Aron Gurwitsch

Phenomenology and the theory of science

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On the Intentionality of Consciousness

The intentionality of consciousness may be defined as a relation which all, or at least certain, acts bear to an object. In this manner, Brentano introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy. Seeking to account for the difference between what he calls “physical phenomena” and what he calls “psychical phenomena,” Brentano found, among other characteristics, that the latter are distinguished by a relation to, or a direction towards, an object.2 This directedness of psychical phenomena is interpreted by Brentano as their containing within themselves an “immanent” object-like entity.

A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness

In the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl did not admit an ego different from the empirical one, and consequently he rejected all theories in which the acts of consciousness are held to spring from a center of conscious life. A highly important class of conscious facts—the intentional acts—have the peculiarity of confronting the experiencing mind with an object, but relatedness to the ego is no essential feature of these acts.2 Certainly an idea or a representation of the ego may appear; it may even easily appear, or, expressed otherwise, there may possibly exist a special disposition or readiness for its appearing. But only if it does actually appear may the act in question be experienced as connected with, or related to, the ego. This is, however, not a general rule. On the contrary, when the subject pays more attention to the object presented to him by the act which he experiences, he becomes more absorbed in dealing with this object, and the more the subject “forgets” himself, i.e., the less the chance that a representation of his ego intervenes in his conscious activity and operations.

Towards a Theory of Intentionality

Husserl’s definition of consciousness in terms of intentionality marks a revolutionary innovation in the history of modern philosophy. It solves a problem which, on the grounds of the traditional modern conception of consciousness, proved hopelessly enigmatic; to say the least, the problem in question is opened to promising theoretical treatment. Hence, it appears opportune to consider Husserl’s theory of intentionality historically, though, to be sure, the theory of intentionality must ultimately be judged on its own merits. Its validity can only depend upon its satisfactorily accounting for the fundamental structure of consciousness. Still, to present it historically brings forth its full significance in the most striking fashion.

The Last Work of Edmund Husserl

In 1936 Husserl published the first of an intended series of articles which were to deal with the general intellectual crisis of our time, especially the crisis of the sciences, and with transcendental phenomenology as a way, the only way, to overcome that crisis.2 The series would have become the principal document of the last phase of Husserl’s phenomenology and would have provided the center of reference of his other writings pertaining to that phase: viz., Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929) and Erfahrung und Urteil (edited by L. Landgrebe and published in 1939, after Husserl’s death; reissued in 1954). Because of his final illness, Husserl had to discontinue all work after August 1937, so that the planned series was never completed, the article of 1936 having thus far been the only one to appear in print.

Phenomenology of Perception.

Foreword, Taylor Carman Introduction, Claude Lefort Preface Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena I. Sensation II. Association and the Projection of Memories III. Attention and Judgment IV. The Phenomenal Field Part 1: The Body 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology 3. The Spatiality of the Ones Own Body and Motility 4. The Synthesis of Ones Own Body 5. The Body as a Sexed Being 6. Speech and the Body as Expression Part 2: The Perceived World 7. Sensing 8. Space 9. The Thing and the Natural World 10. Others and the Human World Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World 11. The Cogito 12. Temporality 13. Freedom Original Bibliography Bibliography of English Translations cited Additional Work Cited Index

Author’s Introduction

Experience always presents us with objects, things, events, etc., within certain contexts and contextures, and never with isolated and scattered data and facts. Looking at a material thing, e.g., a book, we perceive it in certain surroundings. We see the table on which the book is lying, we see other books, papers, pencils, pipes, and through the window a segment of scenery outside the house. Every material thing is perceived amidst other things which form a background for its appearance. Correspondingly, the same is true with regard to thinking. When we are dealing with some theoretical problem, more than the problem alone is given to consciousness.

Gelb–Goldstein’s Concept of “Concrete” and “Categorial” Attitude and the Phenomenology of Ideation

Husserl’s theory of universals as general objects and specific ideal entities very soon acquired widespread notoriety, although often in a grossly misinterpreted and misrepresented form, partly as a result of the not very fortunately chosen term of “intuition of essences” (Wesenserschauung). When Husserl established his theory of ideation for the first time in the Logische Untersuchungen, he hardly went beyond asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of those acts through which universals in contradistinction to particular things are meant and apprehended and, correspondingly, asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of the objects apprehended through the acts in question. For this purpose, Husserl had to engage himself in a thoroughgoing analysis and discussion of the theories of abstraction prevailing in the tradition of classical British empiricism.

William James’s Theory of the “Transitive Parts” of the Stream of Consciousness

William James’s theory of the “transitive parts” of the stream of consciousness will not be considered here from a historical point of view but will be gauged as a contribution to those problems which are of actual concern to present philosophical thought, especially those questions with which phenomenology deals. This orientation will also prevail in some historical considerations.

The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness

Both phenomenology and psychology are concerned with consciousness in general as well as with specific acts of consciousness like perception, memory, comprehension of meaning, reasoning, etc. Yet, the theoretical orientation and perspective in which consciousness is studied in psychology is highly different from that of phenomenology.