Stéphanie Novak

The Silence of Ministers: Consensus and Blame Avoidance in the Council of the European Union†

According to conventional wisdom, in areas where the Council of the European Union is supposed to decide by qualified majority voting, it does not vote but rather decides ‘by consensus’. This article aims to explain why the Council does not vote and what ‘consensus’ means. Given that consensus is often used by international organizations and EU institutional bodies, it is important to explain how it differs from unanimity. The article argues that formal voting is avoided because it would disclose the identity of opponents and would be detrimental to the negotiation process. Furthermore, ministers tend not to register their opposition even when they remain unsatisfied with an adopted measure because they expect to be blamed by their constituencies for having failed to defend national interests. Consensus is not necessarily used to signal that a general agreement is reached. It sometimes results from a strategy of blame avoidance that conflicts with democratic accountability.

Decision rules, social norms and the expression of disagreement: the case of qualified-majority voting in the Council of the European Union

When a group has to make a decision, one can assume that the members’ incentives to state their position vary according to the different decision rules. Decision-making in the Council of the European Union offers an opportunity to study how a decision rule influences the way members of a group state their position. Indeed, in several areas, decisions must be made by qualified-majority voting. But the combination of this rule and of social norms specific to the Council discourages the minority from expressing itself at different stages of decision-making. Decisions seem to be made without opposition at two main stages of the decision-making process: during the plenary sessions, representatives do not vote; according to the official Council records, a high proportion of measures are adopted without opposition. Lorsque les membres d’un groupe doivent prendre une décision, on peut se demander si la règle de décision utilisée influe sur la façon dont ils expriment leur position. La prise de décision au Conseil de l’Union européenne donne un exemple de cette influence. Le vote à la majorité qualifiée s’y articule à différentes normes sociales pour dissuader l’expression de l’opposition. La non-opposition apparente prend deux formes principales: l’absence de vote en séance plénière et la forte proportion de décisions prises avec l’accord de tous les Etats membres que laissent apparaître les registres publics des votes.

‘Integration without transparency’? Reliance on the space to think in the European Council and Council

Abstract To justify the limited publicity of their sessions, members of the European Council and Council regularly argue that they require a ‘space to think’. This article analyses the relative success of the plea for this ‘space to think’ in both legislative (Council) and non-legislative (European Council and Council) modes of decision-making. We consider the concept of the ‘space to think’ as well as the manner in which it is integrated into the theories of new intergovernmentalism and intergovernmental union. We then analyse how the European Council and Council have developed the ‘space to think’ in their daily practices. We find that, while the limited progress of transparency lends partial support to the new intergovernmentalism and intergovernmental union, the drivers underpinning the ‘space to think’ are not limited to non-legislative decision-making but are also increasingly found in the legislative procedure.