intention/belief inference tasks. Discussion Our results suggest abnormal neural functioning in fast emotional appraisal and subsequent cognitive modulation during emotion perspective taking in SCZ. In PP, abnormal activation was observed only in cortical regions well known as recruited in emotional top-down regulation. When there is no emotional content in perspective taking like in intention/belief attribution to others, two core regions appeared as under-activated in SCZ and PP, namely left rostral portion of mPFC and, to a lesser extent, the left fusiform gyrus, suggesting that these two regions play a role in top-down modulation of cognitive mentalizing and could be neuroimaging markers of psychosis endophenotype. Thus, abnormal functioning in these specific brain areas could be a valuable predictor for developing schizophrenia in at-risk subjects. Moreover, these brain regions could be targeted by non-invasive neuromodulation techniques in order to restore cognitive function.