Thomas B. King

FLOW AND STOCK EFFECTS OF LARGE-SCALE TREASURY PURCHASES: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL SUPPLY

The Federal Reserve’s 2009 program to purchase

Distress in the financial sector and economic activity

300 billion of US Treasury securities represented an unprecedented intervention in the Treasury market and provides a natural experiment with the potential to shed light on the price elasticities of Treasuries and theories of supply effects in the term structure. Using security-level data on Treasury prices and quantities during the course of this program, we document a ‘local supply’ effect in the yield curve—yields within a particular maturity sector responded more to changes in the amounts outstanding in that sector than to similar changes in other sectors. We find that this phenomenon was responsible for a persistent downward shift in yields averaging about 30 basis points over the course of the program (the “stock effect”). In addition, except at very long maturities, purchase operations caused an average decline in yields in the sector purchased of 3.5 basis points on the days when those operations occurred (the “flow effect”). The sensitivity of our results to security characteristics generally supports a view of segmentation or imperfect substitution within the Treasury market during this time.

Financial Market Perceptions of Recession Risk

This paper explores the relationship between the health of the financial sector and the rest of the economy. We develop an indicator of financial sector health using a distance-to-default measure based on a Merton-style option pricing model. Our measure spans over three decades and appears to capture periods when financial sector institutions were strong and when they were weak. We then use vector autoregressions to assess whether our indicator of financial-sector health affects the real economy, in particular non-residential investment. The results indicate that our measure has a considerable impact. Moreover, we find that this financial channel amplifies changes in investment resulting from shocks to non-financial firm profitability.

Distress in the Financial Sector and Economic Activity

Over the Great Moderation period in the United States, we find that corporate credit spreads embed crucial information about the one-year-ahead probability of recession, as evidenced by both in- and out-of-sample fit. Furthermore, the incidence of “false positive” predictions of recession is dramatically reduced by utilizing a bivariate model that includes a measure of credit spreads along with the slope of the yield curve; indeed, these bivariate models provide much better forecasting performance than any combination of univariate models. We also find that optimal (Bayesian) model combination strongly dominates simple averaging of model forecasts in predicting recessions.

Did FDICIA Enhance Market Discipline? A Look at Evidence from the Jumbo-CD Market

Abstract We construct daily market-based measures of distance to default for large U.S. financial institutions since 1973. These measures have significant predictive power for institution bankruptcy more than one year in advance. We aggregate the distances to default across institutions to provide an index of the overall health of the financial-services industry. We show that deteriorations in this Financial Institution Health Index are associated with tighter lending standards and higher interest rates on bank loans and precede declines in employment and industrial production. We argue that this points to the condition of financial institutions as an independent source of macroeconomic variability, distinct from traditional accelerator mechanisms.

Variable Participation and Cyclical Unemployment

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) forced uninsured creditors such as jumbo-CD holders to bear more of the losses from bank failures. Because no other federal laws affecting loss exposure took effect in the surrounding years, the Act offers a natural experiment for assessing the supervisory returns from greater reliance on debt markets to police bank risk. Accordingly, we examine the sensitivity of jumbo-CD yields and run-offs to risk before and after FDICIA as well as the implied impact of any risk penalties on bank profitability. The evidence indicates that yields and run-offs were risk sensitive in both periods, but that this sensitivity was always economically small and, more importantly, was not significantly higher after the Act. These findings suggest that raising the deposit-insurance ceiling would not - at least in the current institutional and economic environment - exacerbate moral hazard. More importantly, they also suggest that operationalizing debt-market discipline as pillar of bank supervision could prove more difficult than previously thought.

Credit Risk, Liquidity and Lies

This paper generalizes the standard aggregate worker-flow calculation of Shimer (2007) to account for monthly changes in labor-force participation. The resulting series confirm previous findings with regard to the large procyclicality of the aggregate rate of outflow from unemployment in the U.S. and indicate that this cyclicality is due in approximately equally measure to fluctuations in the rate at which the unemployed find jobs and the rate at which they exit the labor force. Decomposition exercises show that the unemployment-nonparticipation transition rate is more important than job vacancies or job separations in explaining cyclical variation in unemployment. This rate depends in expected ways on the benefits of job search and aggregate income, but compositional fluctuations in the pool of unemployed are important for explaining its pronounced procyclicality.

A Portfolio-Balance Approach to the Nominal Term Structure

We reexamine the relative effects of credit risk and liquidity in the interbank market using bank-level panel data on Libor submissions and CDS spreads. Our model synthesizes previous work by combining the fundamental determinants of interbank spreads with the effects of strategic misreporting by Libor-submitting firms. We find that interbank spreads were very sensitive to credit risk at the peak of the crisis. However, liquidity premia constitute the bulk of those spreads on average, and Federal Reserve interventions coincide with improvements in liquidity at short maturities. Accounting for misreporting, which is large at times, is important for obtaining these results.

Expectation and Duration at the Effective Lower Bound

Explanations of why changes in the relative quantities of safe debt seem to affect asset prices often appeal informally to a “portfolio balance” mechanism. I show how this type of effect can be incorporated in a general class of structural, arbitrage-free asset-pricing models using a numerical solution method that allows for a wide range of nonlinearities. I consider some applications in which the Treasury market is isolated, investors have mean-variance preferences, and the short-rate process is truncated at zero. Despite its simplicity, a version of this model incorporating inflation can fit longer-term yields well, and it suggests that fluctuations in Treasury supply explain a sizeable fraction of the historical time-series variation in term premia. Nonetheless, under plausible parameterizations central-bank asset purchases have a fairly small impact on the yield curve by removing duration from the market, and these effects are particularly weak when interest rates are close to their zero lower bound.

What Drives Bank Funding Spreads

I study unconventional monetary policy in a structural model of risk-averse arbitrage, augmented with an effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal rates. The model exposes nonlinear interactions among short-rate expectations, bond supply, and term premia that are absent from models that ignore the ELB, and these features help it replicate the recent behavior of long-term yields, including event-study evidence on the responses to unconventional policy. When the model is calibrated to long-run moments of the yield curve and subjected to shocks approximating the size of the Federal Reserve’s forward guidance and asset purchases, it implies that those policies worked primarily by changing the anticipated path of short-term interest rates, not by lowering investors’ exposures to interest-rate risk. However, the effects of short-rate expectations were more attenuated than the effects of bond-supply shocks during the ELB period.