Weixing Hu
University of Hong Kong
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Washington Quarterly | 2007
Daojiong Zha; Weixing Hu
A l t h o u g h China and the United States do not rely on one another for energy supplies, energy security has ironically become a necessary agenda item in Chinese-U.S. relations. As the world’s second-largest and largest consumers of oil, respectively, China and the United States are becoming more sensitive to each other’s pursuit of energy sources from other countries. Likely because the Chinese and U.S. economies have absorbed the impact of the most recent global oil price spikes and still enjoyed steady growth, energy rcmains mostly an issue for dialogue rather than a cause for confrontation. Yet, the prospects for energy to become a cause for more serious clashes are high, with demand in both countries set to rise continuously, even rapidly. In an age of global interdependence, Beijing and Washington should seek to ameliorate differences on tense energy issues. Although dialogucs on energy security conceptualizations and policy preferences are positive, they must move beyond talking toward a true partnership that can confront the common challenges they face as importers.
Pacific Review | 1995
Weixing Hu
Abstract The end of the cold war has changed Chinas basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and Chinas strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijings security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijings security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis. Beijings security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial ...
Journal of Contemporary China | 2016
Weixing Hu
Abstract The current Chinese foreign and national security system suffers from problems of inefficiency, a lack of coordination and information sharing, and accountability of decision makers. China’s newly established Central National Security Commission (CNSC) is designed to build a strong platform to coordinate national security work and to strengthen unified leadership of national security at the central level. This article examines the CNSC’s foreign policy and institutional rationales. It argues that the establishment of the CNSC must be viewed in light of China’s growing power and Xi’s aspiration to play ‘big power diplomacy’ in world affairs as well as his ambition for overall institutional reforms of foreign and national security policymaking in China.
The Journal of Asian Studies | 2002
Stanley Rosen; Weixing Hu; Gerald Chan; Daojiong Zha
Chapter 1 List of Tables and Figures List of Abbreviations Preface Chapter 2 Understanding Chinas Behavior in World Politics Chapter 3 International Relations Theory in China Chapter 4 Escaping the Periphery Chapter 5 Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy Chapter 6 Nationalism, Globalism, and Chinas International Relations Chapter 7 Chinese Understanding of International Political Economy Chapter 8 Cultural Norms and the Conduct of Chinese Foreign Policy Chapter 9 Chinese Approaches to International Law Chapter 10 List of Contributors Bibliography Index
The Nonproliferation Review | 1994
Weixing Hu
China has moved up a steep learning curve on nuclear proliferation since it joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. Beijing has stated repeatedly that it opposes nuclear proliferation and will not help any country develop nuclear weapons. In 1992, it acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after more than 20 years of criticism. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that although China has embraced the norms and principles of nonproliferation, there is still a gap between its general nonproliferation posture and its export practice. As it promotes international nuclear cooperation with other countries, China must decide how to balance international nuclear trade with export control. As a nuclear weapons state, China’s nuclear resources, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities set it apart from other emerging nuclear suppliers. China needs Western civilian nuclear technology for its nuclear energy program, but its export of enriched uranium, heavy water, research reactors, and other sensitive technology has caused proliferation concerns. To strengthen overall implementation of the nonproliferation regime, the international community must integrate China into the existing supply-side control system. International supply-side restraints are based on effective national export control systems. In order to fulfill its international nonproliferation commitments, Beijing needs to strengthen its export control system and adjust its nuclear export practice to international standards. This paper will discuss China’s policy in nuclear exports and its attitude toward international supplyside restraints. Also, by comparing China’s controls to those of other nuclear suppliers, it will attempt to characterize the current Chinese export control system and to identify major weaknesses in that system. EXPLAINING CHINA’S NUCLEAR EXPORTS
Journal of Contemporary China | 1996
Weixing Hu
Regionalism has become an interesting phenomenon in Asian international relations. Driven by fast growing trade and investment, Asian countries have developed variegated patterns of economic co‐operation and a complex level of interdependence among themselves. Although the growing Asian regionalism is very much an economics‐driven process, it has profound impacts on regional political organization. This analysis examines Beijings changing attitudes toward Asian regionalism and its policy choice in the regional economic integration. It is argued that the integration of the Chinese economy into the regional structure is promoted by the government as well as driven by market dynamics. Although Beijing has let the Chinese economy develop into the regional ‘flying geese’ structure, the best policy choice for China, as many Chinese scholars have argued, would be a three‐circle strategy of integrating into the world economy and a strategy of ‘market for technology’ in regional economic co‐operation. This analys...
Journal of Contemporary China | 2012
Weixing Hu
Relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced several cycles over the last 60 years. Tension and crisis seem to come and go, followed by periods of peace and stability. What explains the cyclical pattern of change and stability? How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship? This article examines the last 60 years of cross-Strait relations in light of an interpretative framework of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Cross-Strait relations are complex, consisting of actors at the domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. With a high degree of economic interaction, the cross-Strait relationship can be characterized as economic integration cum political impasse. This article analyzes the cyclical changes through three causal factors: (a) the role of issue cycles in cross-Strait relations; (b) the impulsive drivers for change; and (c) the structural constraints dampening change.
East Asia | 1995
Weixing Hu
The Korean peninsula has been one of the key regions for China’s security. With a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, Beijing is readjusting its foreign policy toward two Koreas in the post-cold war era. This article examines the recent changes in Beijing’s defense strategy and their implications for the Korean peninsula. It is argued that although China’s immediate military concerns are moving south, the Korean peninsula still occupies an important place in Beijing’s defense planning. Beijing’s recent weapon acquisitions from Russia have little direct impact on the Korean peninsula, but the Chinese defense modernization will have a long-term impact on the major power military balance in Northeast Asia.
Global Discourse | 2015
Weixing Hu
This is a reply to:Zhang, Yongjin. 2015. “Regional international society in East Asia? A critical investigation.” Global Discourse 5 (3): 360–373. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2015.1053190
Journal of Contemporary China | 2018
Weixing Hu
ABSTRACT Chinese foreign policy and the conduct of China’s diplomacy have undergone tremendous transformation under Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012. How can scholars explain the foreign policy transformation under Xi Jinping? As Chinese power rises fast, do the new power status and the changing balance of power lead to the foreign policy change, or does the more confident leadership play the ‘game changer’ role? The author argues that international structural changes alone cannot explain the foreign policy shift, and Xi Jinping’s leadership has played a key role in transforming Chinese foreign policy since 2012, elevating it to a new height of ‘major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,’ a brand name for the transformed Chinese foreign policy. Xi’s leadership role not only affects the redefinition of the vision and mission of Chinese diplomacy, but also leads to institutional restructuring of Chinese foreign and security policy apparatus.