Terry L. Boles

Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: Lying and threats in ultimatum games

In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This experiment examines the impact of cheap talk in an ultimatum bargaining setting with two-sided imperfect information. In contrast to previous work, the experiment provides an opportunity for deceptions to be revealed and punished. Results show that lies about private information and (incredible) threats of future actions do influence bargaining outcomes (offers and responses) in both the short- and long-term.

Chapter 1 Synthesizing What We Know and Looking Ahead: A Meta-Analytical Review of 30 Years of Emotional Labor Research

The purpose of the current chapter is to meta-analytically examine the nomological network around emotional labor. The results show that negative display rules, high level of job demand, frequent contacts with customers, and lack of autonomy and social support are significantly related to surface acting, whereas display rules, opportunities to display various emotions, and frequent, intensive, and long time contacts with customers are significantly related to deep acting. Further, people high on negative affectivity and neuroticism are more likely to surface act, whereas people high on positive affectivity and extraversion are more likely to deep act. In addition, surface acting is mainly associated with undesirable work outcomes, whereas deep acting is mainly related to desirable work outcomes.

Alternative Reference Points and Outcome Evaluation: The Influence of Affect

Two studies examined the effect of affective states on decision outcome evaluation under the presence or absence of salient alternative reference points. Alternative reference points exist when there are 2 possible referents from which an outcome can be evaluated, and the outcome is judged as good from the perspective of one referent and bad from the perspective of the other. The results support a motivational process of evaluating outcomes in which individuals select the reference point that allows them to maintain positive mood or improve negative mood. Mood measurements taken before and after the task revealed that those in positive moods maintained their mood whether or not they had alternative reference points in the evaluation of their outcomes. Those in negative affective states improved their mood only when there was an alternative reference point that allowed the outcome to be compared favorably; when there was no such alternative reference point, they maintained their negative mood.

Persons, organizations, and societies: The effects of collectivism and individualism on cooperation

A.P. Brief, J.P. Walsh, Series Foreword. R.M. Kramer, A.E. Tenbrunsel, M.H. Bazerman, Social Dilemmas, Social Values, and Ethical Judgments: Touchpoints and Touchdowns in a Distinguished Scholarly Career. Part 1. Social Dilemmas. C.D. Samuelson, K. Watrous-Rodriguez, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Does the Medium Matter? E. van Dijk, A. Wit, H. Wilke, E.W. de Kwaadsteniet, On the Importance of Equality in Social Dilemmas. P.A.M. Van Lange, J.A. Joireman, Social and Temporal Orientations in Social Dilemmas. A.E. Tenbrunsel, G. Northcraft, In the Eye of the Beholder: Payoff Structures and Decision Frames in Social Dilemmas. R.M. Kramer, Dilemmas and Doubts: How Decision Makers Cope with Interdependence and Uncertainty. Part 2. Social Values, Social Control, and Cooperation. G.P. Shelley, M. Page, P. Rives, E. Yeagley, D.M. Kuhlman, Nonverbal Communication and Detection of Individual Differences in Social Value Orientation. T. Boles, H. Le, H. Nguyen, Persons, Organizations, and Societies: The Effects of Collectivism and Individualism on Cooperation. J.L. Grzelak, D.M. Kuhlman, E. Yeagley, J.A. Joireman, Attraction to Prospective Dyadic Relationships: Effects of Fate Control, Reflexive Control, and Partners Trustworthiness. Part 3. Ethical Judgments, Fairness, and Equality. F. Gino, D.A. Moore, M.H. Bazerman, See No Evil: When We Overlook Other Peoples Unethical Behavior. K. Gibson, J.K. Murnighan, From Theory to Practice: Messick and Morality. S.T. Allison, J.L. Burnette, Fairness and Preference for Underdogs and Topdogs. S. Desal, A.P. Brief, J.George, Meaner Managers: A Consequence of Income Inequality. Part 4. Commentary and Reflections. R. Dawes, Appreciation for Professor David M. Messick: Peanuts, Ping Pong, and Naivete. D. Messick, Retrospection on a Career in Social Psychology.University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. June 2009. Major: Economics. Advisor: Aldo Rustichini. 1 computer file (PDF); viii, 94 pages.