Timothy J. Goldsmith

Meta-analysis of field studies on bovine tuberculosis skin tests in United States cattle herds.

Our objective was to summarize information on the diagnostic accuracy, in terms of test sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp), for bovine tuberculosis (bTb) tuberculin skin tests as currently used in the United States. Meta-analyses including Se and Sp estimates from field studies of bTb tuberculin tests conducted in North American cattle were conducted to provide a distribution of estimates and central tendency for Se and Sp of the caudal fold tuberculin (CFT) and serial interpretation of the CFT and comparative cervical tuberculin (CFT-CCT) tests. In total, 12 estimates for CFT and CFT-CCT test Se and Sp were identified from seven publications matching inclusion criteria. Estimates for CFT test Se ranged from 80.4% to 93.0% and CFT test Sp from 89.2% to 95.2%. Estimates for CFT-CCT test Se ranged from 74.4% to 88.4% and CFT-CCT test Sp ranged from 97.3% to 98.6%. These distributions of test Se and Sp are intended to provide a more realistic representation for U.S. bTb skin tests than previously reported. Estimation and discussion of herd-level CFT and CFT-CCT test parameters is also included. These results should be considered at the herd and individual animal level when evaluating results from tuberculin skin test results in North American cattle herds.

Impact of Virus Strain Characteristics on Early Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Infection in Commercial Table-Egg Layer Flocks and Implications for Outbreak Control

SUMMARY. Early detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) infection in commercial poultry flocks is a critical component of outbreak control. Reducing the time to detect HPAI infection can reduce the risk of disease transmission to other flocks. The timeliness of different types of detection triggers could be dependent on clinical signs that are first observed in a flock, signs that might vary due to HPAI virus strain characteristics. We developed a stochastic disease transmission model to evaluate how transmission characteristics of various HPAI strains might effect the relative importance of increased mortality, drop in egg production, or daily real-time reverse transcriptase (RRT)-PCR testing, toward detecting HPAI infection in a commercial table-egg layer flock. On average, daily RRT-PCR testing resulted in the shortest time to detection (from 3.5 to 6.1 days) depending on the HPAI virus strain and was less variable over a range of transmission parameters compared with other triggers evaluated. Our results indicate that a trigger to detect a drop in egg production would be useful for HPAI virus strains with long infectious periods (6–8 days) and including an egg-drop detection trigger in emergency response plans would lead to earlier and consistent reporting in some cases. We discuss implications for outbreak control and risk of HPAI spread attributed to different HPAI strain characteristics where an increase in mortality or a drop in egg production or both would be among the first clinical signs observed in an infected flock.

Development and model testing of antemortem screening methodology to predict required drug withholds in heifers.

A simple, cow-side test for the presence of drug residues in live animal fluids would provide useful information for tissue drug residue avoidance programs. This work describes adaptation and evaluation of rapid screening tests to detect drug residues in serum and urine. Medicated heifers had urine, serum, and tissue biopsy samples taken while on drug treatment. Samples were tested by rapid methods and high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC). The adapted microbial inhibition method, kidney inhibition swab test, was useful in detecting sulfadimethoxine in serum, and its response correlated with the prescribed withdrawal time for the drug, 5 to 6 days posttreatment. The lateral flow screening method for flunixin and beta-lactams, adapted for urine, was useful in predicting flunixin in liver detected by HPLC, 96 h posttreatment. The same adapted methods were not useful to detect ceftiofur in serum or urine due to a lack of sensitivity at the levels of interest. These antemortem screening test studies demonstrated that the method selected, and the sampling matrix chosen (urine or serum), will depend on the drug used and should be based on animal treatment history if available. The live animal tests demonstrated the potential for verification that an individual animal is free of drug residues before sale for human consumption.

A Simulation-Based Evaluation of Premovement Active Surveillance Protocol Options for the Managed Movement of Turkeys to Slaughter During an Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the United States

SUMMARY. Risk management decisions associated with live poultry movement during a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak should be carefully considered. Live turkey movements may pose a risk for disease spread. On the other hand, interruptions in scheduled movements can disrupt business continuity. The Secure Turkey Supply (STS) Plan was developed through an industry-government-academic collaboration to address business continuity concerns that might arise during a HPAI outbreak. STS stakeholders proposed outbreak response measure options that were evaluated through risk assessment. The developed approach relies on 1) diagnostic testing of two pooled samples of swabs taken from dead turkeys immediately before movement via the influenza A matrix gene real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) test; 2) enhanced biosecurity measures in combination with a premovement isolation period (PMIP), restricting movement onto the premises for a few days before movement to slaughter; and 3) incorporation of a distance factor from known infected flocks such that exposure via local area spread is unlikely. Daily exposure likelihood estimates from spatial kernels from past HPAI outbreaks were coupled with simulation models of disease spread and active surveillance to evaluate active surveillance protocol options that differ with respect to the number of swabs per pooled sample and the timing of the tests in relation to movement. Simulation model results indicate that active surveillance testing, in combination with strict biosecurity, substantially increased HPAI virus detection probability. When distance from a known infected flock was considered, the overall combined likelihood of moving an infected, undetected turkey flock to slaughter was predicted to be lower at 3 and 5 km. The analysis of different active surveillance protocol options is designed to incorporate flexibility into HPAI emergency response plans.

Feedlot Vaccination: Does It Really Matter?

The practice of vaccination has been used for more than 200 years and is an important component of livestock preventive medicine programs. The goal of vaccination is to stimulate an immune response in an individual that will protect that individual from disease or reduce the clinical signs in that individual. Vaccination applied to a population has a similar goal, as well as decreasing or preventing spread within a population. Commercial vaccines are evaluated for efficacy and safety, and the proper application of these products to varied cattle populations requires knowledge of risk factors and production system factors.

The Impact of Holding Time on the Likelihood of Moving Internally Contaminated Eggs from a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Infected but Undetected Commercial Table-Egg Layer Flock

SUMMARY. Emergency response during a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak may involve quarantine and movement controls for poultry products such as eggs. However, such disease control measures may disrupt business continuity and impact food security, since egg production facilities often do not have sufficient capacity to store eggs for prolonged periods. We propose the incorporation of a holding time before egg movement in conjunction with targeted active surveillance as a novel approach to move eggs from flocks within a control area with a low likelihood of them being contaminated with HPAI virus. Holding time reduces the likelihood of HPAI-contaminated eggs being moved from a farm before HPAI infection is detected in the flock. We used a stochastic disease transmission model to estimate the HPAI disease prevalence, disease mortality, and fraction of internally contaminated eggs at various time points postinfection of a commercial table-egg layer flock. The transmission model results were then used in a simulation model of a targeted matrix gene real-time reverse transcriptase (RRT)-PCR testing based surveillance protocol to estimate the time to detection and the number of contaminated eggs moved under different holding times. Our simulation results indicate a significant reduction in the number of internally contaminated eggs moved from an HPAI-infected undetected flock with each additional day of holding time. Incorporation of a holding time and the use of targeted surveillance have been adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in their Draft Secure Egg Supply Plan for movement of egg industry products during an HPAI outbreak.

Risk prioritization of pork supply movements during an FMD outbreak in the US - Data and Materials

The Data.csv file contains the raw survey responses (location information collected by Qualtrics has been removed). Information about the variables and value labels can be found in the DataDictionary.txt file. The data can be read into the Analysis_Code.R file to perform analysis described in the paper and to create a static version of the Movements.html graph. Survey.pdf contains the survey questions with relevant skip and display logic.

Quantitative Estimation of the Number of Contaminated Hatching Eggs Released from an Infected, Undetected Turkey Breeder Hen Flock During a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak

SUMMARY The regulatory response to an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in the United States may involve quarantine and stop movement orders that have the potential to disrupt continuity of operations in the U.S. turkey industry—particularly in the event that an uninfected breeder flock is located within an HPAI Control Area. A group of government-academic-industry leaders developed an approach to minimize the unintended consequences associated with outbreak response, which incorporates HPAI control measures to be implemented prior to moving hatching eggs off of the farm. Quantitative simulation models were used to evaluate the movement of potentially contaminated hatching eggs from a breeder henhouse located in an HPAI Control Area, given that active surveillance testing, elevated biosecurity, and a 2-day on-farm holding period were employed. The risk analysis included scenarios of HPAI viruses differing in characteristics as well as scenarios in which infection resulted from artificial insemination. The mean model-predicted number of internally contaminated hatching eggs released per movement from an HPAI-infected turkey breeder henhouse ranged from 0 to 0.008 under the four scenarios evaluated. The results indicate a 95% chance of no internally contaminated eggs being present per movement from an infected house before detection. Sensitivity analysis indicates that these results are robust to variation in key transmission model parameters within the range of their estimates from available literature. Infectious birds at the time of egg collection are a potential pathway of external contamination for eggs stored and then moved off of the farm; the predicted number of such infectious birds was estimated to be low. To date, there has been no evidence of vertical transmission of HPAI virus or low pathogenic avian influenza virus to day-old poults from hatching eggs originating from infected breeders. The application of risk analysis methods was beneficial for evaluating outbreak measures developed through emergency response planning initiatives that consider the managed movement of hatching eggs from monitored premises in an HPAI Control Area.

Establishing Monitored Premises Status for Continuity of Business Permits During an HPAI Outbreak

Recent experiences with avian influenza outbreaks in poultry in the United States have tested biosecurity protocols and outbreak management strategies. During an outbreak, regulatory officials managing the emergency response need to make timely decisions in order to achieve disease control and eradication goals while simultaneously decreasing the unintended consequences of the response. To move susceptible animals or animal products out of a disease Control Area via a secure food supply continuity of business (COB) permit without the risk of expanding a disease outbreak, premises must be designated as Monitored Premises (MP) by regulatory officials. The experience of and lessons learned from the 2014 to 2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak have resulted in defined criteria necessary to establish MP status during an HPAI outbreak and highlighted the need for a clear method to determine that those criteria have been met. Establishing MP status is different from an epidemiologic investigation, though they both require analyses of how avian influenza virus may enter poultry premises and can take significant staff time. MP status of premises seeking to move animals or animal products must be continuously re-evaluated as Infected Premises status, and resulting epidemiologic contacts, can rapidly change during an outbreak. We present here a questionnaire to establish MP status, designed to be initially completed by industry representatives in an attempt to streamline processes and conserve resources. During an outbreak, the MP status questionnaire is an essential risk-based management tool used to establish premises status, as part of operationalizing permitted movement to support COB.

Proactive Risk Assessments and the Continuity of Business Principles: Perspectives on This Novel, Combined Approach to Develop Guidance for the Permitted Movement of Agricultural Products during a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak in the United States

Animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) have the potential to severely impact food animal production systems. Paradoxically, the collateral damage associated with the outbreak response may create a larger threat to the food supply, social stability, and economic viability of rural communities than the disease itself. When FMD occurs in domestic animals, most developed countries will implement strict movement controls in the area surrounding the infected farm(s). Historically, stopping all animal movements has been considered one of the most effective ways to control FMD and stop disease spread. However, stopping all movements in an area comes at a cost, as there are often uninfected herds and flocks within the control area. The inability to harvest uninfected animals and move their products to processing interrupts the food supply chain and has the potential to result in an enormous waste of safe, nutritious animal products, and create animal welfare situations. In addition, these adverse effects may negatively impact agriculture businesses and the related economy. Effective disease control measures and the security of the food supply thus require a balanced approach based on science and practicality. Evaluating the risks associated with the movement of live animals and products before an outbreak happens provides valuable insights for risk management plans. These plans can optimize animal and product movements while preventing disease spread. Food security benefits from emergency response plans that both control the disease and keep our food system functional. Therefore, emergency response plans must aim to minimize the unintended negative consequence to farmers, food processors, rural communities, and ultimately consumers.