Tibor Antal

Distant metastasis occurs late during the genetic evolution of pancreatic cancer

Metastasis, the dissemination and growth of neoplastic cells in an organ distinct from that in which they originated, is the most common cause of death in cancer patients. This is particularly true for pancreatic cancers, where most patients are diagnosed with metastatic disease and few show a sustained response to chemotherapy or radiation therapy. Whether the dismal prognosis of patients with pancreatic cancer compared to patients with other types of cancer is a result of late diagnosis or early dissemination of disease to distant organs is not known. Here we rely on data generated by sequencing the genomes of seven pancreatic cancer metastases to evaluate the clonal relationships among primary and metastatic cancers. We find that clonal populations that give rise to distant metastases are represented within the primary carcinoma, but these clones are genetically evolved from the original parental, non-metastatic clone. Thus, genetic heterogeneity of metastases reflects that within the primary carcinoma. A quantitative analysis of the timing of the genetic evolution of pancreatic cancer was performed, indicating at least a decade between the occurrence of the initiating mutation and the birth of the parental, non-metastatic founder cell. At least five more years are required for the acquisition of metastatic ability and patients die an average of two years thereafter. These data provide novel insights into the genetic features underlying pancreatic cancer progression and define a broad time window of opportunity for early detection to prevent deaths from metastatic disease.

Comparative lesion sequencing provides insights into tumor evolution

We show that the times separating the birth of benign, invasive, and metastatic tumor cells can be determined by analysis of the mutations they have in common. When combined with prior clinical observations, these analyses suggest the following general conclusions about colorectal tumorigenesis: (i) It takes ≈17 years for a large benign tumor to evolve into an advanced cancer but <2 years for cells within that cancer to acquire the ability to metastasize; (ii) it requires few, if any, selective events to transform a highly invasive cancer cell into one with the capacity to metastasize; (iii) the process of cell culture ex vivo does not introduce new clonal mutations into colorectal tumor cell populations; and (iv) the rates at which point mutations develop in advanced cancers are similar to those of normal cells. These results have important implications for understanding human tumor pathogenesis, particularly those associated with metastasis.

Accumulation of Driver and Passenger Mutations During Tumor Progression

Major efforts to sequence cancer genomes are now occurring throughout the world. Though the emerging data from these studies are illuminating, their reconciliation with epidemiologic and clinical observations poses a major challenge. In the current study, we provide a mathematical model that begins to address this challenge. We model tumors as a discrete time branching process that starts with a single driver mutation and proceeds as each new driver mutation leads to a slightly increased rate of clonal expansion. Using the model, we observe tremendous variation in the rate of tumor development—providing an understanding of the heterogeneity in tumor sizes and development times that have been observed by epidemiologists and clinicians. Furthermore, the model provides a simple formula for the number of driver mutations as a function of the total number of mutations in the tumor. Finally, when applied to recent experimental data, the model allows us to calculate the actual selective advantage provided by typical somatic mutations in human tumors in situ. This selective advantage is surprisingly small—0.004 ± 0.0004—and has major implications for experimental cancer research.

Genetic Progression and the Waiting Time to Cancer

Cancer results from genetic alterations that disturb the normal cooperative behavior of cells. Recent high-throughput genomic studies of cancer cells have shown that the mutational landscape of cancer is complex and that individual cancers may evolve through mutations in as many as 20 different cancer-associated genes. We use data published by Sjöblom et al. (2006) to develop a new mathematical model for the somatic evolution of colorectal cancers. We employ the Wright-Fisher process for exploring the basic parameters of this evolutionary process and derive an analytical approximation for the expected waiting time to the cancer phenotype. Our results highlight the relative importance of selection over both the size of the cell population at risk and the mutation rate. The model predicts that the observed genetic diversity of cancer genomes can arise under a normal mutation rate if the average selective advantage per mutation is on the order of 1%. Increased mutation rates due to genetic instability would allow even smaller selective advantages during tumorigenesis. The complexity of cancer progression can be understood as the result of multiple sequential mutations, each of which has a relatively small but positive effect on net cell growth.

Evolutionary dynamics of cancer in response to targeted combination therapy

In solid tumors, targeted treatments can lead to dramatic regressions, but responses are often short-lived because resistant cancer cells arise. The major strategy proposed for overcoming resistance is combination therapy. We present a mathematical model describing the evolutionary dynamics of lesions in response to treatment. We first studied 20 melanoma patients receiving vemurafenib. We then applied our model to an independent set of pancreatic, colorectal, and melanoma cancer patients with metastatic disease. We find that dual therapy results in long-term disease control for most patients, if there are no single mutations that cause cross-resistance to both drugs; in patients with large disease burden, triple therapy is needed. We also find that simultaneous therapy with two drugs is much more effective than sequential therapy. Our results provide realistic expectations for the efficacy of new drug combinations and inform the design of trials for new cancer therapeutics. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.00747.001

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.

Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity

The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals is a fascinating topic that has inspired much work in theoretical biology. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in a model where individuals are characterized by phenotypic properties that are visible to others. The population is well mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but the behavioral strategies can depend on distance in phenotype space. We study the interaction of cooperators and defectors. In our model, cooperators cooperate with those who are similar and defect otherwise. Defectors always defect. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes, which generates a random walk of the population in phenotype space. Our analysis brings together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors. Cooperation is favored when the phenotypic mutation rate is large and the strategy mutation rate is small. In the optimal case for cooperators, in a one-dimensional phenotype space and for large population size, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c=1+2/3. We also derive the fundamental condition for any two-strategy symmetric game and consider high-dimensional phenotype spaces.

Fixation of Strategies for an Evolutionary Game in Finite Populations

A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2× 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire population. The process is discussed in the framework of a random walk with site dependent hopping rates. The time of fixation is found to be identical for both strategies in any particular game. The asymptotic behavior of the fixation time and fixation probabilities in the large population size limit is also discussed. We show that fixation is fast when there is at least one pure evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the infinite population size limit, while fixation is slow when the ESS is the coexistence of the two strategies.

Strategy selection in structured populations

Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd). We study a mutation and selection process. For weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if sigma a+b>c+sigma d. This means the effect of population structure on strategy selection can be described by a single parameter, sigma. We present the values of sigma for various examples including the well-mixed population, games on graphs, games in phenotype space and games on sets. We give a proof for the existence of such a sigma, which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain (natural) properties. We assume weak selection, but allow any mutation rate. We discuss the relationship between sigma and the critical benefit to cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. The single parameter, sigma, allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose efficient equilibria in coordination games.

Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations

Evolutionary dynamics are strongly affected by population structure. The outcome of an evolutionary process in a well-mixed population can be very different from that in a structured population. We introduce a powerful method to study dynamical population structure: evolutionary set theory. The individuals of a population are distributed over sets. Individuals interact with others who are in the same set. Any 2 individuals can have several sets in common. Some sets can be empty, whereas others have many members. Interactions occur in terms of an evolutionary game. The payoff of the game is interpreted as fitness. Both the strategy and the set memberships change under evolutionary updating. Therefore, the population structure itself is a consequence of evolutionary dynamics. We construct a general mathematical approach for studying any evolutionary game in set structured populations. As a particular example, we study the evolution of cooperation and derive precise conditions for cooperators to be selected over defectors.