Tomas Frejka

Long-term prospects for world population growth.

It is estimated that world population will stabilize at 6-13 billion between the years 2000-2050. 4 projections are calculated to correspond to dates of estimated attainment of replacement level fertility: 1980-85 2000-05 2020-23 and 2040-45. Possible world growth rates for the year 2000 range from 1.0%-1.5% and by 2050 could be as low as 0.6%. The population of developed regions has a weak growth momentum; the population is projected to increase moderately by 2000 the rate of increase may be 0.1% per year. In developing countries assuming fertility and mortality trends of the past 10-15 years continue average replacement level fertility would stabilize around 8 billion. Developing region growth rates for 2000 are likely to be between 1.1%-1.8% and 0.5% by 2050. Developing countries represent considerable diversity while developed countries exhibit a high level of homogeneity. East Asias population is likely to stabilize between 1.7-2.5 billion by 2100; however if China reaches zero population growth by 2000 the population could possibly stabilize below 1.7 billion. South Asias projections indicate a stable population between 3.5-5.0 billion by 2100. The population growth prospects are more uncertain for Africa but a stable population between 1.5-2.0 billion by 2100 is reasonable. Latin Americas population will certainly double by 2050 and may triple before stabilizing between 0.8-1.2 billion. Before stabilizing at some point during the 21st century the 1980 world popultion of 4.4 billion is likely to at least double in size but not triple. (summaries in ENG FRE SPA)

L'évolution du calendrier des naissances par génération dans les pays à basse fécondité à la fin du XXe siècle.

Frejka Tomas, Calot Gerard.- La evolucion del calendario de nacimientos рог generacion en los paises de baja fecundidad por fin del siglo XX La evolucion de la fecundidad despues de la segunda guerra mundial se ha caracteriza- do por cambios importantes en la distnbucion por edad del numero de nacimientos (el calen- dano de la fecundidad). Este articulo hace un resumen general y un anahsis de estos cambios entre las generaciones de los paises de baja fecundidad durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX. En los paises occidentales, las generaciones nacidas alrededor de 1940 tuvieron un calendario de fecundidad mas precoz que la generacion de 1930. El cambio se produjo entre las generaciones nacidas durante los afios cincuenta. Las mujeres de estas generaciones acumularon deficits de nacimientos considerables al inicio de su vida reproductiva. Estos deficits se compensaron, al menos en parte, al acercarse a los 30 aňos, o mas tarde. La disminucion de la fecundidad en edades jovenes continuo entre las generaciones nacidas en los afios sesenta y setenta. En los antiguos paises socialistas, la disminucion de la fecundidad entre las mujeres jovenes se inicio en las generaciones nacidas a finales de los айоь cincuenta y continue durante las generaciones siguientes. En casi todos los paises de baja fecundidad, las mujeres de todas las cohortes nacidas en los aňos sesenta y setenta tienen menos hijos que las mujeres de cohortes anteriores. No parece realista esperar que estas generaciones alcancen el nivel de reemplazo, vistos los deficits considerables acumulados durante la juventud. Una posterga- cion de los nacimientos que las parejas consideraban temporal pero que no fue compensado, combinado con una decision consciente de tener menos hijos que las generaciones anteriores, parecen caractenzar las tendencias actuales en la mayoria de paises.

A note on the cohort-fertility analysis in the paper ‘Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe’, Population Studies 58(2): 161–176, by Francesco C. Billari and Hans-Peter Kohler

One-third of the paper by Billari and Kohler (2004) expands upon and criticizes an analysis by Frejka and Calot (2001a /c) of cohort fertility in lowfertility countries. Following Gérard Calot’s death in 2001, Frejka and Sardon continued to work on this subject and published a comprehensive report (2004) on cohort-fertility developments in 35 lowfertility countries throughout the twentieth century. In their paper Billari and Kohler claim that ‘[I]n order to understand the implications of delayed childbearing for cohort fertility, the Netherlands may . . . serve as a ‘‘role model’’ for low and lowest-low fertility countries . . . A comparison of cohort fertility patterns in low and lowest-low fertility countries with the Dutch cohort patterns may . . . be very illuminating’ (p. 167). This note will argue that these authors’ comparison of cohort-fertility patterns in the lowest-low fertility countries of Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe with Dutch cohort patterns is weak on theoretical grounds and that the empirical analysis is incomplete. In consequence, it will be proposed, inferences or conclusions based on their presentation of the comparison are flawed and misleading.