Thomas E. Weisskopf

Power and Profits: The Social Structure of Accumulation and the Profitability of the Postwar U.S. Economy

This paper seeks to explain trends in United States corporate profitability since World War II through an analysis of the rise and subsequent demise of a postwar social structure of accumulation (SSA). Building from a formal model of the determinants of profitability, we provide econometric support for the hypothesis that variations in profitability can be explained to a large extent by variations in quantitative indicators of capitalist power in the postwar SSA.

After the waste land : a democratic economics for the year 2000

This critique of Reaganomics attempts to provide alternatives to both the supply experiments of the 1980s and neoliberal strategies of austerity. It presents arguments for economic democracy with a worker-oriented blueprint for improving productivity, growth, employment and economic justice.

The effect of unemployment on labour productivity: an international comparative analysis

This is a comparative empirical analysis of the effect of unemployment - via a ‘work-intensity effect’ and/or a ‘workplace-innovation effect’ - on manufacturing productivity growth in eight advanced capitalist economies. My econometric results confirm earlier findings of positive work-intensity and workplace-innovation effects of unemployment on productivity growth in the United States; but I do not obtain similarly strong results for the other countries, and in Germany and Sweden I find evidence of negative unemployment effects. My findings are consistent with the comparative hypothesis that the sign and strength of unemployment effects on productivity growth will vary negatively with the degree to which a countrys socioeconomic environment is characterized by cooperative capital-labour relations and worker security.

Toward a Socialism for the Future, in the Wake of the Demise of the Socialism of the Past

In this paper I seek to explore what kind of socialist system can best make good on the socialist commitment to equity, democracy and solidarity - in the wake of the failure of the political-economic systems of the USSR and Eastern Europe. I identify and explore two alternative models of socialism - market socialism and participatory socialism - and conclude by endorsing a form of democratic, self-managed market socialism.

Long-Term Growth and the Cyclical Restoration of Profitability

Macroeconomic theory today is marked by a curious hiatus: the study of long-term growth and the study of cycles are carried on almost entirely independently of one another, the central concerns of the one disappearing in the simplifying assumptions of the other, and conversely. Not surprisingly, the methodological distance between the two fields is associated with a division of labor among macroeconomists almost as rigid as that which at least until quite recently divided the practitioners of microeconomic theory from the macroeconomists.

Reflections on 50 Years of Radical Political Economy

I examine first how radical political economy (RPE) has evolved over the last five decades, as the overall political climate in the United States has shifted increasingly to the right. I explore how this political shift, as well as new developments within mainstream economics, have altered the focus of much of RPE and the activities of many of its practitioners. I then offer suggestions to radical political economists as to the future orientation of RPE.

The relevance of the Chinese experience for third world economic development

ConclusionIf the ten elements of Chinese development strategy discussed earlier are to provide object lessons relevant for other third world nations, they must be potentially transferable to other societies. The extent to which each element of the strategy is transferable depends on the conditions under which it can be successfully implemented, and on the degree to which these conditions are satisfied in other third world nations. I had also sought to determine what political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions are required for the successful implementation of each of the ten elements of strategy. The results of this analysis are summarized in the form of a matrix in Table 1. Each of the ten elements of strategy under discussion requires at least one - and often many more - of the major features of Chinas political-economic system. In all cases an effective and extensive system of public administration and/or a massoriented class structure are required, and in most cases a considerable degree of public ownership of the means of production and administrative control of resource allocation is either necessary or helpful. Less often required, but crucial in a few cases, are a central government with the power to mobilize resources on a large scale, a political leadership capable of influencing and involving people on a wide scale, and a ruraloriented class structure.Among the key geographic characteristics considered, large size is necessary or helpful for the successful implementation of two of the ten elements of strategy, but is disadvantageous in many cases because it is then more difficult for the political leadership to establish an effective system of public administration and to influence and involve people on a wide scale. An abundance of labor and scarcity of land is quite generally disadvantageous because it makes the achievement of rapid economic growth more difficult under any development strategy. But ethnological unity can be very helpful for the establishment of a strong state in all three respects I have distinguished.A cultural tradition oriented to cooperative work is quite helpful - if not strictly necessary - for three of the elements of strategy. A heritage of educational and administrative experience is helpful - but not absolutely essential - for all ten elements, since it improves the operation of those basic economic institutions and those characteristics of the state which have played an important role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. The less a society has been subject to foreign domination, the more its environment is likely to be conducive to the success of many elements of the Chinese strategy. And, finally, a profound social revolution would appear to be necessary in most instances for the development of three features of the Chinese political-economic system which as a group are indispensable for the success of all ten elements of the Chinese development strategy.These conclusions suggest that most of the elements of strategy described are currently applicable in only a few third world nations at best. Only a handful of nations have experienced a social revolution of any kind, and not all of these revolutions have been strongly rooted in the rural masses. Moreover, many of the revolutionary societies (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam) have a bitter history of Western imperialist domination to overcome, and most have only a limited heritage of educational and administrative experience to draw upon (e.g., the African nations). Some do not have a cultural tradition conducive to collective modes of operation (most notably Cuba), and many are ethnologically heterogeneous (e.g., Angola, Mozambique). Of all contemporary third world nations, North Korea would appear to come closest to meeting the historical, geographical, and political-economic conditions that have played a significant (and in many cases an essential) role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. But even in the case of North Korea the match is far from perfect in many respects.Do these observations imply that the Chinese experience is essentially unique and therefore largely irrelevant for the rest of the third world? I think not. First of all, the Chinese experience has set new and higher standards for the evaluation of development performance and policy throughout the world: it is no longer enough to promote rapid economic growth, but development planners can and will be held accountable for achieving a balanced pattern of development in which non-growth objectives such as greater equity and self-reliance are promoted along with faster growth.Second, certain elements of the Chinese development strategy do lend themselves to successful application - at least to a certain extent - in other societies which differ considerably from China in their political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions. For example, the promotion of mass-oriented human resource development could be carried out with some success in a nation with a reasonably strong state (in terms of its capacity for resource mobilization and public administration) and a political leadership somewhat oriented to the masses. A strategy of restriction of luxury consumption is potentially more widely transferable, for it requires mainly a mass-oriented political leadership and, up to a point, does not depend on an unusually effective state apparatus. Some degree of economic diversification of regions and localities, as well as some degree of amelioration of rural-urban imbalance, can be successfully accomplished provided that the political leadership is sufficiently rural-oriented and can rely upon an effective and extensive administrative system. In all these cases the necessary configuration of political-economic conditions is possible (if not very likely) in a society that has not undergone a profound social revolution and that operates within a predominantly capitalist institutional framework. More revolutionary change would be more conducive to success, but not absolutely essential for some progress to be made.Third, and more important, some of the key conditions required for the successful implementation of much of the Chinese development strategy can be realized in the future even if they do not obtain at present in most third world societies. Here it is important to distinguish between those aspects of the setting of any given society which are virtually immutable and those aspects which are amenable to change under appropriate historical circumstances. The key geographical characteristics that I have discussed clearly involve stable features of a societys environment; nothing short of massive territorial annexation, massive migration, or genocide could alter the size, the resource endowment, or the ethnological structure of contemporary third world nations. The historical characteristics I have cited vary considerably in their susceptibility to change. Cultural traditions built up over centuries (and in some cases millenia) cannot be transformed within a generation. The amount of time it takes to overcome the effects of Western imperialism depends of course on the force and the longevity of its imposition, but in many areas at least a generation might be needed. And a substantial degree of educational and administrative experience can only be built up with several decades of concerted effort. The possibility of significant change in any of these three historical characteristics hinges on some kind of decisive break with the past which ushers in new political leadership determined to bring about large-scale change. Such a decisive break need not involve a revolutionary redistribution of power from dominating to oppressed classes, but it does require at least the accession to power of strongly nationalist forces determined to “modernize” their country (i.e., to increase its resemblance to the powerful industrialized nations of the modern world). Social revolution is the most fundamental historical characteristic of all, for it underlies the establishment of many of the key features of Chinas political-economic system and (not incidentally) also creates a context in which the needed changes in the other three historical characteristics become more readily achievable. Profound social revolutions, in which formerly oppressed classes do succeed in wresting power from formerly privileged classes, are not made overnight, but they can be brought about after a period of revolutionary organization and struggle. If the revolutionary movement is to be truly rooted in the masses (and the rural masses in particular), and if it is to succeed in a contemporary international context in which privileged classes in third world nations can often count on support from major foreign powers, it is bound to take a great deal of time and effort. But the point I am making here is that it has been done in some countries in the past, and there is every likelihood that it will eventually be done in some other countries in the future.At present it would be foolhardy to attempt to predict where Chinese-style revolutions might succeed in generating historical and political-economic conditions approximating those which have contributed to the success of the Chinese strategy of development. But there are many third world nations with one or more relevant geographic and historical characteristics already similar to Chinas. For example, India, Indonesia, and Brazil share Chinas large size, some of the Latin American nations are ethnologically quite homogeneous, many East and Southeast Asian nations have cultural traditions resembling those of the Chinese, the people of India and some of the other semi-industrialized nations of the third world have already acquired a substantial degree of educational and administrative skills, and nations such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan were not thoroughly restructured by foreign powers. Prof

Dependence and Imperialism in India

Secondly, India at independence had already experienced some degree of industrialization, and a substantial share of modern business enterprise had come under the control of indigenous capitalists. Although factory establishments and mines accounted for only 6.5% of the national product and employed only 2.6% of the labor force in 1950,1 modern industry was, in absolute terms, quite important. Furthermore, since the early nineteenth century, Indian capitalists had gradually improved their position vis-a-vis foreign (predominantly British) capital. A good deal of British capital followed the retreat of the colonial govcrnment to London, and by the early 1950’s only a third of corporate business in India was still financially controlled by foreigners (mostly British).2 Thus, India attained independence with a significant indigenous capitalist class that had a history of considerable antagonism towards foreign capitalist competitors. Unlike most other ex-colonial nations, India was not completely dependent on foreign business enterprise or managerial expertise. ,.

What Kinds of Economic Inequality Really Matter

I discuss the major reasons why economic inequality should be a source of concern and the forms of inequality that are principally implicated. I consider ten different arguments as to why inequality matters – two of them moral, two political, three economic, and three social. In each case I discuss the economic variable(s) whose unequal distribution is at issue, whether economic class inequality or ethnic group inequality is most salient, and what part(s) of the unequal distribution are the most problematic – i.e., is the problem primarily poverty at the lower end, privilege at the upper end, bipolarization, or the entire distribution?

Affirmative Action and Productivity in the Indian Railways

Critics of affirmative action policies often claim that increasing the representation of members of marginalized communities in jobs comes at the cost of reduced productive efficiency. This paper reports on a systematic empirical analysis of productivity in the Indian Railways - the world’s largest employer subject to affirmative action - in which we examined whether or not higher proportions of affirmative action beneficiaries in employment reduce efficiency in the railway system. We found no evidence for such an effect; and some of our results provide tentative support for the claim that greater labor force diversity boosts productivity.