Zhaogang Song

Rare Disaster Concerns Everywhere

We propose an empirical framework of disaster concerns to explain cross-sectional return variation both within and across asset classes. Using a large set of out-of-the-money options on international equity indices, foreign currencies, and global government bonds, we measure the global …nancial market’s rare disaster concerns under only no-arbitrage conditions. Assets that have low return covariations with such concerns earn high excess returns in the future. The return predictability driven by rare disaster concerns is distinct from that driven by exposures to realized disaster shocks such as macroeconomic downturns and liquidity crunches, and is not

Term Structure of Interest Rates with Short-Run and Long-Run Risks

Bond returns are time-varying and predictable. What economic forces drive this variation? To answer this long-standing question, we propose a consumption-based model with recursive preferences, long-run risks, and inflation non-neutrality. Our model offers two important insights. First, our model matches well the post-1990 nominal upward-sloping U.S. Treasury yield curve. Second, consistent with our models implication, variance risk premium based on the U.S. interest rate derivatives data emerges as a strong predictor for short-horizon Treasury excess returns, above and beyond the predictive power of other popular factors. In the model equilibrium, the variance risk premium is related to the short-run risks in the economy, while standard forward-rate-based factors are associated with long-run risks in the economy.

An Empirical Test of Auction Efficiency: Evidence from MBS Auctions of the Federal Reserve

Auction theory has ambiguous implications regarding the relative efficiency of three formats of multiunit auctions: uniform-price, discriminatory-price, and Vickrey auctions. We empirically evaluate the performance of these three auction formats using the bid-level data of the Federal Reserves purchase auctions of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from June 1, 2014 through November 17, 2014. We estimate marginal cost curves for all dealers, at each auction, based on structural models of the multiunit discriminatory-price auction. Our preliminary results suggest that neither uniform-price nor Vickrey auctions outperform discriminatory-price auctions in terms of the total expenditure. However, they do outperform in terms of efficiency, with efficiency gains around 0.74% of the surplus that dealers extract. We caution that our empirical estimation and analysis involve technical assumptions made about the specific auction mechanism the Federal Reserve uses and how auction participants perceive the auction mechanism, both of which may be distinct from practice and may alter the conclusions substantively.