Susan M. Miller

Public Support for Sale Government Spending and Public Approval of Federal Agency Performance

Federal agencies award thousands of grants and contracts each year. Although we have considerable insight into the implications of these expenditures for politicians, we know little about their consequences for agencies. I develop a theory that links agency spending in citizens’ states to their support of agency performance, with the expectation that this relationship is conditioned by citizen–agency ideological congruence. I contend that agency spending serves as an information shortcut for citizens when evaluating agencies because it is often visible in a way that other agency activities, such as regulatory decisions, are not. When a citizen fundamentally supports the policies and projects an agency is funding, the positive effect of spending may be enhanced. I find support for these expectations. This article contributes to our understanding of the ways in which expenditures shape opinion toward agencies, which is important given the significance of public sentiment for an agency’s political survival.

Pushing Constitutional Limits in the U.S. States Legislative Professionalism and Judicial Review of State Laws by the U.S. Supreme Court

When the U.S. Supreme Court exercises its power of judicial review over state laws, its decisions, like the legislation it considers, frequently speak to major policy debates. Despite the Court’s routine involvement with state statutes, theoretical explanations of judicial review generally do not distinguish between state laws and federal laws. The characteristics of state legislatures lead legislators in different states to have distinct perspectives and incentives, and ultimately affect the types of laws enacted in different states. We suggest that because the level of professionalism of state legislatures affects the types of laws pursued by different states, it may also affect the likelihood that a state has a law struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. We find support for this expectation. Specifically, legislative professionalism is associated with an increased likelihood that a state has a law invalidated by the Court. This new evidence indicates that it is important to consider the legislative context in which state laws originate when examining the Court’s review of state laws.

The Consequences of Legislative Term Limits for Policy Diffusion

Policy diffusion scholarship has long sought to understand when lawmakers will imitate innovations adopted by other jurisdictions and when they actually invest the time and resources necessary to learn about potential policies. We develop the theoretical rationale that term limits will reduce the incentive and capacity of state legislatures to gather information about policies available from previous adoptions in other states. We hypothesize that this will decrease the importance of previous adopters when term-limited legislators consider policy innovations. A multilevel analysis of the diffusion of eighty-seven policies between 1960 and 2009 provides support for this expectation. Our findings provide insight into the way in which institutional features shape policy diffusion.

How the Unorganized Mass Public (Sometimes) Gets Represented in Regulatory Politics

Many scholars have argued that because consumers are poorly organized, regulatory enforcement will tend to be lax and serve the interests of industry. Considering, however, that elections are one of the main mechanisms by which the public exerts control over policy, surprisingly few studies have examined how electoral incentives may spur the government to regulate vigorously on behalf of consumers. We argue that when the threat of electoral accountability is greater, regulatory activities will serve the interests of the public, even if they impose costs on industry. We test this theoretical expectation by analyzing state regulatory activity in the wake of exogenous storms and natural disasters, which provide us with important theoretical and causal leverage. We find that a more “pro-regulation” electorate and elected chief regulators acting in close proximity to elections are associated with pro-consumer regulatory action.