Szilvia Biro

Goal attribution without agency cues: the perception of 'pure reason' in infancy.

The proper domain of naive psychological reasoning is human action and human mental states but such reasoning is frequently applied to non-human phenomena as well. The studies reported in this paper test the validity of the currently widespread belief that this tendency is rooted in the fact that naive psychological reasoning is initially restricted to, and triggered by, the perception of self-initiated movement of agents. We report three habituation experiments which examine the necessary conditions under which infants invoke a psychological principle, namely the principle of rational action, to interpret behaviour as goal directed action. Experiment 1 revealed that the principle of rational action already operates at 9 (but not yet at 6) months of age. Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptual cues indicating agency, such as self-propulsion, are not necessary prerequisites for interpreting behaviour in terms of the principle of rational action. Experiment 3 confirmed that this effect cannot be attributed to generalisation of agentive properties from one object to another. These results suggest that the domain of naive psychology is initially defined only by the applicability of its core principles and its ontology is not restricted to (featurally identified) object kinds such as persons, animates, or agents. We argue that in its initial state naive psychological reasoning is not a cue-based but a principle-based theory.

Where Do Action Goals Come from? Evidence for Spontaneous Action–Effect Binding in Infants

One of the great questions in psychology concerns how we develop to become intentional agents. Ideomotor theory suggests that intentional actions depend on, and emerge from the automatic acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations: perceiving an action–effect sequence creates an integrated representation that can be employed for action control in the opposite order, selecting an action by anticipating its effect. We provide first evidence for the spontaneous acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations in 9- 12-, and 18-month-olds, suggesting that the mechanism underlying action–effect integration is in place at the latest around 9 months of age.

Evidence for a unitary goal concept in 12‐month‐old infants

We investigated whether infants can transfer their goal attribution between situations that contain different types of information about the goal. We found that 12-month-olds who had attributed a goal based on the causal efficacy of a means-end action generated expectations about the actors action in another scenario in which the actor could choose between alternative outcomes. This finding suggests that, by 12 months, infants possess a unitary concept of goal.

From outcome prediction to action selection: developmental change in the role of action-effect bindings

Ideomotor theory considers bidirectional action-effect associations to be the fundamental building blocks for intentional action. The present study employed a novel pupillometric and oculomotor paradigm to study developmental changes in the role of action-effects in the acquisition of voluntary action. Our findings suggest that both 7- and 12-month-olds (and adults) can use acquired action-effect bindings to predict action outcomes but only 12-month-olds (and adults) showed evidence for employing action-effects to select actions. This dissociation supports the idea that infants acquire action-effect knowledge before they have developed the cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform intentional actions.

Resting frontal EEG asymmetry in children: Meta-analyses of the effects of psychosocial risk factors and associations with internalizing and externalizing behavior

Asymmetry of frontal cortical electroencephalogram (EEG) activity in children is influenced by the social environment and considered a marker of vulnerability to emotional and behavioral problems. To determine the reliability of these associations, we used meta-analysis to test whether variation in resting frontal EEG asymmetry is consistently associated with (a) having experienced psychosocial risk (e.g., parental depression or maltreatment) and (b) internalizing and externalizing behavior outcomes in children ranging from newborns to adolescents. Three meta-analyses including 38 studies (N = 2,523) and 50 pertinent effect sizes were carried out. The studies included in the analyses reported associations between frontal EEG asymmetry and psychosocial risk (k = 20; predominantly studies with maternal depression as the risk factor) as well as internalizing (k = 20) and externalizing (k = 10) behavior outcomes. Psychosocial risk was significantly associated with greater relative right frontal asymmetry, with an effect size of d = .36 (p < .01), the effects being stronger in girls. A non-significant relation was observed between right frontal asymmetry and internalizing symptoms (d = .19, p = .08), whereas no association between left frontal asymmetry and externalizing symptoms was observed (d = .04, p = .79). Greater relative right frontal asymmetry appears to be a fairly consistent marker of the presence of familial stressors in children but the power of frontal asymmetry to directly predict emotional and behavioral problems is modest.

Primacy of Information about Means Selection over Outcome Selection in Goal Attribution by Infants.

It has been shown that, when observing an action, infants can rely on either outcome selection information (i.e., actions that express a choice between potential outcomes) or means selection information (i.e., actions that are causally efficient toward the outcome) in their goal attribution. However, no research has investigated the relationship between these two types of information when they are present simultaneously. In an experiment that addressed this question directly, we found that when outcome selection information could disambiguate the goal of the action (e.g., the action is directed toward one of two potential targets), but means selection information could not (i.e., the action is not efficiently adjusted to the situational constraints), 7- and 9-month-old infants did not attribute a goal to an observed action. This finding suggests that means selection information takes primacy over outcome selection information. The early presence of this bias sheds light on the nature of the notion of goal in action understanding.

Explicit Learning of Arbitrary and Non-Arbitrary Action–Effect Relations in Adults and 4-Year-Olds

Ideomotor theories claim that carrying out a movement that produces a perceivable effect creates a bidirectional association between the two, which can then be used by action control processes to retrieve the associated action by anticipating its outcome. Previous implicit-learning studies have shown that practice renders novel but action-contingent stimuli effective retrieval cues of the action they used to follow, suggesting that experiencing sequences of actions and effects creates bidirectional action–effect associations. We investigated whether action–effect associations are also acquired under explicit learning conditions and whether familiar action–effect relations (such as between a trumpet and a trumpet sound) are learned the same way as novel, arbitrary relations are. We also investigated whether these factors affect adults and 4-year-old children equally. Findings suggest that explicit learning produces the same bidirectional action–effect associations as implicit-learning does, that non-arbitrary relations improve performance without affecting learning per se, and that adults and young children show equivalent performance – apart from the common observation that children have greater difficulty to withstand stimulus-induced action tendencies.

Outcome producing potential influences twelve-month-olds' interpretation of a novel action as goal-directed.

Learning about a novel, goal-directed action is a complex process. It requires identifying the outcome of the action and linking the action to its outcome for later use in new situations to predict the action or to anticipate its outcome. We investigated the hypothesis that linking a novel action to a salient change in the environment is critical for infants to assign a goal to the novel action. We report a study in which we show that 12-month-old infants, who were provided with prior experience with a novel action accompanied with a salient visible outcome in one context, can interpret the same action as goal-directed even in the absence of the outcome in another context. Our control condition shows that prior experience with the action, but without the salient effect, does not lead to goal-directed interpretation of the novel action. We also found that, for the case of 9-month-olds infants, prior experience with the outcome producing potential of the novel action does not facilitate a goal-directed interpretation of the action. However, this failure was possibly due to difficulties with generalizing the learnt association to another context rather than with linking the action to its outcome.

Attachment and maternal sensitivity are related to infants' monitoring of animated social interactions.

Infants have been shown to possess remarkable competencies in social understanding. Little is known, however, about the interplay between the quality of infants’ social‐emotional experiences with their caregivers and social‐cognitive processes in infancy.

Attachment quality is related to the synchrony of mother and infant monitoring patterns

ABSTRACT We investigated whether attachment quality is related to infant–mother dyadic patterns in monitoring animated social situations. Sixty 12-month-old infants and their mothers participated in an eye-tracking study in which they watched abstractly depicted distress interactions involving the separation of a “baby” and a “parent” character followed by reunion or further separation of the two characters. We measured infants’ and their mothers’ relative fixation duration to the two characters in the animations. We found that infant attachment disorganization moderated the correspondence between the monitoring patterns of infant–mother dyads during the final part of the animations resulting in reunion or separation. Organized infants and their mothers showed complementary monitoring patterns: the more the mothers focused their attention on the “baby” character, the more the infants focused their attention on the “parent” character, and vice versa. Disorganized infant–mother dyads showed the opposite pattern although the correlation was nonsignificant: mothers and their infants focused on the same character. The attachment-related differences in the nature of the synchrony in the attentional processes of infants and their mothers suggest that by 12 months the dyads’ representations of social situations reflect their shared social–emotional experiences.