Bernard Steunenberg

Strategic Power in the European Union

In this paper we propose a new method to evaluate the distribution of power between decision-making bodies in the European Union. Conventional methods that measure the voting power of players, such as the Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Shapley-Shubik indices, are insufficient for this purpose. They take no account, in an endogenous way, of the differences in the abilities of players to affect the outcome of decision-making, which are a result of the existence of political institutions. We propose a different way to measure decision-making power based on the distance between a players ideal point and the equilibrium outcome of a game. While all previous indices are based on cooperative game theory, the index developed in this paper is based on non-cooperative game theory, which has been the dominant thrust of theoretical politics and economics in the last years. The new index is applied to legislative procedures in the European Union.

Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay

Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition.

Between Power and Luck: The European Parliament in the EU Legislative Process

Taking Barry’s (1980a,b) question ‘Is it better to be powerful or lucky?’ as a starting point, we try to answer the question of how influential the European Parliament is in the European Union (EU) legislative process. We assess the proximity between what the Parliament wants and what it eventually gets and whether this is the result of its own power or the similarity between its position and the positions of other EU actors. The empirical analysis uses different models of legislative decision-making and shows that the European Parliament has been rather influential under co-decision and it has been ‘lucky’ for most legislation negotiated under the consultation procedure. Differentiating between capabilities and preferences, and therefore between ‘power’ and ‘luck’, remains crucial in explaining political outcomes.

Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU: the impact of discretion and legal fit

Transposition performance differs significantly across countries and policy sectors in the EU. In this article we analyse the transposition efforts of all 27 member states with regard to four EC directives expected to create considerable difficulties for compliance at the national level. Using Cox proportional hazards regression, we find that discretion and legal fit are significant factors in explaining transposition. Furthermore, we discover that the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe are not doing any worse than the rest of the EU in terms of transposition timeliness. Surprisingly, government effectiveness has a negative relationship with compliance, while periods of absence of functioning government do not increase transposition time. Our findings emphasize the importance of legal-administrative factors for compliance with EU law.

Sectors at Different Speeds: Analysing Transposition Deficits in the European Union

This article reports on a quantitative study of 1,117 cases of transposition of directives in five EU Member States and eight policy sectors between 1978 and 2002. It finds significant cross-sectoral performance differences, which complicate generalization from studies of only one sector. These differences can be partly explained by systematic cross-sectoral differences in transposition deadlines given, the share of Council versus Commission directives, and the legal implementation measures used.

Is big brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU directives

In this article I analyse the role of the European Commission in monitoring the transposition and implementation of EU Directives. The point of departure is that the Commission, like any political actor, has policy preferences that affect how it shapes its overseeing role. The Commission’s responses may vary between being ‘the guardian of the treaties’, not allowing for any changes, and a ‘silent witness’, permitting member states to set their own, deviating national policies. These different responses are consistent with empirical findings showing that the Commission is rather selective in starting infringement procedures. ‘Big brother is watching’ the member states, but this is evident only when interests clash and the Commission receives sufficient support from the European Court of Justice or the other member states.

The Transposition of European Law in EU Member States: Between Process and Politics

This paper illuminates a critical stage of the implementation of European law: the transposition of European Union (EU) directives. Directives must be transposed into national policies in order to give effect to European law, yet most national authorities experience considerable transposition difficulties. For this reason, the study of transposition has become a focal point within the broader research agenda on noncompliance in the European Union. Highlighting several popular explanatory variables but noting the sometimes contradictory results that follow from empirical testing, this paper outlines an approach that views transposition as a process taking place largely within ministerial agencies rather than across government systems. By using variables related to these domestic processes in our empirical analysis, the paper shows how such an approach can help to explain the way in which member states transpose EU directives.

Widening the European Union : the politics of institutional change and reform

Part 1: Introduction Part 2: Constitutional Aspects of Enlargement Part 3: Reforming European Union Decision-Making Part 4: Dynamics of Widening Part 5: Conclusion

Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?

In this paper, I analyze how the enlargement process is connected to the currently proposed institutional reforms in the European Union. Although the ‘official’ claim is that enlargement requires reform, the relationship between both processes needs clarification. The use of unanimity voting for policy issues leads to substantial deadlock in the current Union, a problem that could be solved by the introduction of (qualified) majority voting. Moreover, in view of its current ‘inflexibility’ enlargement would only marginally decrease the Unions capacity to make decisions. Under qualified majority rule, enlargement is likely to have little or no effect on ‘flexibility’ given the distribution of preferences of the member-states. Also, if qualified majority voting is used, enlargement would decrease the power of the current member-states in a future Union, especially the larger ones. This, and the possibility for current member-states to link enlargement with specific policy demands, could be the crucial factors in the timing and shaping of the enlargement process.

Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: Institutional Reform and the Limits of Conditionality

Democracy, Freedom and Coercion comprehensively covers both private and public law, both applied and theoretical issues, and will therefore be of great interest to students studying law and economics.