Thomas F. Remington

Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem The Case of United Russia

This article analyzes the formation of a stable dominant party in an authoritarian regime as a commitment problem between two sides: the ruler and other elites. After defining a dominant party regime and outlining the costs and benefits that such a regime entails for each side, the authors examine the efforts made in Russia to establish United Russia as a dominant party and argue that the Kremlin and regional elites have overcome their commitment problem through mutual investment in the United Russia party. In contrast to previous party-of-power projects, United Russia represents an equilibrium arrangement between the federal center and other political and economic elite actors.

The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia

Cross-national studies suggest that electoral law, the arrangement of political institutions, political cleavages in the electorate, and political stability influence the number of parliamentary parties and their policy-making role. These factors do not yield unambiguous expectations for the parties in Russias new parliament. Nevertheless, the Duma, the lower and more powerful chamber of the new Russian Federal Assembly, has developed a strongly party-oriented decision-making process. In this paper, we detail the role of parties in the Duma and conclude that the particular sequence of events in late 1993 and early 1994 crucially influenced the emergence of such a strongly party-oriented process.

Patronage and the Party of Power: President–Parliament Relations Under Vladimir Putin

DURING THE TWO TERMS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S PRESIDENCY, Russia has created an authoritarian dominant party regime. In such a regime, the party and state are closely intertwined. The party uses its access to state resources and policies to win overwhelming victories in regional and national legislative elections. In return for their assured path to office, the elected legislators of a dominant party guarantee the president assured passage of any legislation he proposes. United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) exemplifies the party’s role linking president and parliament. In the Fourth Duma (2003–2007), United Russia’s faction commanded a two-thirds majority, and following the December 2007 election, has entered the Fifth Convocation with an even wider margin. The size and cohesion of the United Russia faction provide the president and government with a solid bloc of voting support in the Duma. In the upper chamber, the Federation Council, where no formal party factions are allowed, the president enjoys an even larger margin of control over the voting of the members, both through direct instruction from the president’s staff to the members and through an informal caucus of United Russia members.

Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma

Recent comparative research on presidential systems has analyzed the ways in which presidents build majorities for their legislative agendas. Through an analysis of roll-call votes from the 2000-03 Russian State Duma on a set of issues reflecting President Putins legislative agenda, I examine the impact of parliamentary party affiliation, policy preferences, issue type, and electoral mandate type on structuring floor support for the president. I also assess the implications of a mixed electoral system for building legislative coalitions in multiparty legislatures. Further, my findings shed light on Putins recent reforms of the Dumas rules and procedures and the countrys electoral system.

Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council since 2000

HOW DO MEMBERS OF A PARLIAMENT form majorities around legislative alternatives in the absence of electoral or partisan mandates? Whom do they represent, to whom are they accountable, and how do they align themselves over the range of issues that come before them? The upper house of Russia’s legislature—the Federation Council—offers an interesting case of a chamber which is non-partisan (no party groups may form in the chamber) and formed without direct elections. Moreover, half of its members are directly appointed by the governors of the country’s constituent territories. To be sure, non-partisan, unelected second chambers are rare but not unique among the world’s parliaments. Since 1999, when most of the hereditary peers lost their seats, Britain’s House of Lords has been composed principally of appointed lifetime peers. Although most of its members affiliate themselves with parties, around a third do not. Most upper houses are formed through direct or indirect election, but almost a third of the world’s 61 upper houses are entirely filled through appointment. Yet in many such cases members are chosen on the grounds of some principle of representation—functional, social or territorial. The combination of appointment and non-partisanship in Russia’s Federation Council raises serious questions of political accountability: in the absence of electoral mandates and partisan affiliations, whom do members represent? Federalism introduces another dimension of representation. In Russia, as in all federal systems and many unitary ones, the upper house is structured so as to represent the territorial subdivisions of the country. Only around one-third of the world’s parliaments are bicameral, but all democracies which are federal have upper houses. What links members with the federal units whose mandates they bear? Whether they are designed to represent federal units or are formed on some other basis, upper houses are often vested with less power than lower chambers. Yet, as Tsebelis & Money have shown, even a weak upper chamber can have significant effects on legislative decisions. For instance, the power to delay enactment of a bill can affect legislative bargaining if the executive is under time pressure to pass legislation. Therefore an executive would prefer a reliable majority even in a weak upper house. The partisan composition of upper houses determines whether the executive has a friendly or hostile majority. How do parliamentary chambers form majorities, however, without parties to bundle issues, shape the agenda and coordinate voting? A recent study comparing the state Senate of Kansas with Nebraska’s Unicameral finds that floor voting alignments are quite variable in Nebraska even

Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case

An American political scientist reviews existing theories of transition from communism to democracy. Novel arguments suggesting that both regimecentered and society-centered theories underplay important factors, including processes of institution-building and redefinition of interests during the transition itself, are advanced and systematized. Included in the presentation are relevant references to the economy, particularly with regard to such aspects of modernization as urban degradation or change in occupational structures involving convergence of earnings. The paper marshals evidence on the nature of efforts in the USSR to build political organizations that bridge exclusive ethnic and regional identities. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 124, 822.

The Russian Middle Class as Policy Objective

The subject of the Russian middle class has engaged the attention of scholars and policymakers inside and outside Russia. Debate over how the middle class should be defined and measured has been contentious. This article examines recent Russian social science literature on trends in the development of the middle class since the end of communism, considers problems in defining and measuring the size of the middle class, describes the role assigned to it by the Russian leadership, and looks at factors inhibiting the growth of the middle class.

The early legislative process in the Russian federal assembly

The paper describes the establishment of legislative rules and procedures in the Russian Federal Assembly, the new bicameral parliament created under the 1993 Russian Constitution. The paper reviews the constitutional and electoral setting in which the new parliament formed, its organisational structure, and the elements of the legislative process. We discuss the consequences of the different bases of representation of members of the upper and lower chambers, particularly with respect to the development of parliamentary parties in the lower chamber and their role in its governance. We assess parliaments effectiveness in enacting laws and conclude with observations about the factors likely to affect the future development of the Federal Assembly.

Performance incentives and economic growth: regional officials in Russia and China

How does the degree of centralization and decentralization of political control affect economic performance? To investigate this question, we gather and analyze a comprehensive original data-set measuring the performance, career paths, and incentives of regional officials in China and Russia during the last 15 years. Both China and Russia combine centralized personnel selection with substantial administrative autonomy for regional officials, but differ substantially with respect to the economic outcomes produced by their bureaucratic systems. We find that in contrast to China, regional leaders in Russia are unlikely to be promoted for economic or social performance, have a lower turnover, are almost never transferred from one region to another, have less experience in executive positions, are more likely to come from the region they govern than their Chinese counterparts, and are not encouraged to show initiative in economic affairs and engage in economic policy experimentation.

The Russian Federal Assembly, 1994–2004

Russias Federal Assembly, created in December 1993, is a well-institutionalised legislative body operating in a political environment whose party system is fractious and fluid, and where the presidency dominates the entire system. Parliaments role has reflected the changing balance of forces in the wider polity. With Yeltsin as president, 1994–99, parliament served as a counterweight to the executive branch. Since 2000, however, President Putin has enjoyed unprecedented power in both chambers of parliament, through the dominant party associated with his leadership, United Russia. Parliament has become the instrument which smoothly passes Putins legislative initiatives into law.