Thiago Gomes de Castro

Análise de conteúdo em pesquisas de Psicologia

The study focuses the application of the content analysis method in empirical research in psychology, according to the technical procedures identified under that methodology. It presents in the first place a brief discussion on the variations in CA and an analysis of the scientific validation criteria that support the method practice. Then it describes the most frequent modes of uses of the CA, extracted from a review conducted in 83 articles published between 2004 and 2009 in six psychology journals in Brazil. The selected journals were classified as A1 and A2 in a triennial assessment for the CAPES periodicals (2007- 2009), and were retrieved from the Scielo base of journals. The final discussion highlights the evaluation assessment of methodological rigor accuracy associated to the practice of the method, suggesting clear information about the CA approach, implementation of the CA and careful explanation of the steps and technical procedures adopted in data analysis.The study focuses the application of the content analysis method in empirical research in psychology, according to the technical procedures identified under that methodology. It presents in the first place a brief discussion on the variations in CA and an analysis of the scientific validation criteria that support the method practice. Then it describes the most frequent modes of uses of the CA, extracted from a review conducted in 83 articles published between 2004 and 2009 in six psychology journals in Brazil. The selected journals were classified as A1 and A2 in a triennial assessment for the CAPES periodicals (2007- 2009), and were retrieved from the Scielo base of journals. The final discussion highlights the evaluation assessment of methodological rigor accuracy associated to the practice of the method, suggesting clear information about the CA approach, implementation of the CA and careful explanation of the steps and technical procedures adopted in data analysis.

Movimento Fenomenológico: Controvérsias e Perspectivas na Pesquisa Psicológica

The repercussion of the phenomenological movement on the history of psychology can be perceived by persistent attempts to import eidetic phenomenology features in the systematic analysis of empirical events. In this sense, the concept of phenomenological reduction, described by the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and technically defined for psychological research, was taken as a mean to investigate the attempts of transitions between philosophy and psychology. This review includes three models of methodological transposition: empirical phenomenological psychology, experimental phenomenology and neurophenomenology. Epistemological differences are emphasized between hermeneutic and natural models. The study concludes that a deeper discussion about the influence of phenomenology on the science of psychology would be opportune and appropriate through the study of the history of this intersection.

Adaptação e validação da Escala Filadélfia de Mindfulness para adultos brasileiros

La literatura psicologica ha tenido especial interes en el proceso psicologico de monitoreo continuo de la experiencia individual, o mindfulness. En este estudio, se busco adaptar y presentar evidencias de validez convergente y divergente para una escala de autorrelato que tiene por objeto mensurar mindfulness, la Escala Filadelfia de Mindfulness (EFM). Participaron de la investigacion 703 adultos brasilenos, que respondieron la EFM y otras tres medidas relacionadas a conceptos como autoconsciencia e insight. El analisis factorial indico la presencia de dos dimensiones de la EFM, relativos a dos componentes de mindfulness: Aceptacion y Awareness. Esas dimensiones presentaron indices de consistencia interna de 0,859 y 0,816, respectivamente. Los resultados tambien indicaron convergencia entre el factor Awareness y los datos de autoconsciencia como autofoco, y divergencia entre Aceptacion y facetas mal adaptativas de la autoconsciencia (ansiedad social y ruminacion). En consonancia con la literatura que refiere haber una faceta de mindfulness vuelta a la meditacion, Aceptacion presento tambien correlacion positiva con Insight.

Clínica fenomenológica: do método de pesquisa para a prática psicoterapêutica

Phenomenological clinic is defined as the influence of Husserls method upon psychological treatments. This paper addresses: (1) the philosophy of the concept of existence, defined as taking care of oneself, and of the phenomenological method, defined as the study of consciousness; (2) the controversial transformations undergone by the phenomenological method to analyze the existence; and (3) the extension of the existential analysis to psychotherapy as phenomenological clinic. The study contrasts descriptions of the existential therapeutic process from 1958 to 2007. As for empirical evidences, the traditional resistance is still present, but with some opening. Moreover, research findings are favorable. The historical interpretation indicates that the phenomenological method is losing focus and the existential analysis is moving towards a more integrated psychotherapeutic approach.

Fenomenologia e Psicologia Experimental no Início do Século XX

O estudo examina as relacoes entre fenomenologia e psicologia experimental no inicio do seculo XX para definir origem, especificidade e abrangencia do termo fenomenologia experimental. Inicia com a indicacao de que o termo esta associado a Carl Stumpf em Berlim. A seguir, acompanha as relacoes conturbadas entre Husserl e o Departamento de Psicologia da Universidade de Gottingen. Na sequencia constata a influencia frutuosa da fenomenologia na psicologia experimental da Universidade de Wurzburg e na psicologia gestaltaltica de Max Wertheimer. A fenomenologia experimental continuou pelos meados do seculo XX com repercussoes na psicologia ecologica de James Gibson. Embora Husserl tenha se distanciado da psicologia experimental, a fenomenologia experimental prosseguiu sem seu aval, subsidiando na atualidade as ciencias cognitivas e as neurociencias.

Autoconsciência e ambiguidade perceptual cinestésica: experimento fenomenológico

Relations between kinesthesia and selfconsciousness were examined in a phenomenological experiment with 19 students who responded to three instruments: 1) Self-Consciousness Scale (private, public and social anxiety), 2) The Alien-Hand Experiment (purposely-induced distortion in perceptual motor task, repeated four times) and 3) Phenomenological interview on perceptions of the experiment. The analysis identified two patterns of response: 1) recognition of the distortion and assignment to the experiment, and 2) ambivalent recognition of distortion and attribution to himself. The second response pattern was associated with high levels of self- consciousness. Reversal between experience conscious and consciousness of experience were revealed gradually in the repetitions of the task: 1) description of estrangement, 2) imaginary variations on the causes of distortion (arguments), 3) decision making between positing distortions on experiment variables or personnel difficulty to perform the task. Differentiation of self-consciousness modalities led to argument analysis on task interferences, pointing to an original handling of pre-reflection to self-reflection.Relations between kinesthesia and selfconsciousness were examined in a phenomenological experiment with 19 students who responded to three instruments: 1) Self-Consciousness Scale (private, public and social anxiety), 2) The Alien-Hand Experiment (purposely-induced distortion in perceptual motor task, repeated four times) and 3) Phenomenological interview on perceptions of the experiment. The analysis identified two patterns of response: 1) recognition of the distortion and assignment to the experiment, and 2) ambivalent recognition of distortion and attribution to himself. The second response pattern was associated with high levels of selfconsciousness. Reversal between experience conscious and consciousness of experience were revealed gradually in the repetitions of the task: 1) description of estrangement, 2) imaginary variations on the causes of distortion (arguments), 3) decision making between positing distortions on experiment variables or personnel difficulty to perform the task. Differentiation of self-consciousness modalities led to argument analysis on task interferences, pointing to an original handling of pre-reflection to self-reflection.

Body image perception and sense of agency: notes from the alien hand experiment

Body image perception comprises stable and dynamic representational features. Here, we examined whether a stable body image (BI) measure correlates to a dynamic sense of agency (SoA) score. Moreover, we tested whether differential BI perception scores predicts SoA performance under sensory conflict conditions. A total of 21 university students (age M=25.9, SD=9.29) completed the Brazilian version of the Silhouette Figures Scale (SFS) and participated in The Alien Hand Experiment (TAHE). TAHE is a task that manipulates participants’ hand movement SoA. A Bayesian correlation matrix revealed substantial negative correlation probability between BI perception and SoA confidence in accuracy responses, specifically in experimental conditions where agency was manipulated. Based on the SFS scores, participants were divided into groups with and without evidences of BI distortion. Bayesian Independent Samples T-Tests evidenced substantial differential probability between groups. Analyzes confirmed lower SoA confidence among subjects with BI distortion greater than ±3 kg/m².

From intentional consciousness to progressive regressive method in Husserl

The paper examines the cognitive and phenomenological nature of consciousness, starting with the phenomenal conditions and concluding by its cognitive dispositional activities. The goal is to point out the limits and potentials of the phenomenological method. Thus, we examine the concepts of flow of experience, intentional flow model, and accuracy of self-evidence to specify the problem of method. It is argued that the reflexive activity is limited, not being able to cover the whole floating of meanings and experiences in its margins in the flow. It deals with the limits paying attention to two reflexive movements: 1) the progressive leading to timely and exhaustive description of static elements of experience, and 2) the regressive exploring the origins, expectations, and potential failures of the intentional activity. We conclude that the phenomenological method, despite its limitations, is a valuable resource to guide the researcher in how to think the thought itself.

Desde la intencionalidad de la conciencia al método progresivo regresivo en Husserl

The paper examines the cognitive and phenomenological nature of consciousness, starting with the phenomenal conditions and concluding by its cognitive dispositional activities. The goal is to point out the limits and potentials of the phenomenological method. Thus, we examine the concepts of flow of experience, intentional flow model, and accuracy of self-evidence to specify the problem of method. It is argued that the reflexive activity is limited, not being able to cover the whole floating of meanings and experiences in its margins in the flow. It deals with the limits paying attention to two reflexive movements: 1) the progressive leading to timely and exhaustive description of static elements of experience, and 2) the regressive exploring the origins, expectations, and potential failures of the intentional activity. We conclude that the phenomenological method, despite its limitations, is a valuable resource to guide the researcher in how to think the thought itself.

Da intencionalidade da consciência ao método progressivo regressivo em Husserl

The paper examines the cognitive and phenomenological nature of consciousness, starting with the phenomenal conditions and concluding by its cognitive dispositional activities. The goal is to point out the limits and potentials of the phenomenological method. Thus, we examine the concepts of flow of experience, intentional flow model, and accuracy of self-evidence to specify the problem of method. It is argued that the reflexive activity is limited, not being able to cover the whole floating of meanings and experiences in its margins in the flow. It deals with the limits paying attention to two reflexive movements: 1) the progressive leading to timely and exhaustive description of static elements of experience, and 2) the regressive exploring the origins, expectations, and potential failures of the intentional activity. We conclude that the phenomenological method, despite its limitations, is a valuable resource to guide the researcher in how to think the thought itself.