Thomas Zellweger

Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs: The Importance of Intentions for Transgenerational Control

Family firms are thought to pursue nonfinancial goals that provide socioemotional wealth, but socioemotional wealth is feasible only with family control of the firm. Using prospect theory, we hypothesize that socioemotional wealth increases with the extent of current control, duration of control, and intentions for transgenerational control, thus adding to the price at which owners would be willing to sell their firms to nonfamily buyers. Findings from two countries show that current control has no impact, and duration of control has a mixed impact. However, intention for transgenerational control has a consistently positive impact on the perceived acceptable selling price.

Time Horizon, Costs of Equity Capital, and Generic Investment Strategies of Firms

Recent literature (McNulty, Yeh, Schulze, & Lubatkin, 2002) states that the assumptions behind the capital asset pricing model, in particular the irrelevance of time horizon, do not correspond to the characteristics of firms that prefer long-term investment horizons. I show that family firms display a longer time horizon than most of their nonfamily counterparts, since (1) family firms display a longer CEO tenure, (2) this type of firm strives for long-term independence and succession within the family, and (3) due to the fact that family firms are overrepresented on western European stock markets in cyclical industries in which business cycles inhibit short-term success. As the annual default risk of an investment diminishes with increasing holding period (Hull, 2003), the risk-equivalent cost of equity capital of firms with longer planning horizons (e.g., family firms) can be lower as well. Based on the assumption that economic value to shareholders is created when firms invest in projects with returns above the associated cost of capital (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000), I argue that long-term-oriented firms can tackle unique investment projects represented by two generic investment strategies—the perseverance and the outpacing strategy. The first one, the perseverance strategy, represents investment strategies in which long-term-oriented firms invest in lower return but equal risk projects than their more short-term-oriented counterparts. The second one, the outpacing strategy, comprises investment projects with higher risk and equal return than the short-term competitors.

Why Do Family Firms Strive for Nonfinancial Goals? An Organizational Identity Perspective

This paper develops an organizational identity–based rationale for why family firms strive for nonfinancial goals. We show that the visibility of the family in the firm, the transgenerational sustainability intentions of the family, and the capability of the firm for self–enhancement of the family positively influence the importance of identity fit between family and firm as well as the familys concern for corporate reputation. We suggest that the concern for corporate reputation leads the family to pursue nonfinancial goals to the benefit of nonfamily stakeholders. We also discuss reinforcing feedback loops in these processes.

From Longevity of Firms to Transgenerational Entrepreneurship of Families Introducing Family Entrepreneurial Orientation

Whereas existing research on the longevity of family firms has focused on the survival of firms, this article investigates transgenerational entrepreneurship of families. By building on the transgenerational entrepreneurship research framework, the authors argue that by shifting from firm to family level of analysis, one gains a deeper understanding of family firms’ ability to create value across generations. The authors find evidence for their argument in that such a level shift reveals extended entrepreneurial activity, which is missed when focusing exclusively on the firm level. The study introduces and empirically explores the construct of family entrepreneurial orientation, which may serve as an antecedent to transgenerational value creation by families.

A Stakeholder Perspective on Family Firm Performance

Through the lens of stakeholder theory, this article deepens our understanding of financial and nonfinancial performance outcomes in family firms across multiple stakeholder categories, including the family level of analysis. Based on this foundation, we develop a typology of performance relationships between performance outcomes: overlapping, causal, synergistic, and substitutional. We argue that these relationships, when used between constructive (positive) performance outcomes, are able to increase stakeholder satisfaction, which in turn increases organizational effectiveness. Through this analysis, we extend the common one-dimensional and cause-effect understanding of performance in family firms and move toward a comprehensive stakeholder performance perspective, which provides insights for increasing organizational effectiveness of family firms.

Extending the Socioemotional Wealth Perspective: A Look at the Dark Side

We extend the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective by arguing that SEW can be negatively associated with proactive stakeholder engagement (PSE). We further suggest that the SEW dimensions can be associated with positive or negative valence. Lastly, we propose that negatively valenced SEW dimensions lead to family–centric behavior, which negatively affects PSE. This multifaceted conceptualization of SEW allows us to explain how family firms can partake in harmful stakeholder behaviors despite having seemingly strong SEW. Our paper suggests that SEW can be either an affective endowment or burden for family firms and their constituents.

Exploring the Entrepreneurial Behavior of Family Firms: Does the Stewardship Perspective Explain Differences?

Drawing from stewardship theory, we investigated corporate entrepreneurship in family firms. We argued that stewardship culture determinants––comprehensive strategic decision making, participative governance, long–term orientation, and human capital––differentiate the most entrepreneurial family firms. Based on a study of 179 family firms, we showed that comprehensive strategic decision making and long–term orientation contribute to corporate entrepreneurship. Additionally, family–to–firm unity enhanced the positive effects participative governance and long–term orientation have on corporate entrepreneurship. While we found that family–to–firm unity can compensate for low human capital, unexpectedly, we also found that family–to–firm unity can dampen the positive relationship between human capital and corporate entrepreneurship.

Value Is in the Eye of the Owner Affect Infusion and Socioemotional Wealth Among Family Firm Owners

Drawing on the affect infusion model from cognitive psychology, the authors develop a conceptual framework that explains how affect related to corporate ownership influences the formation of socioemotional wealth perceptions among family firm owners, reflected in altered subjective value perceptions for the ownership stake. The authors explore target, personal, and situational features in the subjective valuation process for the ownership stake and explain how these factors mediate the relationship between affect and socioemotional wealth perceptions. They further the understanding about the level of bias in family owners’ subjective firm value assessments and offer new approaches for socioemotional wealth research.

In the Horns of the Dilemma Socioemotional Wealth, Financial Wealth, and Acquisitions in Family Firms

We posit that family firms often face a dilemma in their strategic decision making: whether to maintain current socioemotional wealth or pursue prospective financial wealth. Applying such a mixed gamble perspective to acquisitions, family owners assess potential acquisitions with regard to their impact on both wealth dimensions. In line with this reasoning, our results show that family control implies a general reluctance to acquire and, when an acquisition happens, a preference for related targets. Because financial and socioemotional viewpoints lead to largely incompatible predictions about the occurrence and relatedness of acquisitions, family firm owners use their firm’s vulnerability as a signal. Increased vulnerability leads to a heightened propensity to prioritize financial over socioemotional wealth problem framing, which is reflected in the acquisition of unrelated targets. Empirical results are supportive of these predictions.

Family, Wealth, and Governance: An Agency Account

Family firms often evolve into ownership constellations with multiple family owners. Building on agency theory, we argue that the growing complexity within a group of family blockholders gives rise to what we label family blockholder conflicts, defined as conflicts within a group of family owners. To curb family blockholder conflicts, families often separate the family from its assets and install intermediary governance structures. We explore four frequently applied structures (uncoordinated family, embedded family office, single family office, and family trust), which vary in their degree of separation between family owners and assets and consequently the extent to which the firm might incur family blockholder costs and the double–agency costs associated with appointing agents to oversee agents. We conclude with a discussion of the distributive effects of the four family governance constellations for family wealth over time.