William L. Miller

Understanding Dual Identities in Poland

‘Parallel’ divisions of identity in Poland are a thing of the past – and perhaps the future – but not the present. Yet contemporary Poles are still politically divided by identities – albeit by ‘nested’ Polish/European identities rather than by ‘parallel’ ethnic identities. They are not divided between Polish and European identities, however, but between exclusive and dual identities – in essence a division between parochial and cosmopolitan identities. Contrary to fears that Europeanism in Poland especially might be narrow, culturally restrictive, or even racist, our data show that dual identities reflect broader cosmopolitan perspectives as well as specifically European or Western sympathies. There is a real significant difference of values between exclusive and dual identifiers which extends well beyond attitudes to Europe – and far beyond attitudes to the EU in particular. To a considerable degree this is a difference – some have argued a conflict – between traditional and modern Poland, between secular and devout Poland, between educated and ignorant Poland, between young and old Poland, and between hopeful and fearful Poland.

Political Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist Countries

Though psychological identification with parties was still weak, attitudes towards political parties in former communist countries were fairly strongly structured by the end of 1993. Different factors explained attitudes towards communist parties, governing parties, and ethnic/nationalist parties. Attitudes towards the Communist Party or its successors were influenced most by socialist values in Russia, Ukraine and the Czech Republic; but socialist values were just one of several weak and competing influences in Hungary, and religiosity had more influence (negatively, of course) than socialist values in Slovakia. Almost tautologously, the main influence upon attitudes towards governing parties was opposition sentiment rather than ideology of any kind. If, however, that explanation is excluded, the main influences appear to be economic optimism and authoritarian values in Russia, Hungary and Slovakia; and economic optimism plus anti-socialist values in the Czech Republic. The positive link between authoritarian values and favourable attitudes to non-communist governing parties is striking, however it is explained. Of the nationalist or ethnic parties whose support we analysed, support for the LDP in Russia was clearly more dependent upon opposition sentiment than upon nationalism; but attitudes to Rukh in Ukraine and the SNP in Slovakia were primarily based on language and nationalism—as also were, to an even greater extent, attitudes towards the minority Hungarian parties in Slovakia. Language or nationalist values were also a significant element in support for the MDS in Slovakia, and for the Free Democrats/Young Democrats (FD/YD) in Hungary—though the MDS attracted nationalists while the FD/YD repelled them.

The new Polish ‘right’?

The Polish election of 2001 marked the reconstruction of the Polish right in parliament, the exit of the former governing parties and the entry of four new parties into parliament including, for the first time, some openly Eurosceptic parties. There is some debate among academics and journalists about the character of these new parties, but these views do not always reflect the attitudes of the Polish people themselves towards the new parties: how they placed them on a left–right scale, and how far they sympathized with them – even if they did not actually vote for them. Although some academic commentators have argued that Europe was not an important issue in that election, in fact the ‘most important’ issues had little impact on sympathies for either old or new parties, while Europe had a strong impact – yet for essentially pragmatic rather than cultural or nationalist reasons.

When does turnout matter? the case of Poland

THERE ARE TWO CLASSIC REASONS for a concern with electoral turnout. First, a top-down concern centred on legitimacy, authority, governance and ultimately governability. Second, a bottom-up concern about representation, political equality and the quality of democracy. Low levels of electoral participation may erode the legitimacy of a regime, and low levels of electoral participation may lead to an unrepresentative outcome. Both are possible consequences of low turnout, but neither is a necessary consequence. It remains an empirical question whether low turnout does in fact erode legitimacy or produce a distorted outcome. Poland is a particularly interesting case. Brady & Kaplan claim that the Polish double referendum of 1987 marked the beginning of the end of Communist hegemony in Eastern Europe. Ironically, the regime won the referendum by margins that would be beyond the aspirations of politicians operating in most democratic regimes. Solidarity campaigned for a boycott of this referendum-and by todays standards, though not the standards of the 1980s, it failed miserably. Jaruzelski won 64% of the vote on price increases and 69% on political reform-with a turnout rate of over 67% of electors on both questions. But he had set a self-imposed target of gaining the support of 50% of all electors (not voters). So what in any established democracy would have counted as an overwhelming success for the regime was widely interpreted as a spectacular defeat for the authorities2 and contributed to the collapse of the regime. A regime brought down-at least in part-by winning only two-thirds of the vote on a turnout of only two-thirds of electors! Clearly some turnouts matter more than others.

The misuse of referendums in post-communist Europe

Referendums can be an efflective device of popular control only if a broad issue of principle is at stake, if the people clearly understand the issue, if they have strong and enduring views about it, and if the options on the ballot correspond to those views. In the early 1990s, referendums on the ‘civilizational choice’ facing Eastern Europe might have met those conditions. But by 2003, referendums on EU accession did not. The issue was no longer an issue of principle: it was about ‘deals not ideals’. For the public, the key criterion was the likely costs or benefits to their families – but almost half could not guess what the impact on their families would be. And the options on the ballot excluded the choice of the majority, which was to join later when the deal might be better, and the costs or benefits clearer.