Stephen M. Walt

The Renaissance of Security Studies

This article examines the evolution of security studies, focusing on recent developments in the field. It provides a survey of the field, a guide to the current research agenda, and some practical lessons for managing the field in the years ahead. Security studies remains an interdisciplinary enterprise, but its earlier preoccupation with nuclear issues has broadened to include topics such as grand strategy, conventional warfare, and the domestic sources of international conflict, among others. Work in the field is increasingly rigorous and theoretically inclined, which reflects the marriage between security studies and social science and its improved standing within the academic world. Because national security will remain a problem for states and because an independent scholarly community contributes to effective public policy in this area, the renaissance of security studies is an important positive development for the field of international relations.

Alliances in a Unipolar World

Unipolarity is a novel condition in world politics, and its effects on international alliances have yet to receive sustained theoretical attention. Tracing its impact requires a careful distinction between the purely structural features common to any unipolar system and the unique characteristics of the current unipole (the United States) or the policies undertaken by particular U.S. leaders (such as George W. Bush). In general, the unipole will enjoy greater freedom of action and be less dependent on allied support, enabling it to rely more readily on ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.” Lesser powers will be concerned about the concentration of power held by the unipole, but they will also face larger barriers to concerted action to contain it. Hard balancing against the unipole will be unlikely—unless the unipole begins a major effort to expand—but lesser powers will engage in soft balancing to contain the latter’s influence. Medium powers may pursue alliances with others in order to reduce dependence on the unipole, but weaker states are likely to ally with the unipole in order to use its power against local security challenges. Bandwagoning will remain rare even under unipolarity, but disputes over burden sharing and alliance leadership will continue. Weaker states will prefer multilateral arrangements that enhance their own influence, while the unipole will prefer bilateral or ad hoc coalitions of the willing that it can more readily dominate.

Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International Relations

Theory creating and hypothesis testing are both critical components of social science, but the former is ultimately more important. Yet, in recent years, International Relations scholars have devoted less effort to creating and refining theories or using theory to guide empirical research. Instead, they increasingly focus on ‘simplistic hypothesis testing,’ which emphasizes discovering well-verified empirical regularities. Privileging simplistic hypothesis testing is a mistake, however, because insufficient attention to theory leads to misspecified empirical models or misleading measures of key concepts. In addition, the poor quality of much of the data in International Relations makes it less likely that these efforts will produce cumulative knowledge. This shift away from theory and toward simplistic hypothesis testing reflects a long-standing desire to professionalize and expand the International Relations field as well as the short-term career incentives of individual scholars. This tendency is also widening the gap between the ivory tower and the real world, making International Relations scholarship less useful to policymakers and concerned citizens. Unfortunately, this trend is likely to continue unless there is a collective decision to alter prevailing academic incentives.

Testing theories of alliance formation: the case of Southwest Asia

The question “what causes alignment?†remains a basic issue in international relations theory. Moreover, competing hypotheses about alliance formation underlie many recurring policy debates. Balance-of-power theory predicts states will ally to oppose the strongest state; the “bandwagoning hypothesis†predicts that alignment with the stronger side is more likely. These two hypotheses are usually framed solely in terms of the distribution of capabilities (that is, the balance of power), which neglects several other important factors and leads to faulty predictions about alliance choices. A careful examination of the alliance policies of Iran, Turkey, India, and Pakistan reveals that “balance-of-threat theory†provides a better explanation of alliance choices than these other conceptions. This theory predicts that states balance against the most threatening state, rather than the most powerful. Threats are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions. Thus, balance-of-threat theory is an important refinement of structural balance- of-power theory.

The Progressive Power of Realism

John Vasquezs assessment of realism suffers from three serious flaws. First, his reliance on Imre Lakatoss (1970) model of scientific progress is problematic, because the Lakatosian model has been largely rejected by contemporary historians and philosophers of science. Second, Vasquez understates the range and diversity of the realist research program and mistakenly sees disagreements among realists as evidence of theoretical degeneration. Finally, he overlooks the progressive character of contemporary realist theory, largely because he does not consider all the relevant literature. Disagreements within and across competing research programs are essential to progress and should be welcomed, but Vasquezs effort suggests that criticism will be most helpful when it seeks to do more than merely delegitimate a particular research tradition.

The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy

A slightly different version of this essay will appear in Daniel Kaufman, David Clark, and Kevin Sheehan, eds., The Future of U.S. National Strategy. Some portions draw upon my ”Two Cheers for Containment: Probable Allied Responses to U.S. Isolationism,” in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., Collective Defense or Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies for the Future (Lexington Books, 1989). I would like to thank Richard Betts, Ivo Daalder, Charles Glaser, Robert Johnson, Deborah Welch Larson, John Mearsheimer, Warner Schilling, Jack Snyder, and Kenneth Waltz for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am especially grateful to Stephen Van Evera, whose work on this subject has shaped my thinking considerably, and to the MacArthur Foundation and Princeton’s Center of International Studies for financial support. Stephen M . Walt

Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy

The terrorist attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon triggered the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of U.S. foreign policy. On September 10, 2001, there was not the slightest hint that the United States was about to embark on an all-out campaign against “global terrorism.” Indeed, apart from an explicit disdain for certain multilateral agreements and a axation on missile defense, the foreign policy priorities of George W. Bush and his administration were not radically different from those of their predecessors. Bush had already endorsed continued NATO expansion, reluctantly agreed to keep U.S. troops in the Balkans, reafarmed the existing policy of wary engagement with Russia and China, and called for further efforts to liberalize global markets. The administration’s early attention focused primarily on domestic issues, and new international initiatives were notably absent. This business-as-usual approach to foreign policy vanished on September 11. Instead of education reform and tax cuts, the war on terrorism dominated the administration’s agenda. The United States quickly traced the attacks to alQaeda—the network of Islamic extremists led by Saudi exile Osama bin Laden—whose leaders had been operating from Afghanistan since 1996. When the Taliban government in Afghanistan rejected a U.S. ultimatum to turn over bin Laden, the United States began military efforts to eradicate al-Qaeda and Beyond bin Laden Stephen M. Walt

Keeping the World Off Balance: Self Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy

The United States now enjoys a position of preponderance unseen since the Roman Empire. Not surprisingly, the past decade has produced a lively debate on U.S. grand strategy, with different authors offering sharply contrasting advice on how the United States should respond to its position as the sole remaining superpower. This paper considers one element of this debate: will U.S. preponderance trigger a defensive backlash by other states? Part I examines why states tend to balance against other states, and argues that structural balance of power theory cannot explain why efforts to balance U.S. power have been remarkably weak since the end of the Cold War. Part II considers alternative explanations for the absence of any serious attempt to balance U.S. power, and argues that a combination of balance-of-threat theory and the theory of collective goods offers the best explanation for the dearth of balancing behavior. Part III lays out a set of prescriptions based on these theoretical insights, emphasizing in particular the need for a policy of self-restraint. The conclusion offers several caveats to these recommendations and identifies issues that merit further investigation.

Can Saddam be Contained? History Says Yes

Should the United States invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein? Over the past few months, advocates of war have advanced a number of reasons why toppling Saddam is desirable. He is a bloodthirsty tyrant. He has defied the United Nations on numerous occasions. He has backed terrorists in the past. Removing him will reinforce respect for American power and spark democratic reform in the Middle East. If you’re looking for a reason to support a war, in short, there are plenty from which to choose.

Is It Love or The Lobby? Explaining America's Special Relationship with Israel

In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, we argued that the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is due largely to the influence of a domestic interest group—comprised of Jews as well as non-Jews—and that this unusual situation is harmful to both the United States and Israel. Jerome Slaters thoughtful review endorses many of our central arguments, but it also highlights several points of disagreement. He argues that we overlooked important alternative sources, defined the lobby too broadly, and exaggerated its influence on Congress and especially the Executive Branch. Although Slater is even more critical of U.S. Middle East policy than we are, he argues that the special relationship is due to strong cultural and religious affinities and broad public support in American society, and not to the influence of the lobby. In fact, the alternative sources cited by Slater do not undermine our basic claims; a broad conception of the lobby makes more sense than his narrower definition; and there is little disagreement between us about the lobbys influence on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Most importantly, public opinion in the United States does not explain why the United States gives Israel such extensive and nearly unconditional backing. Although most Americans have a favorable image of Israel, surveys show that they also favor a more even-handed Middle East policy and a more normal relationship with Israel. Thus, the special relationship is due primarily to the lobbys influence, and not to the American peoples enduring identification with the Jewish state.