Paul Heywood

The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International's Approach to Measuring Corruption

The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International (TI), has had a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption. Despite recent critiques of the CPI, it remains highly influential on research into the causes of corruption and is also extensively used to galvanise support for measures to fight corruption. In this article we explore the CPI in more depth in order to highlight how the index has been used for political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts. The argument is developed in four sections: in the first, we focus on Transparency Internationals definition of corruption, highlighting some conceptual difficulties with the approach adopted and its relationship to the promotion of ‘good governance’ as the principal means of combating corruption. In the second section, we outline some methodological difficulties in the design of the Corruption Perceptions Index. Although the CPI has been much criticised, we demonstrate in the third section that the index continues to exercise great influence both in academic research and in the politics of anti-corruption efforts, particularly as exercised by Transparency International itself. In the final section we argue that the CPI contributes to the risk of creating a ‘corruption trap’ in countries where corruption is deeply embedded, as development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of reforms which are impossible to achieve without that aid.

Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe

Preface: Political Values in Post-Communist Europe - PART 1: INTRODUCTION - Standing on the Ruins of Empire - Communism and After - Methodology and Context - PART 2: PERCEPTIONS - A Fond Farewell? - A Brave New World? - PART 3: VALUES - Socialism After Communism - External and Internal Nationalism - Liberal Values - Popular Control: Direct or Representative Democracy? - Entrepreneurial MPs - The Nationalist, Liberal and Democratic Values of MPs - A Red-Brown Alliance of Ideas? - PART 4: INFLUENCES ON VALUES - Winners and Losers - Adaptable Minds - Land, Language, Culture and Nationality - Political Identifications - A Multivariate Model - PART 5: STABILITY AND CHANGE - Intra-election Trends: Value Stability During a Crisis Election - Inter-election Trends 1993-96 - PART 6: VALUES IN PERSPECTIVE - Postcommunist Values in a Western Perspective - Appendix. Questionnaire: English-language Version

Trust, cynicism and populist anti‐politics

The overall focus of this paper is on developing a framework to explain support for alternative politics of a populist type. It has often been argued that the increasing focus on scandals and corruption has done much to alienate voters from traditional politics and that this alienation has, in turn, been reflected in what might be termed a ‘soap‐operatisation’ of politics, with an attendant diminution of trust in political institutions. We contend that, while reducing political events to variants of soap‐operas (with the demystification and banalisation of politics to which this gives rise) has had profound effects on the public perception of the political and political institutions, the result may not be simply a lack of, or diminution of, trust in politicians and political institutions, but rather a parallel growth in cynicism. The paper argues that while cynicism is often assumed to be a component of the decline in trust in institutions the two are, in fact, different and can give rise to different manifestations. We address the difference between the two concepts and develop a hypothesis that contends that supporters of populist alternatives can be located within two attitudinal clusters. We argue that, with respect to populist politicians and populist political parties, a cynical view of politics and political institutions will tend to produce individuals who support what we term ‘political entrepreneurs’, while a real distrust in institutions will translate into support for a more traditional populism of the radical right.

“Close but no Cigar”: the measurement of corruption

The financial cost of corruption has recently been estimated at more than 5 per cent of global GDP. Yet, despite the widespread agreement that corruption is one of the most pressing policy challenges facing world leaders, it remains as widespread today, possibly even more so, as it was when concerted international attention began being devoted to the issue following the end of the Cold War. In reality, we still have a relatively weak understanding of how best to measure corruption and how to develop effective guides to action from such measurement. This paper provides a detailed review of existing approaches to measuring corruption, focusing in particular on perception-based and non- perceptual approaches. We highlight a gap between the conceptualisation of corruption and its measurement, and argue that there is a tension between the demands of policy-makers and anti-corruption activists on the one hand, and the motivations of academic researchers on the other. The search for actionable answers on the part of the former sits uncomfortably with the latter’s focus on the inherent complexity of corruption.

Developments in European politics

Introduction: Developments in European Politics P.M.Heywood, E.Jones, M.Rhodes & U.Sedelmeier PART 1: THE EUROPEAN STATE - INTEGRATION & THE WORLD Europe and the Global Challenge E.Jones & M.Rhodes International Politics & European States F.Bicchi, K.E.Smith & R.Whitman The EU Dimension in European Politics T.A.Boerzel & U.Sedelmeier PART 2: GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS Power at the Centre: The Organization of Democratic Systems K.Goetz Political Parties I.van Biezen & P.Mair Elections and Representation G.Toka Territorial Politics in Europe M.Keating PART 3: POLITICS AND SOCIETY Political Scandals and Corruption P.M.Heywood & I.Krastev Anti-System Politics C.Mudde Organized Economic Interests: Diversity and Change in an Enlarged Europe S.Avdagic & C.Crouch The Judicialization of European Politics Z.Kuhn The State and Religion J.S.Madeley PART 4: CHALLENGES TO THE POLICY PROCESS European Welfare States: Diversity, Challenges and Reforms A.Hemerijck, M.Keune & M.Rhodes Immigration and Asylum V.Guiraudon & E.Jileva Organised Crime and Anti-Crime Politics L.Paoli & C.Fijnaut Beyond Territoriality: European Security after the Cold War R.A.Epstein & A.Gheciu

Towards a New Europe

Western Europe is undergoing a process of accelerating change. This process is simultaneously supranational, national and subnational in its origins and manifestations. It is of such complexity that there is not as yet — and perhaps will never be — a single formula or theory for comprehending it. The nature of the changes themselves are easily identified: they include the emergence of a transnational economy and polity in the European Union, the redefinition of the nation-state and national identities, and the erosion of traditional political values, beliefs and certainties. But explaining them and accounting for their multifaceted character is far more difficult. This volume neither aspires nor pretends to present an overarching explanation for the tumultuous changes currently being experienced by West European political, social and economic systems. Its more modest aim is to provide a survey of developments in West European politics, taking into account the multiple levels of the new (and still evolving) European political order. In doing so, the authors are highly conscious of the interrelationship of these political levels with the international and global arenas where many of the origins of these developments lie. Thus, while all the chapters stand alone as analyses of the particular phenomena with which they are concerned, important themes link them.

A Multivariate Model

Previous chapters have had a relatively narrow focus, which has allowed considerable attention to nuance and detail. In this chapter we broaden the focus in three ways: first, to look at the relationship between different kinds of values — a topic which we began to explore in Chapter 12; second, to look at how all these values were influenced by a combination of social, economic and cultural factors; third, to see how these values combined to affect attitudes to political parties. Our aim is to develop a relatively simple model that nonetheless encompasses all our main findings with as little distortion as possible. Inevitably these aims of simplicity, comprehensiveness and minimum distortion will have to be weighed against each other.

Political Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist Countries

Though psychological identification with parties was still weak, attitudes towards political parties in former communist countries were fairly strongly structured by the end of 1993. Different factors explained attitudes towards communist parties, governing parties, and ethnic/nationalist parties. Attitudes towards the Communist Party or its successors were influenced most by socialist values in Russia, Ukraine and the Czech Republic; but socialist values were just one of several weak and competing influences in Hungary, and religiosity had more influence (negatively, of course) than socialist values in Slovakia. Almost tautologously, the main influence upon attitudes towards governing parties was opposition sentiment rather than ideology of any kind. If, however, that explanation is excluded, the main influences appear to be economic optimism and authoritarian values in Russia, Hungary and Slovakia; and economic optimism plus anti-socialist values in the Czech Republic. The positive link between authoritarian values and favourable attitudes to non-communist governing parties is striking, however it is explained. Of the nationalist or ethnic parties whose support we analysed, support for the LDP in Russia was clearly more dependent upon opposition sentiment than upon nationalism; but attitudes to Rukh in Ukraine and the SNP in Slovakia were primarily based on language and nationalism—as also were, to an even greater extent, attitudes towards the minority Hungarian parties in Slovakia. Language or nationalist values were also a significant element in support for the MDS in Slovakia, and for the Free Democrats/Young Democrats (FD/YD) in Hungary—though the MDS attracted nationalists while the FD/YD repelled them.

Political science approaches to integrity and corruption

Integrity ought logically to be a particularly important concept within political science. If those acting within the political system do not have integrity, our ability to trust them, to have confidence in their actions, and perhaps even to consider them legitimate can be challenged. Indeed, the very concept of integrity goes some way towards underwriting positive views of political actors. Yet, despite this importance, political science as a discipline has perhaps focused too little on questions of integrity. Where political science has looked at the subject of integrity, it has often done so without using the specific linguistic formulation “integrity”. Most commonly, the focus has instead been on “corruption”—a strand of research which has produced results that cannot always be translated into discussions of integrity, by virtue of its narrower focus upon the “negative pole” of public ethics. Other measures, such as “Quality of Government”, focus on positive attributes, notably impartiality, but this also fails fully to capture the notion of integrity: dishonesty can be impartial. Specific formal “codes” used within public life and among political practitioners can be much more nuanced than the most widely used measures, and can be much closer to what we understand—academically—as “integrity”. This paper argues that the hard conceptual and empirical work of elaborating integrity into a fully operationalizable concept offers the potential reward of an analytical concept that is more closely aligned with political reality.

Executives, Bureaucracies and Decision-Making

It has been argued that a country’s size can be a crucial determinant of executive power: Allum (1995, p. xviii) quotes Thucydides’ dictum that ‘great states do what they may; tiny states do what they must’. A distinction should therefore be drawn, argues Allum, between Europe’s principal states — Britain, France, Germany and Italy — and the remainder. None the less, in all states, no matter what their size, national political executives are charged with three basic functions: the elaboration, co-ordination and implementation of public policies (Blondel, 1992, p. 268). How they carry out these functions varies widely, of course, and is affected by numerous factors. One such factor, which is of particular significance in terms of the real power enjoyed by national executives, is the constitutional provisions established in any given state.