Stephen M. Saideman

DEMOCRATIZATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND ETHNIC CONFLICT A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998

Although there has been much debate about whether democratization causes ethnic conflict, and many comparativists have argued about which kinds of political institutions are best for managing communal strife, little large-N work has addressed these issues. The authors apply a theory of ethnic conflict—the ethnic security dilemma—to derive predictions about the impact of democratization and political institutions on ethnic unrest. They then test these predictions by performing a series of pooled time-series analyses covering all ethnic groups in the Minorities at Risk data set from 1985 to 1998. The authors find that democratization, federalism, and presidentialism may not be as problematic as some argue and that proportional representation tends to reduce severe ethnic violence. They conclude by suggesting some directions for future research.

Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups

Why do some ethnic groups in conflict (those that are mobilized or face discrimination) receive more external support than others do? This is an important question that has been overlooked despite the crucial role international support has played. Which characteristics of groups and their host states cause them to receive more support? I consider three explanations. First, separatist groups are less likely to receive support owing to their threat to regional stability and international norms. This argument is derived from accounts focusing on the inhibiting impact of vulnerability upon the foreign policies of African states. Second, groups in stronger states are more likely to receive support as states try to weaken their most threatening adversaries - an application of realist logic. Third, groups with ethnic ties to actors in positions of power elsewhere are more likely to receive external assistance. Using Minorities at Risk data, analyses focusing on the number of states supporting particular groups and the intensity of this support suggest that ethnic ties influence the international relations of ethnic conflict more than vulnerability and relative power. Further analyses contrast the international relations of peaceful ethnic disputes and violent ethnic conflicts. These analyses reveal that some factors (such as regime type, nearby separatism) increase breadth and/or intensity of support for groups that are not engaged in violence, while other variables (separatism of the group in question, relative power of host) influence the international relations of violent conflicts. The article concludes with implications for policy and future research.

Is separatism as contagious as the common cold or as cancer? Testing international and domestic explanations

Analysts frequently argue that ethnic conflict in general, and separatism in particular, is contagious. This article develops the logic of diffusion and then considers the role potentially played by domestic political dynamics. The article then tests external and internal dynamics by applying logistic regressions to the Minorities at Risk Dataset. We find that while domestic factors perform somewhat better by themselves, when combined into one model, each argument helps to explain why some groups seek separation while others do not.

National Self-Determination and Secession . Edited by Margaret Moore. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 285p.

Yugoslavias violent disintegration revealed that self-determination is difficult to apply in practice. Because the right of self-determination applied only to colonial territories (narrowly defined) from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the complexity of self-determination was overlooked until recently. This book presents a debate about whether and which groups should be allowed to secede. Margaret Moore introduces the book by delineating three lines of thought: just cause theories, choice theories, and theories of national self-determination. The first half of the book presents these ideas, and the last three chapters are more empirical. One striking omission (although the last three contributions come close) is a defense of the old conventional wisdom that the right of states to their territorial integrity is superior to a groups right to self-determination. Ironically, Allen Buchanans book, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, 1991, which has set the terms of the debate, was a challenge to the conventional wisdom of the time, as it seemed to grant more support for secession than previously allowed. Yet, in subsequent debates and in this volume, he presents the most restrictive view of the right to self-determination. Buchanan argues that the right to secede is a remedial right, like the right to revolution. A group should be allowed to secede only if it faces persistent violations of human rights or had been previously free. Of course, how one determines whether either condition exists is quite difficult. Furthermore, Buchanan is quite clear in arguing that no groups deserve support if they are seceding from a legitimate democracy (p. 17). Thus, the Quebec separatists do not have a legitimate case, according to Buchanan. Canadians outside Quebec would agree with his key point that easy terms of secession would make it possible for a minority to blackmail the majority.