Steven M. Glover

The influence of time pressure and accountability on auditors' processing of nondiagnostic information

This paper extends Hackenbrack [1992] in examining the influence of nondiagnostic (i.e., irrelevant) information on auditor judgment. Hackenbrack found that auditors given a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence made fraud-risk assessments that were less extreme (more regressive) than those based on diagnostic evidence only. This behavior is consistent with the nonnormative judgment tendency known as the dilution effect (Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley [1981]). Using a different task and context than Hackenbrack, I replicate his results. I extend Hackenbracks research by investigating, in a laboratory setting, whether auditors exhibit the dilution effect when faced with time pressure and

The Association Between Trading Recommendations and Broker-Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This study examines analyst forecast errors within the context of stock recommendations. We predict positive forecast error (i.e., optimism) for buy recommendations and negative forecast error (i.e., pessimism) for sell recommendations. We offer two explanations for this prediction: (1) the unconscious tendency to process information in a manner that supports one’s goal, which we refer to as the “objectivity illusion” hypothesis, and (2) the economic incentive to boost trade, which we refer to as the “trade boosting” hypothesis. The pattern of analyst forecast bias we predict (i.e., optimism for buys and pessimism for sells) is opposite in direction to that predicted by the management relations hypothesis—a commonly cited hypothesis for analyst forecast bias. We find broker‐analyst earnings forecast errors are significantly optimistic for buy recommendations and significantly pessimistic for sell recommendations, consistent with the objectivity illusion and trade boosting hypotheses. Our study indicates that the pattern of results reported in prior research (i.e., increasingly optimistic earnings forecasts as the stock recommendation becomes less favorable) is likely driven by a correlated omitted variable, actual earnings. Results of an analysis to distinguish between trade boosting and objectivity illusion appear more consistent with the objectivity illusion.

Understanding Audit Quality: Insights from Audit Professionals and Investors

Projects seeking to define, measure, and evaluate audit quality are on the agendas of auditing standards setters as well as audit firms. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) currently provides information regarding audit quality through the release of inspection reports, and the Board intends to establish and report audit quality indicators. To provide additional perspective on audit quality, we obtain auditors’ and investors’ views, definitions, and indicators of audit quality. We find that investors’ definitions of audit quality focus more on inputs to the audit process than do auditors’, and that investors view the number of PCAOB deficiencies as an indicator of overall firm quality. We find a consensus that auditor characteristics may be the most important determinants of audit quality, and that restatements may be the most readily available signal of low audit quality. We relate responses to a general audit quality framework, provide support for archival audit research, and identify additional disclosures that participants suggest could signal audit quality. Taken together, we provide evidence regarding the construct of audit quality in the post-SOX environment, evaluate many of the audit quality indicators proposed by the PCAOB, and suggest avenues for future research. Comprendre la qualit e de l’audit : points de vue de professionnels de l’audit et d’investisseurs

Do Critical Audit Matter Paragraphs in the Audit Report Change Nonprofessional Investors’ Decision to Invest?

SUMMARY: Both U.S. and international standard setters have recently proposed changes to the standard audit report, including a requirement to include a critical audit matter (CAM) paragraph. We examine how nonprofessional investors react to an audit reports CAM paragraph that is centered on the audit of fair value estimates. We perform an experiment with nonprofessional investors who are business school graduates who invest in individual stocks and analyze company financial data. We find that investors who receive a CAM paragraph are more likely to change their investment decision than are investors who receive a standard audit report (an information effect) or investors who receive the same CAM paragraph information in managements footnotes (a source credibility effect). We also find that the effect of a CAM paragraph is reduced when it is followed by a paragraph offering resolution of the critical audit matter. Our findings should be of interest to regulators and standard setters as they consider the ...

The Effect of Materiality Disclosures on Investors’ Decision Making

Recent reviews of the academic literature indicate that little is known regarding how users evaluate the materiality levels auditors use or respond to quantitative materiality disclosure. Regulators around the world have taken different stances on whether materiality should, or should not, be disclosed in the auditor’s report. In response to the dearth of research on these policy decisions, we examine the effect of audit materiality disclosures, or lack thereof, on professional investors’ decision making across different investment contexts (debt vs. equity, public vs. private). Our study is designed to test global audit policy and as such our hypotheses are motivated by audit theory, auditing standards, and assertions made by regulators. Among a sample of 246 professional investors, we find that investors struggle to understand materiality disclosures. Most importantly, we do not find evidence that investors’ decisions are consistent with audit theory or regulator assertions. For example, investors fail to make consistent connections between the amount of disclosed audit materiality and the level of auditor effort. Our results hold across debt and equity investment settings for both public and private companies. In sum, our findings suggest that disclosures of audit materiality are not well understood by professional investors. This research informs practitioners, regulators, and academics regarding the effect of materiality disclosure on investor decision making as well as stakeholders’ views and expectations of overall materiality.