Svend Østergaard

Motion verb sentences activate left posterior middle temporal cortex despite static context.

The left posterior middle temporal region, anterior to V5/MT, has been shown to be responsive both to images with implied motion, to simulated motion, and to motion verbs. In this study, we investigated whether sentence context alters the response of the left posterior middle temporal region. ‘Fictive motion’ sentences are sentences in which an inanimate subject noun, semantically incapable of self movement, is coupled with a motion verb, yielding an apparent semantic contradiction (e.g. ‘The path comes into the garden.’). However, this context yields no less activation in the left posterior middle temporal region than sentences in which the motion can be applied to the subject noun. We speculate that the left posterior middle temporal region activity in fictive motion sentences reflects the fact that the hearer applies motion to the depicted scenario by scanning it egocentrically.

Concrete spatial language: see what I mean?

Conveying complex mental scenarios is at the heart of human language. Advances in cognitive linguistics suggest this is mediated by an ability to activate cognitive systems involved in non-linguistic processing of spatial information. In this fMRI-study, we compare sentences with a concrete spatial meaning to sentences with an abstract meaning. Using this contrast, we demonstrate that sentence meaning involving motion in a concrete topographical context, whether linked to animate or inanimate subjects nouns, yield more activation in a bilateral posterior network, including fusiform/parahippocampal, and retrosplenial regions, and the temporal-occipital-parietal junction. These areas have previously been shown to be involved in mental navigation and spatial memory tasks. Sentences with an abstract setting activate an extended largely left-lateralised network in the anterior temporal, and inferior and superior prefrontal cortices, previously found activated by comprehension of complex semantics such as narratives. These findings support a model of language, where the understanding of spatial semantic content emerges from the recruitment of brain regions involved in non-linguistic spatial processing.

Making sense together: A dynamical account of linguistic meaning-making*

Abstract How is linguistic communication possible? How do we come to share the same meanings of words and utterances? One classical position holds that human beings share a transcendental “platonic” ideality independent of individual cognition and language use (Frege 1948). Another stresses immanent linguistic relations (Saussure 1959), and yet another basic embodied structures as the ground for invariant aspects of meaning (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Here we propose an alternative account in which the possibility for sharing meaning is motivated by four sources of structural stability: 1) the physical constraints and affordances of our surrounding material environment, 2) biological constraints of our human bodies, 3) social normative constraints of culture and society, and 4) the local history of social interactions. These structures and constraints interact in dynamical ways in actual language usage situations: local dialogical and social dynamics motivate and stabilize the profiling of a conceptual space already highly structured by our shared biology, culture, and environment. We will substantiate this perspective with reference to recent studies in experimental pragmatics and semiotics in which participants interact linguistically to solve cooperative tasks. Three main cases will be considered: The dynamic grounding of linguistic categories, the construction of conceptual models to relate entities in a scene, and the construction of shared conceptual scales for assessing and appraising subjective experiences.

Thinking together with material representations: Joint epistemic actions in creative problem solving

Abstract How do material representations such as models, diagrams, and drawings come to shape and aid collective, epistemic processes? This study investigated how groups of participants spontaneously recruited material objects (in this case, LEGO blocks) to support collective creative processes in the context of an experiment. Qualitative microanalyses of the group interactions motivate a taxonomy of different roles that the material representations play in the joint epistemic processes: illustration, elaboration, and exploration. Firstly, the LEGO blocks were used to illustrate already well-formed ideas in support of communication and epistemic alignment. Furthermore, the material concretization of otherwise abstract ideas in LEGO blocks gave rise to elaboration: discussions, requests for clarification, and discovery of unnoticed conceptual disagreements. Lastly, the LEGO blocks were used for exploration. That is, the material representations were experimented on and physical attributes were explored resulting in discoveries of new meaning potentials and creative solutions. We discuss these different ways in which material representations do their work in collective reasoning processes in relation to ideas about top-down and bottom-up cognitive processes and division of cognitive labor.

Brains striving for coherence: Long-term cumulative plot formation in the default mode network

Many everyday activities, such as engaging in conversation or listening to a story, require us to sustain attention over a prolonged period of time while integrating and synthesizing complex episodic content into a coherent mental model. Humans are remarkably capable of navigating and keeping track of all the parallel social activities of everyday life even when confronted with interruptions or changes in the environment. However, the underlying cognitive and neurocognitive mechanisms of such long-term integration and profiling of information remain a challenge to neuroscience. While brain activity is generally traceable within the short time frame of working memory (milliseconds to seconds), these integrative processes last for minutes, hours or even days. Here we report two experiments on story comprehension. Experiment I establishes a cognitive dissociation between our comprehension of plot and incidental facts in narratives: when episodic material allows for long-term integration in a coherent plot, we recall fewer factual details. However, when plot formation is challenged, we pay more attention to incidental facts. Experiment II investigates the neural underpinnings of plot formation. Results suggest a central role for the brains default mode network related to comprehension of coherent narratives while incoherent episodes rather activate the frontoparietal control network. Moreover, an analysis of cortical activity as a function of the cumulative integration of narrative material into a coherent story reveals to linear modulations of right hemisphere posterior temporal and parietal regions. Together these findings point to key neural mechanisms involved in the fundamental human capacity for cumulative plot formation.

Waterproof fire stations? Conceptual schemata and cognitive operations involved in compound constructions

Abstract The paper develops a characterization of nominal compounds. The analysis is carried out on frame-schematic and construction-grammatical grounds. It rests on assumptions about cognitive processing long since known within cognitive linguistics, but it criticizes certain linguistic applications of Fauconnier and Turners theory of conceptual integration, which historically is a reelaboration of Lakoff and Johnsons theory of metaphor. The first section sums up two classical approaches in the analysis of nominal compounds; it comments on their inadequacies, and how these have been assessed by Fauconnier and Turner; next, it sketches out the way these two authors and other scholars in blending theory have traditionally analyzed nominal compounds in terms of conceptual integration, and finally one of the major drawbacks of this approach is identified: namely, its limited descriptive import. In the following section, the authors unfold their own semantic analysis. A non-trivial and non-standard compositional theory is proposed, likely to capture the general way in which semantic parts of a compound configure into a semantic whole. Hereafter the authors proceed to a summary survey of how this scaffolding is actually instantiated or processed cognitively. A crucial difference between processing of literal and metaphorical compounds is established. Thus, the approach has a double scope: it aims at characterizing both the semantics of compounds and the way the semantics is cognitively accessed.

The emergence and nature of genres – a social-dynamic account

Abstract This article has a double scope. First, we consider the dynamics inherent in the emergence of genres. Our view is that genres emerge relative to two sets of constraints, which we aim to capture in our double feedback loop model for the dynamics of genres. On the one hand, (text) genres, or text types, as we will interchangeably call them, emerge as a variation of already existing text types. On the other hand, genres develop as a response to the negative constraints or positive affordances of given situations: that is, either the “exigencies” of the situation or the new resources available in a situation. Accordingly, Section 1 is mainly devoted to a characterization of situations and of the dynamic relation between situational constraints/affordances and genres. Our main claim is that situations and genres stand in a relation of mutual scaffolding to each other so that the existence of a text type is not simply caused by the exigencies present in a given situation, but, once emerged, also feeds back into the situation, further stabilizing or consolidating it: hence, the use of the term “feedback loop.” Section 2 is a more detailed discussion of the dynamics of genres with a particular focus on the first feedback loop: the way genres develop as deviations from existing text types and then stabilize as text types proper with a normative import. The second scope of this article consists in developing a typological apparatus consistent with the dynamic approach to the emergence of genres. This is our parameter theory of genres presented in Section 3. Here we consider genres as governed by parameters external to them and intrinsic to the situations they are dynamically related to. Genres should thus be understood not simply in terms of inherent textual or formal traits, but also relative to a certain set of situational parameters and relative to the degree to which they are governed by them.

The story turned upside down: Meaning effects linked to variations on narrative structure

Abstract This text has two parts. In the first section, we intend to define the narrative schema — the canonical plot structure — as a symbolic form in Ernst Cassirers sense of the term. This basically implies that the narrative schema is not an invariant higher order combinatorial form, but may itself be subject to variations in view of yielding specific meaning effects. This is because the production and reception of a narrative is a dynamic process where physical forces, modal forces and intentions set up a space of possibilities for the narrative trajectory. We therefore propose a determination of the narrative schema in terms of ‘force dynamics.’ In the next section we proceed to an analysis of Ernst Hemingways ‘A Very Short Story’ in order to illustrate this point. We lay down the main elements of its remarkable, if not simply outstanding both narrative and semantic-configurational structure: its plot structure is indeed driven by an inverted narrative schema and each significant event in the story but one (as well as each physical paragraph but one) has its rigorously symmetrical counterpart. Moreover, this inverted schema can be explained in terms of the modal forces at stake in the narrative.

Art and Cognition

This paper deals with Ramachandrans & Hirsteins laws for aesthetic experience such as grouping, contrast detection, and the principle of generic viewpoint. These are general morphological principles of how the Visual system integrates perceptual input into a coherent representation. This paper analyzes how the materiality of the painting i.e. the canvas and the brush-strokes — interacts with these morphological principles and thereby modifies the conceptual content. We consider cases. Firsdy, how manipuladons of the 2D presentation makes the 3D representation ambiguous. This is exemplified by Picasso. Secondly, we examine how Van Gogh uses the dynamics evoked by the stroke pattems to destabilize the 3D representation.

Aesthetic perception, attention, and non-genericity: How artists exploit the automatisms of perception to construct meaning in vision

Abstract The present work is an attempt to bring meaning to the fore of not only empirical aesthetics but also experimental aesthetics. We have addressed meaning in terms of attention-grabbing perceptual structure, doing so in the strong sense of structure; i.e., structure understood as a pure spatial relation between shapes, independently of what objects these shapes represent. The structures we investigate are the so-called non-generic configurations that obtain between objects seen from a unique vantage point. In the paper, we first introduce the notion of non-genericity, in general, and its use in visual art in particular, where it is claimed to affect the visual brain as an attention grabber. We then present an experiment we have designed to test the effect of such a relation on the visual brain, and we give evidence to the effect that non-generic configurations in pictures do attract attention significantly more than their generic counterparts. Non-genericity can therefore be considered as one among other pictorial techniques artists dispose of to construct perceptual meaning in vision.